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Abstract
Increasingly awareness of corporate activity in developing and less
developed economies has come under public scrutiny in terms of corporate
voluntary disclosure and firm performance. Shareholders and a range of
other stakeholders rely on the transparency afforded by corporate public
disclosures and the governance mechanisms that ensure accountability.
Therefore, studies in voluntary disclosure and firm performance that
combine elements of corporate governance and shareholder and stakeholder
perspectives provide insights for regulators, especially in developing
economies competing in a global market. Accordingly, this study examines
the determinants and effects of voluntary disclosures within Bangladesh
after a severe share market crash in 2010. Despite being one of the poorest
countries, Bangladesh has significant opportunities for companies in the
future as an emerging economy experiencing significant economic
development. Therefore, regulators are interested in how to improve
corporate governance to ensure transparency and promote investment.
To understand voluntary corporate disclosure practices, three significant
categories ‒ social, environmental and intellectual capital ‒ are used as a
proxy for CSR and transparency. To accommodate a diverse range of
stakeholders, the framework developed by An et al. (2011) is adapted for
the Bangladeshi context as it combines agency, legitimacy and signalling
theories. The investigation is conducted in two stages. First, important
indicators of corporate governance are identified from the extant literature
to determine the effects on the level of voluntary corporate disclosures.
Second, the effect of these disclosures on firm performance is determined.
The study is conducted by examining the top 200 listed firms on the Dhaka
Stock Exchange for the years 2011 to 2013. To accommodate the lag in firm
performance the data set is extended to 2014. This panel data is subjected
to statistical analysis including Ordinary Least Square and Two Stage Least
Square. Robustness tests are also applied throughout.
The findings determine that the presence of a sub-committee, audit
committee composition and foreign ownership have a significant positive
relationship with voluntary corporate disclosure; on the other hand, CEO
duality and director ownership is significantly negatively associated. In
relation to firm performance, voluntary disclosure has a significant positive
effect on return on assets, market capitalization, earnings per share and
Tobin’s Q.
While limited to the top 200 listed firms, the findings provide insights into
how corporate governance characteristics moderate and ensure transparency
by considering discretionary disclosures related to social, environmental
and intellectual capital aspects to facilitate development of future corporate
governance guidelines. It further indicates that voluntary disclosure can
improve firm performance in Bangladesh. This offers an incentive to the
firm to ensure greater transparency through voluntary disclosure.

i

This study makes a further contribution to the ongoing debate regarding a
more integrative approach by utilizing a combined theoretical framework
dedicated to a developing country context and a diverse range of
stakeholders.
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Chapter One: Introduction
1.1 Introduction
There is a growing interest in the voluntary disclosure of a firm’s activities
in its annual report. Not only has this trend emerged during the last three or so
decades amongst companies in developed countries, but it has also become a
significant agenda in developing countries. This growing interest in voluntary
disclosure may be due to the nature of the type of disclosures. Mandatory
disclosures in a firm’s annual report generally cover activities of a financial nature;
these information requirements are regulated and enforced by company law or the
relevant accounting standards adopted by the country in which the firm operates. In
contrast, voluntary disclosures provide additional information about a firm’s
activities, incorporating social, ethical and environmental aspects, as well as
potential value creation through intellectual capital; this kind of information is
aimed at supplementing mandatory disclosure. This non-financial information is
usually disclosed voluntarily (Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010) with some
exceptions.
Given that one of the primary purposes of a firm is to improve shareholders’
value, the voluntary disclosure literature focuses on why a firm should adopt nonmandatory disclosure that may incur additional cost. This study extends the prior
literature that explores the potential determinants of voluntary disclosure as well as
investigates whether voluntary disclosure is an explanatory factor for firm
performance, in particular, by focusing on a developing country context. This
context is of interest because developing regions are generally characterized by
poor social economic conditions and social inequity. Accordingly, academics,
policymakers, government and private organizations, and investors, to name a few,
from both developed and developing countries, have become increasingly
interested in exploring the determinants and effects of voluntary disclosure in
developing countries.
Voluntary disclosure is defined as any information that is additional to
mandatory disclosure. While there is a wide range of voluntary disclosure
1

categories, most voluntary disclosure relates to social, environmental and
intellectual capital aspects (Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010). Social
disclosure is the provision of financial and non-financial information that derives
from the economic activity of a firm, and is discharged mainly to communicate with
groups concerned with social activities (Aribi & Gao 2010; Gray et al. 1987;
Guthrie & Mathews 1985), for example, information regarding staff welfare
involvement or donations in social issues, policies on employee harassment and
information on product safety (Cui et al. 2018; Hackston and Milne 1996; Haniffa
and Cooke 2005; Kamal and Deegan 2013; Khan et al. 2013). Environmental
disclosure refers to the information that derives from the interaction of a firm and
the natural environment; for instance, any information regarding environmental
risks, impacts, policies, strategies, targets, costs, energy savings and liabilities
(Deegan & Gordon 1996; Sen et al. 2011; Lokuwaduge & Heenetigala 2017).
Intellectual capital is considered as the knowledge of an organization; for example,
any form of talent, skills from individuals and groups, including technological and
social networks, software, culture, and intellectual property. This resource is
considered to be a vital strategic asset with significant value creation potential
(Akpinar & Akdemir 1999; Garanina, & Dumay 2017; Mouritsen 1998). Thus, any
information from a firm that reflects these values or assets is considered as
intellectual capital disclosure. Therefore, from a firm perspective, social,
environmental and intellectual capital disclosures cover information about the
social and environmental effects of a firm’s operations and the values derived from
an intangible asset perspective and consequently are of interest to a wide range of
stakeholders, not just shareholders.
Among the many themes in the voluntary disclosure literature, one area of
consistent attention has been the attempt to identify the determinants of voluntary
disclosure by considering corporate governance characteristics as a potential
determinant for stock exchange listed companies (Ali et al. 2017; García‐Sánchez
et al. 2018; Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010; Khlif et al. 2016; Khlif &
Souissi 2010; Samaha et al. 2015). According to the Cadbury Report (1992),
corporate governance is the process of administration and control within an
organization that is directed towards ensuring the best interest of shareholders in
regard to compliance with regulation. Accordingly, corporate governance of a firm
2

plays a significant role in the decision making process of a firm. Consistent with
this definition, corporate governance characteristics play a significant role in
voluntary disclosure as there is no legal enforcement to disclose additional
information. It should also be noted that the level of voluntary disclosure varies in
annual reports from country to country (Boesso & Kumar 2007) as well as company
to company (Abeysekera 2007). Therefore, there is scope to extend the literature by
exploring voluntary disclosure from a different research context.
A stream of research is devoted to exploring the effects of voluntary
disclosure (Allouche & Laroche 2005; Griffin & Mahon 1997; Margolis & Walsh
2003; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Wang et al. 2016), mostly seeking to understand how
firms have traditionally focused on strategies to develop business operations and
ultimately enhance profitability or improve financial performance. These effects are
documented but are contrasted with the additional managerial emphasis and
accompanying costs required to produce this information and pursue such strategic
goals. Examination of the aggregate effects of voluntary disclosure therefore
becomes a thought-provoking research agenda; and the relationship between
voluntary disclosure and firm performance has been much debated in the literature
(Griffin & Mahon 1997; Wang et al. 2016). This research can provide greater
insight when considering how the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm
performance vary from country to country. Similarly, the approach or method of
the research used influences the results of previous studies. So while there is an
established voluntary disclosure literature, there is still ample scope to investigate
the relationship between voluntary disclosure and firm performance by considering
different research settings.
Much of the research into voluntary disclosure to date has taken place within
developed country contexts (Ahmed & Courtis 1999; Cooke 1989; Hackston &
Milne 1996; Hossain et al. 1995; Stanwick & Stanwick 1998). There may be less
motivation to examine voluntary disclosure within developing countries due to
weak social and economic conditions. Firms in underdeveloped regions have
maintained a focus on monetary rather than social agendas and therefore do not
emphasize voluntary disclosure, but this may be to the detriment of firm
performance in the long term. Prior studies have suggested that voluntary disclosure
3

not only serves as a potential tool of social legitimacy but can also enhance firm
performance (Wang et al. 2016) and the current study seeks to extend this research
agenda.
While there is limited research focusing on voluntary disclosure in
developing countries, this particular field of research is increasing (Ali et al. 2017;
Abeysekera 2008; Ahmed Haji & Mubaraq 2012; Andrew et al. 1989; Sobhani et
al. 2009). The bulk of this research has occurred since 2000 (Abdolmohammadi
2005; Abeysekera & Guthrie 2005; Eng & Mak 2003; Haniffa & Cooke 2005;
Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Ho & Wong 2001; Jusoh et al. 2017) and there are still
many avenues to investigate. In particular, Bangladesh has received limited
attention and insights into voluntary disclosure in Bangladesh will contribute to the
wider literature on voluntary disclosure.
Bangladesh is a developing country situated in the region of South Asia and
became an independent country in 1971. Bangladesh is a unitary and sovereign
republic known as the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. The area known as
Bangladesh was colonized by the British in 1757. British rule led to some practices
that continue to prevail in the corporate culture of Bangladesh. Bangladesh was
established on the four pillars of nationalism, secularism, democracy and socialism,
although Bangladesh was under military rule for 15 years (1976‒1991) and
democracy was restored in 1991 (Kabeer et al. 2012; White 1992). Within
Bangladesh, the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party are major
political parties. From a religious perspective, the dominant religion is Islam (85%
of total population) while other religions like Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity
are also present in Bangladesh. Despite being the third largest Muslim country in
the world, sharia law is not the source of public law in Bangladesh and a democratic
government is in place (Hasan 2011). Hence, although there are followers or
various religions, a considerable degree of religious harmony prevails.
It should be noted that over the last few decades, the economy of
Bangladesh has made commendable progress, with consistent growth in GDP.1

1

Chapter Four presents detailed discussion on the Bangladesh economy
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Similar to other developing countries, foreign investment plays a vital role
in the Bangladesh economy. In particular, pressure from external authorities like
international regulators and foreign investors play a key role for corporate
accountability and reporting multinational firms (Belal & Owen 2007; Imam &
Malik 2007; Islam & Deegan 2008; Muttakin & Khan 2014). Due to a relatively
stable economy 2 and substantial progress in poverty reduction, 3 Bangladesh is
considered a model for developing countries.4 However, Bangladesh is subject to
criticism due to widespread povery, inefficient government (UK Border Agency
2012; Begum et al. 2012), poor socio-cultural indicators, corruption at varying
levels (Azmat & Samaratunge 2009; Islam & Deegan 2008), and weak enforcement
of the law. The Bangladeshi government is seeking to resolve these challenges by
considering several initiatives from a social perspective 5 as well as a regulatory
context.6
Therefore, this study will apply two significant streams of investigation into
voluntary disclosure in a developing country context by studying the determinants
and effects of voluntary disclosures with a focus on corporate governance
characteristics and firm performance in Bangladesh. A foundation for this study is
developed in the remaining sections of this chapter. It is structured as follows.
Section 1.2 discusses the motivation for this study. Section 1.3 presents the
research questions for this study. Section 1.4 elaborates on the contribution made
by this study. Section 1.5 presents the framework of this thesis by giving a brief
outline of each chapter. Finally, Section 1.6 provides a summary and conclusion of
this chapter.

1.2. Motivations for the Study
In the last few decades, financial crises and corporate collapses have been
witnessed within developed (e.g., Enron) and developing (e.g., Asian financial

2

http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2017/05/14/bangladesh-development-updatebreaking-barriers visited 26/03/2018 6..38 pm
3
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bangladesh/overview visited 26/03/2018 6..37 pm
4
https://asiafoundation.org/2014/06/25/bangladeshs-development-surprise-a-model-fordeveloping-countries/ visited 26/03/2018 6..31 pm
5
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bangladesh/overview visited 26/03/2018 10.08 am
6
http://www.secbd.org/ visited 26/03/2018 9.50 am
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crisis) regions of the world. The reasons for these crises are often attributed to poor
corporate governance, transparency and disclosure practices (Arnold & De Lange
2004; Gul & Leung 2004; Haniffa & Hudaib 2006; Ntim et al. 2012). Voluntary
disclosure is considered as a means of contributing to the transparency of a firm.
Given the importance of corporate reform in light of the financial crises and
corporate collapses referred to above, corporate governance and voluntary
disclosure have attracted much attention from policymakers and academics
(Aguilera & Cuervo‐Cazurra 2009; Brown et al. 2011; Brown et al. 2006; Samaha
et al. 2015).
In response to a recent share market collapse, Bangladesh reformed its
corporate governance guidelines and also reformed the Bangladesh Securities and
Exchange Commission (BSEC) to boost the confidence of investors.7 This suggests
corporate governance might be a significant explanatory factor to address problems
of transparency and establish best practices relating to voluntary disclosure. While
engaging in these agendas, the issue of maintaining firm performance is also an
imperative that is balanced or harmonized with practices of voluntary disclosure.
While the management and production of voluntary disclosure may incur additional
costs, a lack of information may warrant negative responses from investors that can
hinder a company’s ability to thrive. Investigation of these contrasting elements,
therefore, is of interest to academics, policymakers, public and private sector
organizations, and stakeholders. This study investigates the determinants and
effects of voluntary disclosure with a focus on corporate governance characteristics
and firm performance within the context of Bangladesh. This area of research has
been selected for the following reasons.
First, studies in the prior literature consider particular categories of
voluntary disclosure independently and apply empirical analyses to social (Choi et
al. 2010; Haji 2013; Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Islam & Deegan 2008; Mishra & Suar
2010; Muttakin & Khan 2014), environmental (Halme & Huse 1997; Montabon et
al. 2007; Rao et al. 2012), or intellectual capital disclosures (Abdolmohammadi
2005; Abeysekera 2007; Hidalgo et al. 2011; Li et al. 2008). Others combine one
7
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or two categories only (Hackston & Milne 1996; Hossain et al. 2006; Khlif et al.
2015; Qiu et al. 2016), while some do not differentiate between categories (Chau &
Gray 2002; Eng & Mak 2003). Limiting the focus to a particular category inhibits
an understanding of the bigger picture. Similarly, it is argued that categorizing
voluntary disclosure allows various stakeholders, who may have a stake in the study
or firm, to select their own relevant types of information while ignoring others
(Meek et al. 1995). This focus is worthwhile in given contexts but may not service
a broader range of users and may not provide accurate guidance when it comes to
policy development or implementation. There are limited studies that focus on
combined social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures within a single
study and, in particular, no such study examines the Bangladeshi context for
combined disclosure.
Second, exploration of the determinants of voluntary disclosure is an
interesting field as these practices are not enforced vigorously by policymakers and
accounting standard-setters. By considering the monitoring and controlling role of
corporate governance, a significant number of prior studies stress corporate
governance characteristics as a potential determinant of voluntary disclosure. It
should also be noted that the results of the relationship between corporate
governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure are not yet conclusive (GarciaMeca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010; Samaha et al. 2015). Furthermore, research from
a corporate governance perspective is subject to limitations due to an endogeneity
problem and this issue is not addressed widely (Larcker et al. 2007; Larcker &
Rusticus 2007, 2010). In addition, although, there are a large number of prior
studies that focus on corporate governance as a determinant of voluntary disclosure,
a change in the context of the study (i.e., data selection, country and methodology)
provides an opportunity to create a richer base of evidence (Brown et al. 2011).
Third, as mentioned previously, examining the effects of voluntary
disclosure on firm performance is considered to be a significant agenda. Within
business, firms must always focus on output, profitability and innovation while not
breaking their social licence to operate. From a purely economic perspective, the
foremost purpose of a firm is to be profitable. The absence or neglect of voluntary
disclosure may convey a negative message that the firm is not interested in social
7

or environmental imperatives. In contrast, managing voluntary disclosure is subject
to additional costs and too much disclosure can reveal confidential information
about a firm’s operations that may influence its ability to thrive in a competitive
market. A large number of prior studies has stressed the effects of voluntary
disclosure on firm performance and the results are not yet considered to be
conclusive (Orlitzky et al. 2003; Qiu et al. 2016; Ribeiro Soriano et al. 2012), due
to various factors, including the perceived limitations of statistical analyses to
examine the relationship between disclosure and firm performance (Al-Tuwaijri et
al. 2004; Garcia-Castro et al. 2010) and the challenges associated with the selection
of appropriate indicators of firm performance (Griffin & Mahon 1997; Lu et al.
2014; Orlitzky et al. 2003). Categories of firm performance measurements (i.e.,
accounting-based, market-based and mixed) are also subject to limitations (Richard
et al. 2009) as every indicator has distinct features. Results from one indicator might
therefore be conflated with other indicators. Therefore, a further study that
addresses these limitations using different contexts may provide significant insight
and make a unique contribution to the literature.
Fourth, it may be assumed that within developing country contexts,
disclosures in annual reports may be less significant as poverty, corruption, social
inequalities and mismanagement, small capital market and weak regulations
represent significant obstacles. This perception is reinforced by the observation that
developed countries have received much more attention in the literature than
developing countries. However, in recent times, an increasing trend towards
voluntary disclosure has been observed (Haji 2013; Sobhani et al. 2009). Studies
focusing on developing countries have the potential to provide significant
contributions for policymakers (Abeysekera & Guthrie 2005; Eng & Mak 2003;
Haniffa & Cooke 2002) as Western concepts of accounting are not appropriate for
less developed regions (Disu & Gray 1998). Further, most prior studies in
developing countries are limited to a few countries, including China (Huafang &
Jianguo 2007; Zeng et al. 2012), Malaysia (Haji 2013; Haniffa & Cooke 2005;
Haniffa & Cooke 2002) and Singapore (Cheng et al. 2014; Cheng & Courtenay
2006; Eng & Mak 2003).
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Finally, among developing countries, voluntary disclosure in the
Bangladeshi context is of greater significance than that of other developing
countries, in particular, the three categories of voluntary disclosure mentioned
earlier – social, environmental and intellectual capital. This is because the
Bangladeshi economy has experienced significant growth of nearly 6% per year in
the past decade. A recent report from the World Bank8 and PWC9 also forecasts
that Bangladesh will be one of the emerging economies within a few decades.
Accordingly, the Bangladeshi government is keen to improve social conditions at
both micro and macro levels.10 As a result, firms from Bangladesh may consider
social disclosure as a means to legitimize firm activities, especially as it attempts to
meet the needs of a range of global stakeholders. Bangladesh also has unique
environmental characteristics that influence its environmental disclosures as it is
subject to many natural disasters (Belal et al. 2010), such as rising sea levels and
frequent major cyclones. Furthermore, policymakers in Bangladesh have been
active in initiating several activities to encourage and enforce transparency among
firms to protect shareholders’ interests. For example, in 2006 BSEC introduced a
new corporate governance rule enforcing mandatory corporate governance
disclosure by the year 2012 to improve overall disclosure and protect shareholders’
interests.
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Therefore, voluntary disclosure carries more significance in

Bangladesh. However, despite this there is a dearth of studies that emphasize the
effects of voluntary disclosure. In addition, limited studies examine the
determinants of voluntary disclosure with a focus on a particular category (social,
environmental and intellectual capital disclosure). It should be noted that most of
these are limited to data before 2010 12 while very little is known after 2010.
Moreover, most studies from Bangladesh cover a small sample limited to one
sector. Thus, there is ample opportunity to contribute to the literature in the
Bangladeshi context by considering data after 2010 and multiple years and sectors,
as well as applying a rigorous statistical approach.
8
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Based on the above, it is concluded that the examination of voluntary
disclosure is important in developing country contexts, compared to developed
countries where such practices are well established. What little is known about
voluntary disclosure in developing contexts is compounded by the scarcity of
studies. Therefore, there is an opportunity to contribute to the literature by
addressing those issues and Bangladesh is a prime investigatory context.

1.3 Research Questions
The central research question of this study is: ‘What are the determinants
and effects of voluntary disclosure of firms in the Bangladeshi context?’
To address this, two sub-questions are addressed in this thesis. See Figure
1-1 for a graphical representation of the basic research framework of this study.
Corporate
Governance
Characterstics

Voluntary Dislcosure
Social
Environmental
Intellectual Capital

Firm
Performance

Figure 1-1 Research framework for this study

The two research questions addressed in this thesis are as follows:
1. To what extent do corporate governance characteristics affect voluntary
disclosure of social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures
in Bangladesh listed firms?
2. To what extent does voluntary disclosure affect firm performance in
Bangladeshi listed firms?

1.4 Contributions of this Study
The current study seeks to understand the determinants and effects of
voluntary disclosure by synthesizing the concepts of corporate governance,
voluntary disclosure and firm performance located in the literature. It is expected
that this study contributes to the literature in several ways.
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First, it determines the explanatory factors of voluntary disclosure whilst
simultaneously showing the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance in
Bangladeshi listed companies. Regarding the determinants and effects of voluntary
disclosure, most prior studies limit the focus either to determinants (Garcia-Meca
& Sánchez-Ballesta 2010; Samaha et al. 2015) or effects (Molina-Azorín et al.
2009; Orlitzky et al. 2003) of voluntary disclosure. In particular, this study
integrates three perspectives: (1) corporate governance; (2) voluntary disclosure;
and (3) financial performance using quantitative methods. This study offers a more
complete picture as it is presumed that during the decision-making process
pertaining to voluntary disclosure, firms also assess the potential effect on
performance. This warrants attention, particularly as Bangladesh seeks to move
toward a more flexible and active economy. Thus, this study extends the literature
by considering all three aspects – social, environmental and intellectual capital
disclosures. In addition, this study considers data following the share market crash
in Bangladesh. The findings of this study may have practical implications for
regulatory authorities and policymakers, such as the Bangladesh Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Stock Exchanges, the Institute of Cost and Management
Accountants of Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute and the Bangladesh
Bank.
Second, the study contributes to the literature by adopting a combined
theoretical framework to interpret the empirical findings and to understand the
underpinnings of corporate governance, voluntary disclosure and firm performance
in depth in a developing country context. In so doing, this study reviews existing
theoretical frameworks and finds that a combination of several theories may be
effective for guiding voluntary disclosure studies. Although, An et al. (2011) is
considered as a pioneering study in considering interrelated concepts by developing
a combined theoretical model, this study develops a modified theoretical framework
by considering agency, legitimacy and signalling theory in a developing country
context. This is the first attempt to adopt a combined theoretical framework for
various voluntary disclosures including social, environmental and intellectual
capital disclosure to explore the determinants and effects of voluntary disclosure in
a developing country context.
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Third, this study extends the voluntary disclosure literature by categorizing
social and environmental disclosure from three different perspectives: long-term,
short-term, and general disclosure. Prior studies have mainly concentrated on an
assessment of disclosures by considering operational constructs (Belal et al. 2010;
Hackston & Milne 1996; Kamal & Deegan 2013; Khan et al. 2013). Since voluntary
disclosure is also considered as a strategic tool for the firm because it has the
potential to develop competitive advantage (Mishra & Suar 2010), consideration of
a strategic management view for the long or short term (Banks & Wheelwright
1979) is a useful insight (Carroll 1991). Therefore, this study extends the literature
by aligning strategic management concepts to the current literature on voluntary
disclosure.
Fourth, this study investigates the relationship between corporate
governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure; and, by combining social,
environmental and intellectual capital disclosures it extends the extant literature. It
also extends the understanding of this relationship by considering other
characteristics of corporate governance13 that have not been considered within the
Bangladeshi context. In addition, for corporate governance-related studies,
endogeneity is considered to be a major pitfall (Larcker et al. 2007; Larcker &
Rusticus 2007), however this study’s approach eliminates this problem.
Furthermore, the period of data used for this study incorporates data from after
Bangladesh’s share market crash, which is an under-utilized data set.
Finally, this study investigates the effects of voluntary disclosure from
Bangladesh – an under-researched context. Three categories of firm performance
indicators – accounting, market-based and mixed – are used, in contrast to most
other studies that consider only one or two (Brine et al. 2007; Hossain et al. 2015;
Lima Crisóstomo et al. 2011).This study proceeds with five indicators of firm
performance – Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Sales (ROS), Market
Capitalization (MCAP), Earnings per Share (EPS) and Tobin’s Q. This selection
covers all three categories of performance indicators and reports a consistent result.

13

This study considers sub-committee and audit committee independence while these have not
previously been examined within a Bangladeshi context. In addition, consideration of institutional
ownership is also very limited within Bangladesh.
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Thus, this study makes an important contribution to the literature based on its
methodological approach, conceptual base and statistical techniques employed.

1.5 Organizations of the Thesis
Figure 1-2 illustrates the structure of the thesis. Chapter Two reviews the
literature on voluntary disclosure, corporate governance characteristics and
financial performance. It reviews voluntary disclosure studies within the context of
developed, developing and Bangladeshi contexts before discussing the literature on
the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and voluntary
disclosure from developed, developing and Bangladeshi perspectives. After
reviewing the literature, the significance of the characteristics of corporate
governance are isolated and selected for this study. Finally, the literature on the
effects of voluntary disclosures on firm performance is reviewed from developed,
developing and Bangladeshi contexts. Some significant indicators of firm
performance are isolated, deemed important, justified and nominated for this study.
Chapter Three discusses the theoretical underpinnings related to the
research questions of this study. Prior studies that involve single and combined
theories are reviewed. An et al.’s (2011) theoretical framework, which combines
agency, legitimacy, stakeholder and signalling theories, is considered the most
appropriate model. This theoretical framework is modified by deleting stakeholder
theory to fit the context of this study.
Chapter Four describes the background of Bangladesh from historical,
economic, legal and regulatory perspectives. In addition, corporate voluntary
disclosure, capital market and corporate governance settings in Bangladesh are
described in the chapter. Then, relevant hypotheses are developed to examine the
determinants and effects of voluntary disclosure.
Chapter Five elaborates on the data and methodology for this study. The
data set considers top 200 listed firms on the Dhaka Stock Exchange. Based on data
availability the final sample includes 134 annual reports of listed companies
between the years 2011 and 2014. Voluntary disclosure and corporate governance
characteristics data are based on the years 2011 to 2013 while firm performance
covers the years 2012 to 2014. A detailed description of the measurement process
13

of the entire independent, dependent and control variables follows. Two research
models are developed. The first model emphasizes the determinants of voluntary
disclosure while the other focuses on the effects of voluntary disclosure.14 These
models are addressed sequentially in Chapter Five. In addition, various statistical
tests, including assumptions of normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity,
endogeneity and descriptive tests are outlined and applied before proceeding with
the analysis. Pooled ordinary least squares and two stage least squares regressions
are then discussed and applied. The chapter concludes with a discussion of
robustness tests to ensure the rigour of the findings.
Chapter Six presents the results of the analysis of the relationship between
corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure. Initially, it presents
the results of descriptive statistics, normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity
and endogeneity tests for the research model. It finds that CEO Duality and Director
Ownership are negatively associated with voluntary disclosure while Foreign
Ownership, Sub-committee, and Audit Committee Composition are positively
associated. However, no significant relationship is found for Board Size, Board
Composition or Institutional Ownership.
Chapter Seven demonstrates the results of the effects of voluntary
disclosure on firm performance. Consistent with the previous chapter, the results of
descriptive

statistics,

assumptions

of

normality,

multicollinearity,

heteroscedasticity and endogeneity tests for the research model are scrutinized. It
is found that voluntary disclosures of a firm have a positive effect on financial
performance by considering ROA, MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q as relevant
indicators. However, no significant effects are found regarding ROS.
Chapter Eight provides a summary of the main results and discussions on
the findings of the research in relation to the research questions. The section
presents a discussion of the findings of this chapter and draws a comparison with
the prior literature. It highlights the contribution of this study in the context of
Bangladesh and the overall contribution to the literature. Finally, the conclusion
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Research model 1: Relationship between corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure by
considering corporate governance characteristics as an independent variable.
Research model 2: The effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance by considering voluntary
disclosures as an independent variable.
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and recommendations from the empirical analysis, along with the limitations of the
study, are outlined. Directions for future research are also extrapolated based on
these findings.

Thesis Structure
Chapter One
Introduction

Chapter Two
Literature Review

Chapter Three
Theoretical Framework

Chapter Four
Research Context & Hypotheses Development

Chapter Five
Research Methodology

Chapter Six
Results: The Relationship between Corporate
Governance Characteristics and Voluntary Disclosure

Chapter Seven
Results: The Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Firm
Performance

Chapter Eight
Summary and Conclusion
Figure 1-2 Thesis structure

1.6 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter presented an introduction to the topic of investigation focusing
on the determinants and effects of voluntary disclosure and their relationship with
corporate governance characteristics and financial performance in the context of
Bangladesh. The motivations, research questions and contributions of the study
were discussed. Finally, an overview of the remaining chapters was also presented.
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There are several factors that motivate this study. First, there is a dearth of
studies that combine significant categories of voluntary disclosures (social,
environmental and intellectual capital) compared to studies that examine these
categories independently. A study that combines these three categories will
contribute to a more thorough understanding of corporate voluntary disclosure.
Second, literature regarding the relationship between voluntary disclosures
is contradictory at present. A further study that utilizes a more in-depth data set,
addresses methodological limitations and considers an important context where
there is currently a scarcity of research will extend the current literature.
Third, research into the effects of voluntary disclosures on firm performance
has also yielded contradictory results. As above, a study that considers a wide range
of firm performance indicators, addresses methodological limitations and considers
an under-researched context will extend the current literature.
Fourth, voluntary disclosure studies have mostly focused on developed
countries. However, an increasing focus on voluntary disclosure in developing
countries is also required. It has been noted that, given the poor socio-economic
context existing in certain developing nations, firms tend to ignore voluntary
disclosure-related agendas but there may be an opportunity to put the concept into
practice and leverage this opportunity to benefit both organizations and the society
in which they operate.
Finally, among various developing countries, Bangladesh carries extra
significance for social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures due to
recent economic developments and share market crashes. There are limited studies
in this area and most prior studies apply limited samples and methodological rigour.
A data set retrieved after the share market crash that covers a wide range of sectors
will contribute valuable findings and extend the literature.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this study is to investigate the determinants and effects of
voluntary disclosure with a focus on corporate governance characteristics and firm
performance in a developing country context. Disclosures of a firm are mainly
categorized as mandatory and voluntary. In the context of mandatory disclosure, a
firm must comply with the rules and regulations imposed by a range of authorities,
including accounting standard-setters. In contrast, voluntary disclosures are at the
discretion of firms as there is minimal regulation to guide voluntary disclosures.
There is a lack of specific national guidelines for voluntary disclosure, therefore,
firms’ annual reports should be considered from multiple perspectives to ascertain
what voluntary disclosures are made and how and why firms make these
disclosures.
From the firm’s perspective, voluntary disclosure complements mandatory
disclosure (Graham et al. 2005). Voluntary disclosure is considered as an effective
way to communicate with stakeholders and also an opportunity to create a good
impression by disclosing positive social, environmental and intellectual capital
information. In so doing, every firm needs to consider the potential impacts of any
negative impression created by the absence of disclosures, which could be
interpreted as hiding or ignoring information. However, too much disclosure can
reveal information about a firm’s operations that may influence its ability to thrive
in a competitive advantage or bargaining power in various contexts (Admati and
Pfleiderer 2000). Given these conditions, it can become difficult to determine a
firm’s intentions about voluntary disclosures.
Before conducting any investigation, it is essential to carry out a review of
the relevant literature to extend the understanding of the relevant research agenda.
Bruce (2001, p. 1) states that:
Completing a literature review is usually a significant intellectual
achievement in its own right, requiring the analysis and synthesis of
previous work in such a manner that new understandings of that work are
uncovered and the way is opened for new scholarship or research.
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As has been stated in Chapter One, this study will primarily investigate two research
questions. The first question addresses the determinants of voluntary disclosure by
considering corporate governance characteristics as a potential influential factor.
The second question prompts an examination of the effects of voluntary disclosure
on firm performance. Accordingly, the literature review is conducted in three
stages. First, prior studies pertaining to voluntary disclosure are reviewed. Prior
voluntary disclosure studies will be further categorized into developed, developing
and Bangladeshi contexts. Second, literature on the relationship between corporate
governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure is reviewed and divided into
meta-analysis studies, studies from developed/developing countries and studies in
the Bangladeshi context. Finally, the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm
performance are reviewed by categorizing into meta-analysis studies, studies from
developed/ developing countries and studies in the Bangladeshi context.
The chapter is organized in the following manner. Section 2.2 reviews the
literature on voluntary disclosure studies. Section 2.3 reviews prior studies
regarding the relationship between corporate governance characteristics
(determinant) and voluntary disclosure across three areas as described above and
summarizes the corporate governance characteristics chosen for this thesis. This is
followed by Section 2.4, which reviews studies regarding the effects of voluntary
disclosure on firm performance and summarizes the firm performance indicators
considered for this thesis. Finally, the chapter summary and conclusion is presented
in Section 2.5.

2.2 Voluntary Disclosure Studies
Wallace and Naser (1995) assert that unregulated disclosures of financial
and non-financial information to stakeholders are to be considered voluntary. In
addition, voluntary disclosure is also considered an effective means of
communication with various stakeholders. Therefore, providing extra information
to these stakeholders that is not required by regulation is also considered to be
voluntary disclosure.
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Investigations of voluntary disclosure in the context of accounting research
are not new, with the first such study of developed countries undertaken by Cerf
(1961). However, within developing countries, attention was not given to voluntary
disclosure until the mid-1980s (Andrew et al. 1989; Teoh & Thong 1984). Since
then, a dramatic upsurge in voluntary disclosure studies has been witnessed in
developed as well as developing countries. It is claimed that a lack of adequate
disclosures was one of the significant reasons for the Asian financial crisis (Gul &
Leung 2004) and corporate collapses, such as Enron (Arnold & De Lange 2004).
Therefore, an increasing trend of investigating voluntary disclosures is observed.
In the following, studies on voluntary disclosure are reviewed in three sub-sections:
studies within developed countries in Sub-section 2.2.1, other developing countries
in Sub-section 2.2.2 and within the Bangladeshi context in Sub-section 2.2.3.
2.2.1 Voluntary Disclosure Studies within Developed Countries

A significant number of prior studies has been conducted to examine
voluntary disclosure within various developed country contexts. Developed
countries have played a leading role in this type of research with a wide
consideration of social, environmental and intellectual capital considered as
significant voluntary disclosure.
In relation to disclosure practices, Gray et al. (1995) report a substantial
change in the pattern of social and environmental disclosures for UK firms during
the period 1979 to 1991. Campbell (2000) provides further evidence of the growing
trend of social disclosures after analysing data contained within the annual reports
of the UK firm Marks and Spencer for the period 1969 to 1997. This study
concludes that a substantial increase in social disclosures had occurred. Hartman et
al. (2007) compare 16 multinational firms in the United States (US) and the
European Union (EU) in regards to social reporting by focusing on language,
citizenship, corporate accountability, and moral commitments like ethical context.
They reported that, within US firms, the focus of voluntary disclosure was limited
to economic terms. On the other hand, firms from the EU placed an emphasis on
both economic and sustainability issues.

19

For environmental disclosure practices, Deegan and Gordon (1996)
contribute to a more detailed understanding of voluntary disclosure by considering
firms in Australia. This study reveals three significant issues. First, firms are
inclined to promote positive aspects of their environmental performance while
negative disclosures are ignored. Second, an increasing trend of environmental
disclosures has been reported from 1980 to 1991. Finally, the extent of
environmental disclosure is positively associated with environmental lobby groups'
concerns regarding the environmental performance of firms within particular
industries. Studying Spanish firms, Larrinaga et al. (2002) assert that environmental
disclosure is very low. By comparing political motives with disclosures in financial
reporting, they also observe regulation may not motivate the development of
environmental responsibility. This has theoretical implications for this thesis, which
is based on the assumption that firms have a tendency to overlook formal
accountabilities that do not contribute to a firm’s social legitimacy. Campbell
(2004) considers environmental disclosures based on ten UK firms across five
sectors between the years 1974 and 2000, finding further evidence for the increasing
trend of voluntary environmental disclosures following rapid growth in the late
1980s and continuing into the 1990s.
For intellectual capital practices, Guthrie and Petty (2000) assert that from
an Australian perspective the main components were not well understood and
managed in an efficient manner, as well as not reported within a consistent
framework. This study also reports that the main focus for disclosures is allocated
to human capital-related issues while other matters are given less attention. In
contrast, Sujan and Abeysekera (2007) report an increase in intellectual capital
disclosures in Australia. Their conclusions are based on comparison of data from
2004 with the data used by Guthrie and Petty (2000). Abeysekera (2007) conducts
a comparison between intellectual capital disclosures from a developing country
(Sri Lanka) and a developed country (Australia) using data from the period 1998–
1999 to 1999–2000. It should be noted that, regarding Australian disclosure data,
this study relies on the data set from Guthrie and Petty (2000). The results of the
Abeysekera (2007) study suggest that the internal capital disclosure level is higher
in Australia compared to Sri Lanka, except for human capital in which the opposite
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is the case. It is argued that differences in economic, social, and political factors
might cause such differences in disclosure levels.
From the above discussion it can be extrapolated that voluntary disclosure
(social, environmental and intellectual capital) research within developed countries
has received significant and ongoing attention (Al-Shaer et al. 2017; Appuhami &
Tashakor 2017; Pisano et al. 2017).
2.2.2 Voluntary Disclosure Studies within Developing Countries

At the earlier stage of voluntary disclosure research, developing country
contexts were less explored (Teoh & Thong 1984). However, the limited results
from these studies have contributed to a richer understanding of the research topic.
It should also be noted that most of the prior studies from developing countries are
limited to Malaysia, China and Singapore.
In relation to social disclosure practice, Andrew et al. (1989) examine 119
listed firms in Malaysia and Singapore in 1983 and reveal that the focus of social
disclosures is limited to larger firms only. In contrast, considering data from more
recent years, Tsang (1998) suggests that a growing trend of social disclosure has
been observed from the years 1986 to 1995 within the banking, hotel, and food and
beverages sectors of Singaporean firms. Similarly, Haji (2013) reports an increase
in the extent and quality of social disclosure after examining 85 Malaysian firms
between the years 2006 to 2009. Based on a sample of firms from China, Noronha
et al. (2013) report that the practice of social disclosure is still in its infancy and
lags behind Western countries.
Regarding environmental disclosures, Nik Ahmad and Sulaiman (2004)
report that there is very limited environmental disclosure for Malaysian firms.
Considering a later longitudinal study, Alrazi et al. (2009) assert that there is an
increasing trend of environmental disclosures in Malaysia.
Within the context of intellectual capital disclosures, a significant number
of studies from various countries also report an increasing trend. Ahmed Haji and
Mubaraq (2012) assert that intellectual capital disclosures for Nigerian firms in the
banking sector have increased over time. This study reveals that, in terms of
intellectual capital, a major proportion of voluntary disclosure is dominated by
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human and internal capital. In the Malaysian context, Haji and Ghazali (2013)
indicate that external capital-related information dominates firms’ voluntary
disclosure practices. Abeysekera and Guthrie (2005) also conclude that there is an
increasing trend for intellectual capital disclosures for Sri Lankan firms. This study
considers 30 top listed firms from 1998–1999 to 1999–2000.
Overall, consistent with developed countries, an increasing trend towards
voluntary disclosure is observed, and the level of voluntary disclosure is increasing.
Bangladesh represents one such developing nation with a patchy history of
voluntary disclosure, and this is explored in the following section.
2.2.3 Voluntary Disclosure Studies within Bangladesh

Voluntary disclosure within the context of Bangladesh began in the late
1990s (Belal 1997; Belal 1999; Ahmed 1996). Ahmed’s (1996) research plays a
pioneering role in disclosure research within Bangladesh by examining the extent
of disclosure and the relationship with firm characterstics. After comparing the
dislcosure level for 1987‒1988 and 1992‒1993 for 118 non-financial public listed
firms, Ahmed reports that there is a very low level of voluntary disclosure. In
addition, it was found that the extent of disclosure had improved when comparing
the years. Furthermore, multinational firms and firms audited by large auit firms
dislcose more when compared to other firms. However, no significant relationship
was found for company size and total amount of debt. Since then, various studies
have contributed to the literature regarding voluntary disclosure with major
attention being placed on social disclosure.
In the last century, very limited social disclosure for Bangladeshi firms
occurred and was mainly based on employees and related to ethics (Belal 1999).
Imam (2000) investigates 40 firms for the years 1996–1997, finding that social
disclosure was limited and insufficient for discharging social responsibilities. He
further adds that only firms with superior performance express a clear intention to
disclose social issues. Belal (2001) examines social disclosures and supports the
previous findings, showing that limited social disclosure takes place in practice.
Similarly, Kamal and Deegan (2013) report disclosures by firms in the garment
industry falling well short of international expectations. Similarly, Khan et al.
(2009) investigate the banking sector in Bangladesh and find only perfunctory
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social disclosure by firms. Azim et al. (2009) also support these findings by
demonstrating that the banking sector discloses more social issues compared to
other industries. Similarly, Al Mamun and Kamardin (2014) report that there is an
increasing trend for corporate voluntary disclosures within the banking sector in
Bangladesh.
In the context of environmental disclosures in Bangladesh, Belal (2000)
reports limited disclosure in his examination of 30 firms in 1996. Similarly, Bala
and Yusuf (2003) suggest that very few firms disclose environmental information
in Bangladesh. In addition, they reveal a lack of regulation is the key reason for the
scarcity of environmental disclosure, although the specific reasons are not
discussed. Consistent with these findings Bose’s (2006) study of Petrobangla (a
firm from the fossil fuel sector in Bangladesh) also reports a limited focus on
environmental initiatives. Similarly, Belal et al. (2010) reveal limited
environmental and climate change disclosures in their investigation of the 100
largest firms for the year 2008. Therefore, overall there is a lower level of
environmental disclosure within firms in Bangladesh, although Sobhani et al.
(2009) argue that the situation had been improving.
In regards to intellectual capital disclosures in Bangladesh, there seems to be limited
disclosure. However, a few studies have attempted to investigate this phenomenon.
Ali et al. (2008) examine 22 listed non-financial firms and report that minimal
qualitative disclosures are evident. Similarly, Khan and Khan (2010) report an
insufficient level of human capital disclosures after examining 32 manufacturing
firms in Bangladesh. In addition, they find within human capital, employee related
information, such as numbers of employees, training, recruitment policies and
career related information, like career development, receives more attention than
other categories. In addtion, it is also observed that the extent of reporting has also
increased due to intervention from regulators. Abhayawansa and Azim (2014) find
that intellectual capital reporting is not consistent among the 16 pharmaceutical
firms in their sample in Bangladesh. Therefore, Bangladeshi firms lag in regards to
managing intellectual capital, although Rashid (2013) concludes from a study of
136 non-financial firms there appears to be an increasing trend of intellectual capital
disclosures.
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The above discussion indicates that voluntary disclosures, including social,
environmental and intellectual capital disclosures, are not well documented or
researched in the Bangladeshi context as most of the studies are limited to a small
sample size and do not consider all industry sectors. Prior studies have indicated a
limited but increasing trend of voluntary disclosures, suggesting they are becoming
more significant.

2.3 Corporate Governance Characteristics (Determinants) and
Voluntary Disclosure Studies
Voluntary disclosure is not enforceable and therefore relies solely on the
willingness of management and is influenced by the desire, motive and perception
of persons within the organization who are involved with control, monitoring and
decision making (Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010; Samaha et al. 2015).
These factors are moderated by the corporate governance characteristics of the firm
(Dalton et al. 1998; Dalton et al. 1999; Fama & Jensen 1983). Accordingly, it could
also be argued that corporate governance characteristics play a significant role in
decisions pertaining to voluntary disclosure. Consistent with this argument, a
substantial number of studies documents that corporate governance characteristics
act as an explanatory factor for voluntary disclosure (Garcia-Meca & SánchezBallesta 2010; Khlif et al. 2016; Khlif & Souissi 2010; Samaha et al. 2015).
The Cadbury Report (1992) defines corporate governance as the system by
which companies are directed and controlled. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) extend
this definition and state that corporate governance is an institutional arrangement
by the finance providers of the firm (shareholders) to secure a proper return on
investment. There is no single comprehensive definition of corporate governance,
but these definitions, as with other definitions, emphasize that a firm is directed and
controlled by corporate governance. Brown et al. (2011, p. 98) elaborate the concept
of corporate governance:
Corporate governance is about the governance of corporations, which may
not be a particularly revealing statement from a definitional point of view
but it does remind us that [corporate governance] is to do with corporations
and it is also to do with determining the activities in which they are properly
engaged.
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Therefore, corporate governance can be succinctly defined as the process of
administration, monitoring and control within a firm to assist in the ongoing goal
of efficiency and accountability. Furthermore, the above definition suggests that
corporate governance characteristics can reinforce monitoring and controlling
activities and lead to a reduction in information asymmetry (Fama & Jensen 1983).
In addition, Ho and Wong (2001) argue that if a firm has an intensive monitoring
environment it is difficult for managers to withhold information or disclose false
information. Further, it could also be argued that the characteristics of corporate
governance can affect accountability of a firm (Cong & Freedman 2011) due to its
monitoring and control mechanisms. Therefore, management or boards may
discharge (ignore) accountability by providing (avoiding) additional information
such as voluntary disclosure.
Consistent with the above arguments, a large number of prior studies has
documented that corporate governance characteristics act as an explanatory
mechanism for voluntary disclosures of a firm and the trend continues (GarciaMeca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010; Khlif et al. 2016; Khlif & Souissi 2010; Samaha
et al. 2015). However, the results of prior studies are contradictory; it has been
argued that changing the context of research (i.e., data selection, country, time and
methodology) may present findings from a different perspective (Brown et al.
2011). The following section reviews prior studies regarding the relationship
between corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure in detail
according to prior meta-analysis studies, studies within other countries
(develop/developing) and Bangladesh respectively.
2.3.1 Relationship between Corporate Governance Characteristics and
Voluntary Disclosure Meta–analysis

For an in-depth understanding of the literature that considers the
relationship between corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure,
several studies combine the findings of existing studies to draw a conclusion about
the relationship. The key findings of those studies are summarized in Table 2.1.
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Table 2-1 Summary of Meta-analysis of the relationship between corporate governance characteristics (determinant) and voluntary disclosure

Year

Authors

Reviewed
Papers

Considered direction
Dependent:
Independent: Corporate
Disclosure
Governance Characteristics

2010

Garcia-Meca &
SánchezBallesta

27

Voluntary Disclosure

Board Independence (+)

2010

Khlif & Souissi

16

Corporate Disclosure

Audit Firm Size (+)

Voluntary Disclosure

Board Size (+)
Board Composition (+)
Audit Committee (+)
CEO Duality (-)

69

Voluntary Disclosure

State Ownership (+)
Foreign Ownership (+)
Institutional Ownership
Managerial Ownership (-)
Ownership Concentration (-)

76

Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR)
Disclosure

Corporate Governance
Mechanism has an influence on
Corporate Social Responsibility
Disclosure.

2015

2016

2017

Samaha et al.

Khlif et al.

Ali et al.

64
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Results and additional comments

A positive relationship between board independence and voluntary
disclosure occurs if there are high investor protection rights within the
research context.
There is a very limited study to explore the effects of CEO duality, audit
committee, insider ownership and institutional ownership to voluntary
disclosure.
This study fails to find any significant relationship between ownership
dispersion and voluntary disclosure.
Differences in culture and the organizational environment may have an
impact on the observed dissimilar relationships.
Geographic location acts as a moderating factor for the relationship between
board size, board composition, CEO duality and voluntary disclosure.
The relationship of voluntary disclosure with CEO duality and board
composition might be moderated by disclosure type, and differences in
definitions of explanatory variables.
Owners of firms might vary with wealth constraints, competence,
preferences and non-ownership ties to the firm. Such difference might also
affect the firm disclosure.
The relationship between ownership structure and voluntary disclosure is
moderated by country- and firm-level governance mechanisms.
The determinants of CSR disclosure vary from developed to developing
countries.
In developed countries, the main determinants are specific stakeholders
including regulators, shareholders, creditors, investors, environmentalists and
the media.
In developing countries, the main determinants are external forces/powerful
stakeholders such as international buyers, foreign investors, international
media and international regulatory bodies (e.g., the World Bank)
Public pressure is greater within developed countries compared to
developing countries.

The significant characteristics of corporate governance considered by the
studies in Table 2.1 include: board composition (independence), audit firm size,
board size, board composition, audit committee, CEO duality, state ownership,
foreign ownership, institutional ownership, managerial ownership, director
ownership and ownership concentration. It should also be noted that the influence
of corporate governance characteristics on voluntary disclosure has no unique
research context (i.e., country, time) and contextual factors such as these may
moderate the relationship (Ali et al. 2017; Brown et al. 2011). Accordingly, mixed
findings (positive, negative, no relationship) between corporate governance
characteristics and voluntary disclosures have been documented in the literature
(Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010; Khlif et al. 2016; Samaha et al. 2015).
Therefore, to gain a thorough understanding regarding the relationship between the
characteristics of corporate governance and voluntary disclosure, the following
section reviews studies from developed and other developing countries separately.
2.3.2 Relationship between Corporate Governance Characteristics and
Voluntary Disclosure: Developed and Other Developing Countries
Contexts

Ali et al. (2017) report that the determinants of voluntary disclosure vary
particularly from developed to developing countries. Therefore, to find the key
characteristics of corporate governance that act as a determinant of voluntary
disclosure, a review of various studies is conducted below. Key findings of the
reviewed studies are summarized in Appendix A.
Within the existing literature, the characteristics of corporate governance
can be categorized as internal and external mechanisms. In particular, board and
audit committees are considered as internal mechanisms while ownership
concentration is an external mechanism of corporate governance. Both have been
considered as important factors for voluntary disclosure as they are the key
mechanism for controlling, monitoring and decision-making processes (GarciaMeca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010; Khlif et al. 2016; Khlif & Souissi 2010; Samaha
et al. 2015). It should be noted that sevral characteristics of corporate governance,
including CEO duality (Allegrini & Greco 2013; Hidalgo et al. 2011), board size
(Abeysekera 2010; Akhtaruddin et al. 2009; Hidalgo et al. 2011), board
composition (Akhtaruddin et al. 2009; Esa & Anum Mohd Ghazali 2012; Rao et al.
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2012), audit committee independence (Haji 2015), presence of a sub-committee
(Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007), foreign ownership (Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Huafang
& Jianguo 2007), director ownership (Ghazali & Weetman 2006; Mohd Ghazali
2007) and institutional ownership (Barako et al. 2006a; Ntim et al. 2012), are
widely considered. These factors are also found to be significant explanatory factors
for voluntary disclosure within various research contexts of both developed and
developing countries.
The relationship between corporate governance characteristics and
voluntary disclosure within the Bangladeshi context is reviewed in the following
section.
2.3.3

Relationship between Corporate Governance Characteristics
(Determinant) and Voluntary Disclosure: Bangladesh Context

Studies of the relationship between corporate governance characteristics
and voluntary disclosure in Bangaldesh are primarily limited to social disclosures.
Rashid and Lodh (2008) play a pioneering role by examing this relationship within
small firms. They report that director ownership is negatively associated, and board
compositon positively associated, with social disclosure but fail to find any
relationship between ownership concentration and institutional ownership. By
considering the banking sectors, Khan et al. (2013) extend this understanding by
considering 116 listed firms from Bangladesh to explore the determinants of social
disclosure. They report that public ownership, foreign ownership, board
composition from independent directors and presence of an audit committee are
positively associated with social disclosure but negatively with managerial
ownership. Compared to social disclosure, the relationship between corporate
governance characteristics and other forms of voluntary disclosure, such as
environmental disclosure and intellectual capital disclosure, has not been widely
explored (see Hossain et al. (2006) and Muttakin et al. (2015) as exceptions).
Hossain et al. (2006) is the only study that emphasizes environmental as well as
social disclosure and fails to find any significant relationship with the presence of
an international link to an audit firm. More recently, Muttakin et al. (2015) explore
intellectual disclosure and find that foreign ownership, the proportion of
independent directors and existence of an audit committee all have positive
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influences on intellectual capital disclosure. It should be noted that most of the
studies from Bangladesh consider a single year to explore relationships (Khan 2010;
Rashid & Lodh 2008; Rouf 2011; Rouf & Al Harun 2011) with notable exceptions
using multiple years (Khan et al. 2013; Muttakin et al. 2015; Muttakin et al. 2016).
The key findings of prior studies from the Bangladeshi context are summarized in
Appendix B.
Within the limited studies in Bangladesh, some characteristics of corporate
governance, including CEO duality (Rouf & Al Harun 2011), board size (Muttakin
et al. 2016), board composition (Khan et al. 2013), foreign ownership (Khan et al.
2013), director ownership (Rashid & Lodh 2008) and institutional ownership
(Rashid & Lodh 2008), are found to be significant. It should be noted that most of
these studies focus on only a particular category of voluntary disclosure or are
subject to limitations including, for example, small sample size, data from the
period of the share market collapse and limited statistical analyses. In addition,
other important variables, such as the presence of a sub-committee and audit
committee composition are yet to be explored from a Bangladeshi context.
The following section discusses the characteristics of corporate governance
that are considered to be significant factors for the decision-making, monitoring and
controlling processes of a firm. In particular the potential explanatory factors for
voluntary disclosure in Bangladesh are identified.
2.3.4 Corporate Governance Characteristics Considered for this Study

In the preceding sections, several prior studies on the relationship between
the characteristics of corporate governance and voluntary disclosure from various
research contexts were reviewed. It was found that both internal (CEO duality,
board composition, audit committee independence, sub-committee) and external
(foreign ownership, director ownership, and institutional ownership) mechanisms
of corporate governance act as significant explanatory factors for voluntary
disclosure.
Within the set of corporate governance characteristics, the features of the
board are considered to be essential elements for the decision-making process of a
firm. These features allow firms to resolve principal–agent conflicts and stimulate
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firm monitoring (Dalton et al. 1998; Dalton et al. 1999). Consistent with this
argument, several features of the board play an important role (Abeysekera 2010).
Board independence in regards to leadership or composition is a significant factor
in resolving conflicts of interest between agent and principal to improve a firm’s
monitoring capability (Fama & Jensen 1983). In addition, the number of persons on
the board, or ‘board size’, allows a firm to gather together various skills that
contribute to a cumulative knowledge of the business environment, thus
augmenting a firm’s capabilities in a competitive marketplace. Furthermore, it is
argued that the monitoring role of the board is facilitated by the existence or
independence of sub-committees and this may also act as an explanatory factor for
voluntary disclosure (Samaha et al. 2015). For instance, the audit committee is
considered as a monitoring and controlling mechanism that governs firm disclosure
and ensures compliance (Ho & Wong 2001; Khan et al. 2013; Li et al. 2012;
Othman et al. 2014). Besides the presence of an independent audit committee, the
existence of other sub-committees has also been found to be influential for
voluntary disclosure (Allegrini & Greco 2013; Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007;
Karamanou & Vafeas 2005; O’Sullivan et al. 2008). Internal features, such as the
presence and independence of the various committees, are therefore observed to be
vitally important for the discharge of formal and informal accountabilities that are
espoused by voluntary disclosure.
Ownership of a firm is an external feature of corporate governance and is
closely associated with agent–principal conflict (Jensen & Meckling 1976) as well
as the monitoring and control system of a firm (La Porta et al. 2000). Regarding
ownership, Eng and Mak (2003), p. 326) argue that “(t)he structure of ownership
determines the level of monitoring and thereby the level of disclosure”. Further, it
should be noted that the preference, interest, sense of moral obligation and access
to firm information is not unique and the preference for disclosure might vary with
the nature of the owners. For instance, foreign investors are considered to be more
powerful in shaping the views of a firm and might also demand compliance with
foreign norms, thereby influencing firm disclosure policies (Imam & Malik 2007;
Muttakin & Khan 2014). In addition, directors are able to access extra information
compared to outsiders as directors play a vital role in firm management. They also
play a role in the selection of appropriate disclosure policies for their respective
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firms (Eng & Mak 2003; Jensen & Meckling 1976). As a result, director ownership
is another important feature. Institutional investors are considered to be expert
investors who are capable of monitoring firms and stimulating firm disclosure
(Barako et al. 2006a) and play a significant role in firm transparency.
Therefore, in light of the above discussions, CEO duality, board size, board
compositions, presence of a sub-committee and audit committee independence are
identified as the key characteristics of the internal mechanisms of corporate
governance that influence the monitoring, controlling and decision-making
processes. External mechanisms of corporate governance include foreign
ownership, director ownership and institutional ownership. The relationship
between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure is contradictory, and
studies in Bangladesh are subject to several limitations, such as data from a single
year, the inclusion of a period of market collapse, or limited statistical analyses.
Therefore, a study within Bangladesh will provide valuable insights.

2.4 Voluntary Disclosure and Firm Performance (Effects) Studies
Within voluntary disclosure studies, a relationship between voluntary
disclosure and firm performance has been observed. However, the results of such
studies are still contradictory (Allouche & Laroche 2005; Das & Bhunia 2016; Lu
et al. 2014; Margolis et al. 2009; Margolis & Walsh 2003; Mathews 1997; MolinaAzorín et al. 2009; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Qiu et al. 2016; Wang et al. 2016), requiring
further investigation. Voluntary disclosure is an effective medium of
communication. It helps to reduce information asymmetry and also acts as a
signalling mechanism for stakeholders (Anam et al. 2011; Qiu et al. 2016; Ribeiro
Soriano et al. 2012). Accordingly, it could be argued that voluntary disclosure may
also influence firm performance.
A significant number of prior studies has explored the effects of corporate
voluntary disclosure on firm performance in both developed and developing
countries. However, limited attention has been given to Bangladesh and the existing
literature is still contradictory (Lu et al. 2014; Mathews 1997; Orlitzky et al. 2003).
The following review of the literature examines the effects of corporate governance
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and firm performance. In so doing, meta-analysis studies are considered in Subsection 2.4.1. Studies in developed and developing countries are then reviewed,
followed by studies in the Bangladeshi context. Inferences for this study are then
made in Sub-section 2.4.4 .
2.4.1 Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Firm Performance: Meta-analysis

To

understand

the

relationship

between

corporate

governance

characteristics and voluntary disclosures in more depth, several meta-analyses have
taken place. In particular, the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance
have been identified by aggregating several studies. The key findings and additional
comments are summarized in Table 2.2
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Table 2-2 Summary of Meta–analysis: Relationship between voluntary disclosure and firm performance

Year

Authors

Reviewed
Papers

1997

Griffin &
Mahon

51

2003

Orlitzky et al.

2003

Considered directions
Dependent: Firm Independent: Disclosure
Performance

Results and Additional comments

Firm Performance

Corporate Social
Performance

There is a mixed finding among prior studies.
Considering multiple firm performance indicators are advised.
Industry is also important for such relationships while it is recommended to consider several
years for investigation.

US studies

Firm Performance

Corporate Social
Performance

Corporate Social Performance appears to be more highly correlated with accounting-based
measures of CFP than with market-based indicators

Margolis &
Walsh

109

Firm Performance

Corporate Social
Performance

Positive, negative, non-significant and mixed findings have been reported by 54, 7, 28,20
prior studies respectively.

2005

Allouche &
Laroche

Total 82
(64 firm
performance
dependent)

Firm Performance

Corporate Social
Performance

It is advisable to include firm size as control variable.
Regarding social performance all the categories do not affect financial performance.
It is advisable to use Structural Equation model, Two or Three Stage Least Square
regression model for an effective result.

2009

Margolis et al.

251

Firm Performance

Corporate Social
Performance

Overall there is a positive effect from corporate social performance to firm performance.

2009

Molina-Azorín
et al.

32

Financial
Performance

Green Management

2014

Lu et al.

84 studies
between
2002-2011

Firm Performance

Corporate Social
Performance

2016

Wang et al.

42 studies
between
2003-2012

Firm Performance

Corporate Social
responsibility (+)

Mixed results, mostly environmental management has a positive influence on firm
performance.
There are various statistical methods used while regression analyses are mostly considered.
Various firm performance indicators have used with an extensive consideration of ROA and
Tobin’s Q.
Although there is a positive association between corporate social performance and firm
performance, the relationship between social disclosure and firm performance is
insignificant.
Overall there is a positive effect from social responsibility to firm performance.
Following year firm performance is associated with prior year social responsibility.
However, no evidence is supported for the reverse direction. The relationship between
social reporting and firm performance is more visible in developed countries compared to
developing countries.
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As seen in Table 2.2, the meta-analysis studies report that voluntary
disclosure positively influences firm performance. In addition, to explore the
relationship several firm performance indicators are used. Therefore, the selection
of firm performance indicators can moderate the result. In addition, it is also
documented that the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance might not
be consistent between developed and developing countries. To gain a more in-depth
understanding of the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance the
following review includes studies from both developed and developing countries.
2.4.2 Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Firm Performance: Developed and
Developing Country Contexts

A major contribution in the literature comes from studies in developed
countries and these key findings are summarized in Appendix C.
Within the prior studies, three types of findings are documented. First, a
positive effect is identified from voluntary disclosure to firm performance
(Abdolmohammadi 2005; Chen & Wang 2011; Choi et al. 2010; Khlif et al. 2015).
This is consistent with the argument that by considering voluntary disclosure a firm
may receive a positive impression from various stakeholders that may influence
firm performance. Second, a negative effect of voluntary disclosure on firm
performance (Li et al. 2016; Lima Crisóstomo et al. 2011; Mathuva & Kiweu 2016)
is identified, consistent with the argument that voluntary disclosure is subject to
additional costs and the information may not be accepted positively by
stakeholders. Third, no significant effect of voluntary disclosure on firm
performance (Aras et al. 2010; Brine et al. 2007) is found. It should also be noted
that, although the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance are explored
by considering internet-based disclosures, key performance indicator disclosures
and research and development disclosures (Basah & Khairi 2015; Elzahar et al.
2015; Garay et al. 2013; Kim et al. 2013; Uyar & Kılıç 2012), a large number of
studies are limited to social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures. In
addition, firm performance measurement also varies as a wide range of indicators
has been considered. Detailed results of the effects of social, environmental and
intellectual capital disclosure on several firm performance indicators are discussed
below.
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From a social disclosure perspective, the effect on firm performance is also
mixed, with studies finding positive effects (Choi et al. 2010; De Klerk et al. 2015;
Murray et al. 2006; Prado-Lorenzo et al. 2008; Reverte 2016; Verbeeten et al. 2016;
Veronica & Bachtiar 2010), negative effects (Malarvizhi & Matta 2016) and no
significant relationship (Aras et al. 2010; Brine et al. 2007). In addition, firm
performance indicators such as ROA, return on equity (ROE), ROS, sales growth,
share price, Tobin’s Q, and EPS are widely considered for prior studies.
Consistent with social disclosures, a mixed result has been reported
regarding the effects of environmental disclosure on firm performance. For
instance, positive (Chen et al. 2016; Khlif et al. 2015; Nor et al. 2016; Qiu et al.
2016) as well as negative (Li et al. 2016; Mathuva & Kiweu 2016) effects from
environmental disclosure have been found in the literature. In addition, consistent
with the studies from social disclosure, ROA, ROE, ROS, return on investment
(ROI), sales growth, share price, Tobin’s Q and EPS are widely considered as firm
performance indicators for prior studies.
Compared to social and environmental disclosures, the effects of intellectual
capital disclosure are examined in a limited manner and mostly positive effects have
been found (Abdolmohammadi 2005; Anam et al. 2011; Ribeiro Soriano et al.
2012). In addition, as a firm performance indicator, MCAP, ROA and market to
book value ratio are considered.
The following section compares the limited evidence from the Bangladeshi
context to that from developed and other developing countries.
2.4.3 Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Firm Performance: Bangladesh Context

It has already been mentioned that there is a paucity of studies that explore
the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance within the Bangladeshi
context. Nonetheless, some useful insights have been established (see Appendix D
for a summary). Recently, Hossain et al. (2015) have reported that corporate social
disclosure has a positive impact on firm performance for Bangladeshi firms. They
consider 131 listed firms in Bangladesh by excluding Treasury Bonds and Mutual
Funds for the period 2008 to 2012. Consistent with prior studies from other
countries, ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q are considered indicators of firm performance.
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In light of legitimacy theory, their study suggests that corporate social disclosure
influences firm performance positively (ROA and ROE) but fails to find effects
using Tobin’s Q.
In addition, there are other studies that investigate the effects of social
reporting on firm performance by considering other measures of disclosure. Islam
and Rahman (2016) report that corporate social reporting has a significant effect on
firm performance for the Dutch Bangla Bank in the years 2010 to 2014. For the
social reporting variable, expenditure on corporate social reporting was considered
while as an indicator of firm performance several variables, including Dividends
Per Share (DPS), Net Profit After Tax (NPAT), Economic Value Added (EVA),
Market Value Added (MVA), EPS, ROA, ROE and ROI, are considered. The
results show that CSR expenditure has a positive effect on firm performance. In
addition, Ahmed et al. (2012) examine the effect of social reporting on firm
performance after considering five banks in their sample. The study uses a survey
to assess social reporting. However, they are not able to find a significant effect on
ROA, EPS or price earnings ratio. Further, Ahmed and Habib (2015) and Ahmed
(2016) also investigate the effects of social reporting by considering 25 and 30
banks in Bangladesh but are unable to find a significant effect. It is worthwhile
noting that most of the prior studies in Bangladesh are limited to social disclosures.
Therefore, within the Bangladeshi context, the effects of environmental and
intellectual capital disclosure are not known. In addition, these studies are limited
to small sample sizes and include the period when the Bangladesh share market was
facing a severe market collapse. In addition, less sophisticated statistical methods
were used. Therefore, to explore the effects of voluntary disclosure with a larger
sample, different period and several statistical methods will contribute to a more
robust understanding.
2.4.4 Considered Firm Performance Indicators for this Study

The preceding sections reviewed several prior studies on the effects of
voluntary disclosure on firm performance from various research contexts, finding a
large number of firm performance indicators have been applied. In particular, ROA,
ROE, ROS, ROI, sales growth, share price, MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q were used
extensively. Therefore, consistent with prior studies, this study selects five widely
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used indicators of firm performance. The accounting-based indicators selected for
use are ROA and ROS. Market-based indicators are MCAP and EPS. Tobin’s Q
has been selected as a mixed indicator. These indicators are further discussed in the
research methodology (Chapter Five).

2.5 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter reviewed the relevant literature on voluntary disclosure, the
relationship between corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure,
and the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance.
A literature review was conducted and separated into three sections. First,
voluntary disclosure studies were reviewed within developed, developing and
Bangladeshi contexts. An increasing trend towards voluntary disclosure was
observed within all the contexts. Second, studies regarding the relationship between
corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure were reviewed by
considering several meta-analyses in developed, developing and Bangladeshi
contexts. Factors including CEO duality, board size, board compositions, subcommittee, audit committee independence, foreign ownership, director ownership
and institutional ownership were considered to examine their respective
relationships with voluntary disclosure. Finally, studies regarding the effects of
voluntary disclosure were reviewed by considering several meta-analyses in
developed, developing and Bangladeshi contexts. After reviewing the prior studies
ROA, ROS, MCAP, Earnings per Share and Tobin’s Q were selected to investigate
the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance for the purposes of this
study.
After conducting a detailed literature review, a theoretical framework is
required to guide the study. Thus, in the following chapter the development of a
theoretical framework for this thesis will be discussed.
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Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework
3.1 Introduction
Collis and Hussey (2013) argue that, for any study, it is essential to make
the theoretical stance(s) explicit because it underpins the methodology and research
perspective. Theoretical positions relating to corporate governance underpin and
provide insight into what disclosures are made and why firms disclose corporate
social, environmental and intellectual capital information in annual reports (or
elsewhere). Prior research indicates that the reasons for voluntary disclosure are
considered to be multifaceted (Collett & Hrasky 2005). For example, a firm may
decide to voluntarily disclose information to create a ‘good’ impression, however,
too much disclosure can reveal confidential operational information. In addition,
managing extra information is subject to increased cost. In contrast, an absence of
disclosures could be interpreted as hiding or ignoring information. This implies that
the selection of any particular theoretical framework is significant.
Although there is a growing interest in corporate governance and voluntary
disclosures, there is no uniform theoretical framework providing a full explanation
for the determinants and effects of voluntary disclosure of a firm. However, there
are several theoretical stances that have been adopted in prior studies examining the
relationship between voluntary disclosure and corporate governance characteristics
(Abeysekera 2010; An et al. 2011; Haji 2015; Watson et al. 2002) and the effects
of voluntary disclosure on firm performance (Anam et al. 2011; Hossain et al. 2015;
Platonova et al. 2016) using differing contexts. Theories that are commonly used15
include the following: agency theory (Barako et al. 2006a; Chau & Gray 2002;
Haniffa & Cooke 2002); legitimacy theory (Khan et al. 2013; Khan 2010; Momin
& Parker 2013); stakeholder theory (Azim et al. 2009; Islam & Deegan 2008;
Reverte 2009); signalling theory (Watson et al. 2002; Whiting & Miller 2008; Xiao
et al. 2004); political economy theory (Abeysekera & Guthrie 2005; Buhr 1998;
Guthrie & Parker 1990); resource dependency (Abeysekera 2010; Haniffa & Cooke

15

While there are a multitude of theoretical approaches, only the most commonly used in
accounting studies of voluntary disclosure that are relevant to this thesis are discussed.
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2005); and institutional theory (Baldini et al. 2016). Several theories mentioned
here, including agency, legitimacy, stakeholder and signalling, have been widely
considered in the literature (Alves 2012; An et al. 2011; Chan et al. 2014; Haji 2013;
Watson et al. 2002).
It has been argued that a firm’s disclosures are complex phenomena and
cannot be explained by a single theory (Cormier et al. 2005; Tagesson et al. 2009).
Tagesson et al. (2009) further argue that, to adequately investigate voluntary
disclosure, several theories may need to be employed simultaneously. Accordingly,
voluntary disclosure studies that use multiple theories have typically combined
agency, legitimacy, stakeholder and signalling theories (An et al. 2011; Haji 2013;
Watson et al. 2002). However, the assumptions of any single theory may weaken
or contradict the idea of other theories. Therefore, it is necessary to consider
interrelated theoretical concepts when a combined theoretical framework is
proposed. A weakness of prior studies is that the interrelationships between theories
are rarely discussed. For example, Haji (2013) explores corporate social disclosure
using three theories, agency, legitimacy and signalling theory, but does not discuss
the interrelations. Similarly, Xiao et al. (2004) investigate voluntary disclosure by
considering agency and signalling theories in combination but fail to show the
theoretical interactions.
In contrast, An et al. (2011) develop a combined theoretical framework for
the voluntary disclosure of intellectual capital information involving four theories,
including agency, stakeholder, legitimacy and signalling theories, and incorporate
discussion of the interrelationship. While the study used only intellectual capital
disclosures, they argue that their framework “can be extended to explain other
voluntary disclosure practices of information” (p. 81). However, the An et al.
(2011) theoretical framework is not without limitations. Therefore, an extension of
their theoretical framework may provide the opportunity to apply combinations of
theories to voluntary disclosure studies in multiple contexts to offer a more
comprehensive explanatory rationale.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Theoretical
frameworks that have been adopted in prior research into voluntary disclosures will
be reviewed in Section 3.2 including both single and combined theories. This is
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followed by a review of the combined theoretical framework developed by An et
al. (2011). Section 3.3 begins with a discussion of the omission of stakeholder
theory in a developing country context, followed by agency, legitimacy and
signalling theories, including how they are integrated and why the theoretical
framework is used. A chapter summary and conclusion is presented in Section 3.4.

3.2 Theoretical Frameworks Used in Voluntary Disclosure Studies
Voluntary disclosure in annual reports is influenced by several factors
(Ahmed & Courtis 1999; Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010; Khlif et al. 2016;
Samaha et al. 2015). Similarly, the effects of voluntary disclosures are diverse
(Orlitzky et al. 2003; Qiu et al. 2016). Several theories have been adopted by prior
voluntary disclosure studies. The following section presents a brief review of the
different theories frequently used in voluntary disclosure studies.
3.2.1 Single Theory Studies

Within voluntary disclosure studies a number of theories have been
considered, including agency theory (Barako et al. 2006a; Chau & Gray 2002;
Haniffa & Cooke 2002), legitimacy theory (Khan et al. 2013; Khan 2010; Momin
& Parker 2013), stakeholder theory (Azim et al. 2009; Islam & Deegan 2008;
Reverte 2009), signalling theory (Watson et al. 2002; Whiting & Miller 2008; Xiao
et al. 2004), resource dependency theory (Abeysekera 2010; Haniffa & Cooke
2005) and political economy theory (Abeysekera & Guthrie 2005; Buhr 1998;
Guthrie & Parker 1990). Each of these theories offers a single lens from which to
explore the complexities of voluntary disclosure. Therefore, each approach will
inevitably have limitations.
Agency theory focuses on the agent and principal conflict between
ownership and control of a firm. From a general perspective, the agent is nominated
to maximize the interest of the shareholders through control of the firm (Jensen &
Meckling 1976). According to agency theory, in order to reduce the conflict
between the agent and principal, an agent may use voluntary disclosures to inform
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the principal. This is particularly relevant since agents have better access to
information and the firm decision-making process (Hossain et al. 1995)
Legitimacy theory is based on the view that a social contract exists between
the firm and society. According to legitimacy theory, firms continually seek to
ensure that their operational activities are considered within the constraints and
norms of their relevant public. From this theoretical perspective, voluntary
disclosure can be used to show a firm’s compliance with societal norms (Deegan et
al. 1996; Deegan & Gordon 1996; Guthrie et al. 2006).
Stakeholder theory focuses on how firms operate and deal with their
stakeholders. Firms are able to use natural and other resources, including human
resources, to produce goods, services and sustainable waste, on the condition that
these are in stakeholders’ interests (García-Sánchez et al. 2013; Mathews 1993). In
other words, stakeholder theory focuses on the relationship between an organization
and various stakeholders in society. Organizations may use voluntary disclosure to
address stakeholders’ concerns.
Institutional theory focuses on the relationship between the environment
and firm and the incorporation of institutionalized norms and rules to achieve
stability. Dillard et al. (2004) explain that institutional theory focuses on a firm’s
interactions with the political and economic institutional environment. In addition,
institutional theory also emphasizes the impact of external pressures on a firm and
how these influence the alignment of organizational practices.
Signalling theory suggests that a firm may reduce information asymmetry
by providing additional information as a signal to receive positive feedback from
interested parties (shareholders and policymakers) (An et al. 2011; Morris 1987;
Whiting & Miller 2008). As a result, a firm may try to consider voluntary disclosure
as a medium of effective communication to create a good image of the firm among
stakeholders.
Resource dependency theory focuses on how the external resources of a firm
may affect the behaviour of an organization. To understand organizational
behaviour, it is essential to know the ecology of the organization (Pfeffer &
Salancik 1978). Accordingly, resource dependency theory places an emphasis on
the strategic actions of a firm, including maintaining the resource requirements
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within the firm and interdependence with other firms (Mustakallio 2002; Muttakin
et al. 2016). Therefore, resource dependency theory posits that firm actions are
related to available resources.
Political economy theory emphasizes the socio-economic and political
contexts that influence firm’s disclosure. Guthrie and Parker (1990, p. 166) state
that,
(t)he political economy perspective perceives accounting reports as social,
political and economic documents. They serve as a tool for constructing,
sustaining and legitimizing economic and political arrangements,
institutions, and ideological themes which contribute to the corporation’s
private interests. Disclosures have the capacity to transmit social, political
and economic meanings for a pluralistic set of report recipients.
In addition, Hopwood and Miller (1994) note that political economy theory
“emphasizes the fundamental interrelationship between political and economic
forces in society” (p. 16). This approach posits that firm disclosure can satisfy
individual stakeholders and explain the firm’s economic and political arrangements
(van der Laan 2009).
Of the theories discussed, the concept of agency theory is used most
frequently for voluntary disclosure studies within the context of both developed
countries (Campbell et al. 2001; Cooke 1989, 1992; Hossain et al. 1995; Li et al.
2008; Lim et al. 2007; Meek et al. 1995) and developing or emerging countries
(Barako et al. 2006a, 2006b; Eng & Mak 2003; Ho & Wong 2001; Huafang &
Jianguo 2007). This suggests that the agent and principal conflict perspective plays
a vital role in voluntary disclosure. In addition to agency theory, legitimacy theory
is widely used within the context of developing or emerging countries (Haniffa &
Cooke 2005; Khan et al. 2013; Khan 2010; Nurhayati et al. 2016). The concept of
legitimacy theory is also important for voluntary disclosure because it demonstrates
firms’ intent to reflect, rhetorically or otherwise, that their operational activities are
aligned with the norms of society. However, this approach may vary by country,
according to national, historical and cultural contexts (Deegan 2002); (Islam &
Deegan 2008; Lindblom 1994). In a developing country, societal norms may
include the expectations of the global community, including international buyers,
investors, media and regulatory bodies (Ali et al. 2017; Imam & Malik 2007;
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Muttakin & Khan 2014), and, therefore, the concept of legitimacy is perhaps more
applicable to a developing country context.
Signalling theory is applied in studies of both developed and developing
countries (Lan et al. 2013; Leventis & Weetman 2004; Watson et al. 2002).
Although it is not used widely, it is considered useful for exploring the effects of
voluntary disclosure. In particular, disclosures from a firm may act as a signal;
accordingly a firm may consider voluntary disclosures as conveying a message to
the market or stakeholders for implementing a firm’s goals.
3.2.2 Combination Theory Studies

Various studies of voluntary disclosures have considered a combination of
several theories to better explain the phenomena (Alves et al. 2012; An et al. 2011;
Chen & Roberts 2010; Haji 2013; Leventis & Weetman 2004; Reverte 2009;
Watson et al. 2002; Whiting & Miller 2008). The use of a combined theoretical
framework is justified because voluntary disclosure is a multifaceted and complex
issue. Thus, the use of a single theory is not always sufficient to fully explain
complex situations (Chen & Roberts 2010) and allow comprehensive investigation
(An et al. 2011; Leventis & Weetman 2004; Tagesson et al. 2009). Therefore, a
combination of theories may provide more detailed and comprehensive
explanation.
However, no single theory is free from limitations. Hence, combining
several individual theories without considering their interrelatedness may introduce
conflicts and contradictions. Table 3.1 reviews combined theoretical frameworks
that have been considered in prior studies of voluntary disclosure.
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Table 3-1 Summary of combined theoretical frameworks

Research Objective

Interrelated
Concept between
Theories

(Anam et al. 2011)

Examining the effects on market capitalization of
intellectual capital disclosure in the annual
reports of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia

Not considered

(Haji & Ghazali
2013)

Examining the relationship between corporate
attributes and intellectual capital disclosure based
on Malaysian firms.

Not considered

Y

(Alves et al. 2012)

Examining the determinants of voluntary
disclosure based on Portuguese and Spanish
firms.

Not considered

Y

Y

(An et al. 2011)

Develop a comprehensive theoretical framework
for interpreting voluntary intellectual capital
disclosure

Yes, Considered

Y

Y

(Anam Ousama et al.
2012)

Examining the determinants
of intellectual capital disclosure in the annual
reports of Malaysian listed companies.

Not considered

Y

Y

(Baldini et al. 2016)

Examining the determinants
of environmental, social, and governance
disclosure based on 42 countries data.

Not considered

Y

(Branco & Rodrigues
2008)

Examining the influencing factor for corporate
social responsibility for Portuguese firms.

Not considered

Y

Study

AGT**

** AGT= Agency Theory, LGT=Legitimacy Theory, SHT= Stakeholder Theory,
ST= Signalling Theory, RDT= Resource Dependency Theory, PET= Political Economy Theory,
IT= Institutional Theory, CT= Competition Theory, IMT= Information Theory and Y=YES
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LGT**

SHT**

ST**

RDT**

Y

Y

PET**

IT**

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Others**

Table 3-1 Summary of combined theoretical frameworks (Continued)

Research Objective

Interrelated
Concept between
Theories

(Chan et al. 2014)

Examining the relationship between corporate
governance quality and CSR disclosure based on
Australian Firms.

(Chen & Roberts
2010)

LGT**

SHT**

Not considered

Y

Y

To analyze the overlapping perspective of
legitimacy, institutional, resource dependency,
and stakeholder theory.

Not considered

Y

Y

(Farook et al. 2011)

Developing and testing a theoretical model of the
determinants of Islamic banks’ social disclosures
based on 14 countries.

Not considered

Y

Y

Y

(Haji 2013)

Examining the trend and determinants of CSR
disclosure based on Malaysian firms.

Not considered

Y

Y

(Ho & Wong 2001)

Examining the relationship between corporate
governance and voluntary disclosure based on
Hong Kong firms.

Not considered

Y

(Li et al. 2008)

Examining the relationship between corporate
governance and intellectual capital disclosure
based on UK firms

Not considered

Y

(Leventis &
Weetman 2004)

Examining the relationship between firm
characteristics and voluntary disclosure based on
the Athens stock exchange

Not considered

Y

Study

AGT**

** AGT= Agency Theory, LGT=Legitimacy Theory, SHT= Stakeholder Theory,
ST= Signalling Theory, RDT= Resource Dependency Theory, PET= Political Economy Theory,
IT= Institutional Theory, CT= Competition Theory, IMT= Information Theory Y=YES
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ST**

RDT**

PET**

Y

IT**

Others**

Y

Y

Y

IMT

Y

Y

Table 3-1 Summary of combined theoretical frameworks (Continued)

Research Objective

Interrelated
Concept between
Theories

AGT**

(Muttakin et al.
2016)

Examining the effect of directors’ human and
social capital on CSR disclosure based on
Bangladeshi firms.

Not considered

Y

(Reverte 2009)

Examining the relationship between firm
characteristics and CSR disclosure based on
Spanish firms.

Not considered

Y

(Ribeiro Soriano et
al. 2012)

Examining the effect of human capital disclosure
on firm performance based on firms from
Taiwan.

Not considered

(Haniffa & Cooke
2002)

Examining whether corporate governance,
culture and firm characteristics acts as a
determinant of voluntary disclosure based on
Malaysian firms.

Not considered

(Verbeeten et al.)
2016

To investigate whether corporate social
responsibility
(CSR) disclosures are associated with firm value

Not considered

(Watson et al. 2002)

Examining the relationship between firm
characteristics and voluntary disclosure based on
UK firms

Not considered

Study

LGT**

SHT**

ST**

Y

Others**

Y

Y

Y
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IT**

Y

Y

** AGT= Agency Theory, LGT=Legitimacy Theory, SHT= Stakeholder Theory,
ST= Signalling Theory, RDT= Resource Dependency Theory, PET= Political Economy Theory,
IT= Institutional Theory, CT= Competition Theory, ECT= Economic Theory and Y=YES

PET**

Y

Y

Y

RDT**

Y

Y

ECT

Y

As noted in Table 3.1 agency, legitimacy, stakeholder and signalling
theories are predominantly considered in combined theoretical frameworks and
single theory studies of voluntary disclosure. It is noteworthy that, among the use
of combined theoretical frameworks, only a few studies have considered
interrelated concepts. In particular, An et al. (2011) develop a combined theoretical
framework for voluntary disclosure by demonstrating the relationship between
agency, legitimacy, stakeholder and signalling theory with an emphasis on
intellectual capital disclosure. This thesis provides further empirical support by
adopting this framework and extending it to include social and environmental
disclosures.
3.2.3 An et al. (2011) Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework proposed by An et al. (2011) demonstrates how
agency, stakeholder, legitimacy and signalling theories interact within the context
of voluntary intellectual capital disclosure. They relate these theories to voluntary
disclosure because they are considered to reduce information asymmetry, discharge
accountability and signal legitimacy to stakeholders. The relationship is
summarized in Figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1 Interrelated concepts of the considered theories, Source: An et al. (2011), p. 580
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The relationship between agency theory and stakeholder theory is explained
by An et al. (2011, p. 578).
Stakeholder theory expands agency theory which primarily focuses on the
manager-shareholder relationship. This can be seen as an advancement of
stakeholder theory. However stakeholder theory does not utilize the concept
of information asymmetry. Therefore in explaining the voluntary disclosure
practices of IC, both theories need to be integrated.
Therefore, from a voluntary disclosure perspective (intellectual capital disclosure),
an integration of agency and stakeholder theory may explain information
asymmetry and the principal–agent relationship as well as the relationship with
other stakeholders.
An et al. (2011) argue that the concept of legitimacy and stakeholders is
closely tied because legitimacy theory focuses on the firm and society while
stakeholder theory focuses on firm accountability towards various stakeholders.
Therefore, a connection between stakeholder and legitimacy may extend our
understanding of voluntary disclosure (intellectual capital disclosure).
Furthermore, An et al. (2011) argue that a firm intends to legitimize
operational activities by the disclosure of information voluntarily, therefore
signalling theory acts as an explanatory tool. Accordingly, the concept of legitimacy
and signalling theory complement each other in the context of voluntary disclosure
(intellectual capital disclosure).
Moreover, An et al. (2011, p. 579), also argue that “(s)ignalling theory deals
with how to address problems arising from information asymmetry (e.g., adverse
selection and moral hazard) and, thus, it is closely linked to agency theory”
Therefore, a firm may consider voluntary disclosure as a more effective means of
communication both in signalling that information is available and in reducing
information asymmetry.
The relationship mentioned above, and the interactions among the
theoretical concepts, provide a strong base for empirical studies of voluntary
disclosure. However, while this integrated theoretical framework is able to provide
a more comprehensive understanding, it is also subject to limitations. The
limitations and potential ways of overcoming these are discussed below.
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First, the theoretical framework does not explicitly consider the research
context (i.e., a developed or developing country). The research context is important,
as a change in the environment may influence the relevance of the study (Brown et
al. 2011) because socio-economic conditions and culture impact on the issue to be
researched. Islam (2010) has noted that earlier studies from a developing country
context do not provide a notable contribution from a theoretical perspective. Thus,
there is a need for a theoretical framework with an explicit emphasis on a
developing country context.
Second, the An et al. (2011) framework focuses on a particular category of
voluntary disclosure: intellectual capital. However, as An et al. (2011, p. 581)
assert:
... the framework can be extended to explain other voluntary disclosure
practices of information. Corporate social reporting (CSR) is a good
example for this application because the three drivers for voluntary IC
disclosure are also applicable to CSR. Although there have been many
theoretical traditions interpreting CSR, the current framework could be a
beneficial supplement.
This thesis applies the An et al. (2011) theoretical framework to include a broader
range of voluntary disclosures by incorporating social and environmental disclosure
in addition to intellectual capital.
Finally, An et al. (2011, p. 581) highlight that “… the framework is not
justified by any empirical evidence so that we do not know whether it does work or
not in the real practice”.
Therefore, this thesis extends the An et al. (2011) theoretical framework to
address these limitations. It should also be noted that prior studies have considered
agency, legitimacy and signalling theory in a combined theoretical framework
(Alves et al. 2012; Anam Ousama et al. 2012; Farook et al. 2011; Haji 2013; Reverte
2009). This provides an alternative method for understanding and exploring the
determinants and effects of voluntary disclosures. The following section presents
the process of constructing the theoretical framework for this study.
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3.3 Theoretical Framework
The preceding section presents the An et al. (2011) theoretical framework
as a combination of agency, stakeholder, legitimacy and signalling theories.
However, stakeholder theory may not be suitable for voluntary disclosure studies
within a developing country because individual stakeholders might not be
considered of equal importance and the focus of disclosure limited to a few groups
of important stakeholders (Islam & Deegan 2008) where firms are keen to consider
voluntary disclosure as an element of legitimacy. By complying with the social
contract a firm can attract investors, customers, employees and others (Deegan
2006). Accordingly, from a developing country perspective, legitimacy theory is
more applicable because firms are keen to legitimize their activities rather than
focus on individual stakeholders and stakeholder groups. In prior studies into
voluntary disclosure, Gray et al. (1995) has stated that stakeholder and legitimacy
theories overlap but legitimacy theory is preferred over stakeholder theory (Chen
& Roberts 2010; Deegan et al. 2002; Deegan et al. 2000; Gray et al. 1996).
Therefore, this study develops a combined theoretical framework by including
agency, legitimacy and signalling theory and excludes stakeholder theory as not
relevant for this study.
Adopting the theoretical framework developed by An et al. (2011), this
study constructs a combined theoretical framework that includes agency, legitimacy
and signalling theory. The following section discusses the concepts and application
of the individual theories in the context of voluntary disclosure.
3.3.1 Concepts and Application of Considered Theories in Voluntary
Disclosure Studies

Agency, legitimacy and signalling theories have similar philosophical
underpinnings and overlapping concepts. However, they vary according to some
underlying assumptions. For example, agency theory is based on the premise of
maximizing the benefit to shareholders while resolving agent–principal conflicts.
In contrast, legitimacy theory focuses on macro-level issues in society to legitimize
a firms’ activities among various stakeholders (Reverte 2009; Woodward et al.
1996) instead of limiting the focus to shareholders only. Signalling theory
articulates the concept that firms send a signal to stakeholders about firm activity
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and reduce information asymmetry among stakeholders. Therefore, although
agency, legitimacy and signalling theory have some similarities, they are not
identical. The following section discusses the definitions and key concepts and their
application pertaining to voluntary disclosure including the relationship between
corporate governance and firm performance.
3.3.1.1 Agency Theory

To reiterate, agency theory deals with the conflicting relationship between
the agent and the principal and it also suggests that the agent should act in the best
interests of shareholders. However, this is challenging since the activities of the
agent have consequences for several stakeholders and may not be aligned with the
goal of shareholders (Shapiro 2005).
Agency theory was originally developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.
308) who defined this relationship as “… a contract under which one or more
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority
to the agent”. Within the context of the firm, the agent acts on behalf of the principal
(shareholder) and the welfare of the principal is affected by the decisions of the
agent (Jensen & Meckling 1976). From the perspective of agency theory, the agents
(managers) have better access to firm information and may consider providing extra
information as voluntary disclosure to reduce information asymmetry between the
principals (shareholders) and their agents (managers) (Hossain et al. 1995). Agency
theory focuses on the conflict between agent and principal and the potential issues
that may arise when shareholders appoint an agent to manage the firm. The firm’s
decision-making process and regime of corporate governance is therefore a core
consideration in understanding this conflict (Dalton et al. 1999). This point is
reinforced by the Cadbury Report (1992), which outlines that corporate governance
is about directing, managing and controlling the systems of a firm. In line with the
concept of agency theory, the corporate governance of a firm is a vital factor in
influencing the firm’s decisions relating to voluntary disclosure to reduce
information asymmetry.
Within the literature, agency theory is a widely used theory to focus on the
instruments of corporate governance and identify the determinants of voluntary
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disclosure (Akhtaruddin et al. 2009; Allegrini & Greco 2013; Barako et al. 2006b;
Cheng & Courtenay 2006; Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008; Eng & Mak 2003; Muttakin
et al. 2015). The concept of principal–agent conflict in agency theory allows
researchers to develop several inferences regarding these determinants.
First, as Healy and Palepu (2001) and Botosan and Plumlee (2002) have
argued, along with mandatory disclosure, the provision of additional disclosure may
overcome, to some extent, the information asymmetry problem. Separation of
ownership from control, one of the antecedents of agency theory, suggests that
board independence is key to reducing the conflict between agent and principal.
This insight seeks a resolution to the question posed by Jensen and Meckling (1976,
p. 306): “why accounting reports would be provided voluntarily to creditors and
stockholders”? It follows that a firm may disclose more information when the
interests of the owners and board do not overlap. Board independence and a better
monitoring system can ensure that an unscrupulous attitude towards disclosure does
not exist. The internal mechanisms of corporate governance also reduce
opportunistic disclosure policies, thereby further reducing information asymmetries
and limiting the self-interest of agents. Overcoming information asymmetry is an
essential tenet of a strong corporate governance regime in both developed and
developing countries but is considerably more relevant for developing countries
where corporate governance systems have not reached maturity (Claessens & Fan
2002).
Second, as already mentioned, corporate governance is the centre of
decision making, control processes and management of conflict in a firm. As a
result, decisions pertaining to voluntary disclosure are outcomes of these processes.
So, voluntary disclosure provides an excellent opportunity to examine corporate
governance through the lens of agency theory.
Third, managing voluntary disclosure of a firm is also subject to extra costs.
The additional cost may be justified in a principal–agent relationship, which seeks
to minimize information asymmetries, but this justification must be communicated
to the shareholder to whom the agent is responsible. The additional costs will
therefore tend to influence the agent–principal conflict and will subsequently have
an effect on decisions regarding voluntary disclosure. Wright et al. (1996) argue
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that “The nonfinancial rewards (or costs) are subject to consumption only by
insiders, with shareholder consumption not possible”.
Finally, the agent and principal relationship may also vary based on
differences between the monitoring systems in place. These monitoring systems are
based on the company’s preferred corporate governance structure. From the
Bangladeshi perspective, reformation of the security exchange commission may
also stimulate firms to disclose, particularly voluntary disclosures. Therefore, the
concept of agency theory is also closely related to the research context of this study.
In summary, corporate governance mechanisms have been widely
considered as vital determinants of voluntary disclosure. For instance, board,
ownership and audit committee structures (Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010;
Khlif et al. 2015). These variables have been selected for the determinant of
voluntary disclosure during the analysis phase of this research.
3.3.1.2 Legitimacy Theory

Within legitimacy theory, emphasis is placed on social acknowledgment,
that is, a firm’s relationship with society or the ‘social contract’. This includes firm
behaviour within a social framework (Nasi et al. 1997). The concept of legitimacy
theory is outlined by Suchman (1995, p. 574) as a “ … generalized perception or
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”.
Deegan (2006) elaborates on this issue by highlighting that firms should comply
with the legal requirements imposed by society while simultaneously maintaining
the social contract. The concept of a social contract addresses how a firm should
operate within society by respecting the values and norms of that society. Failure
to comply may lead to negative legal and social ramifications. Therefore, legitimacy
theory considers how a firm should operate by satisfying the expectations of
society, thereby legitimizing its operational activities (Deegan et al. 1996; Deegan
& Gordon 1996; Guthrie & Parker 1989; O’Donovan 2002). In other words,
legitimacy theory is grounded in the view that a firm should focus (or be perceived
as focusing) on meeting its social expectations, by doing ‘the right thing’. The
concept of ‘rightness’ in this context is based on social norms and the consequences
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of not doing the right thing (Dowling & Pfeffer 1975; Scott 1977; Suchman 1995)
may not be necessarily established by laws.
Voluntary disclosure has been widely explored through the lens of
legitimacy theory in the literature (Deegan 2002; Guthrie et al. 2006; Khan et al.
2013; Khan 2010; Muttakin & Khan 2014; O’Donovan 2002) and their relationship
can be identified by the following features.
First, according to legitimacy theory, legitimizing firm activities are those
in which a firm seeks to comply with the social values of the society in which it
operates, and also acknowledges its activities through firm disclosures (Dowling &
Pfeffer 1975). As a result, firms may be encouraged to focus on voluntary
disclosures (Deegan 2002). Hence, the firm’s legitimizing efforts and voluntary
disclosure policies may be closely related.
Second, it has been demonstrated that a firm’s activities have a significant
impact on its image and this can translate to increases or decreases in firm value.
Through voluntary disclosure, firms try to communicate with stakeholders to
maximize their wealth. So, firms continually seek to legitimize operational actions
through various channels of communication (Deegan 2002; Deegan et al. 2002;
Guthrie et al. 2006; O’Donovan 2002). For instance, firms focus on convincing
stakeholders that they are adhering to the social contract in regards to their
operational activities and that they are not doing harm to society.
Finally, legitimacy theory emphasizes that the mechanisms of legitimacy
may differ as the basis of a firm’s legitimacy varies according to the country
context, community and attitudes (Deegan et al. 2000). Since context is more
important for voluntary disclosure as it is not enforced by regulation, these factors
must be identified and examined to unveil the most significant operational activities
that contribute to the firm’s social contract.
3.3.1.3 Signalling Theory

Signalling theory, originally constructed by Spence (1973), has been used
to explain labour market behaviour. Morris (1987) argues that the concept of
signalling theory is applicable in any market to explore information asymmetry. An
et al. (2011) note that a firm may reduce information asymmetry by considering
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extra information (mostly positive information) as a signal. This extra information
may also have an impact on stakeholders’ perceptions towards the firm and affect
firm performance (Whiting & Miller 2008). By considering an effective signal,
information asymmetries can be reduced, and insufficient signals may worsen
information asymmetry problem.
The concept of signalling and information asymmetry is closely associated
with accounting research, particularly for voluntary disclosure issues. For instance,
it could be argued that better signalling contributes to a firm’s performance as it
would encourage stakeholders to reassess the value of the firm, and thus make
decisions more favourable to the firm (Whiting & Miller 2008), and expedite
operational activities by reducing the cost of capital (Botosan 1997; Botosan &
Plumlee 2002; Dhaliwal et al. 2011) and cost of debt (Sengupta 1998). Therefore,
a firm may minimize operational costs through voluntary disclosure. Furthermore,
by disclosing voluntarily, signals about operational activities, social commitment
and sustainability may stimulate other positive impressions of the firm thereby
creating a good reputation. Consequently, this positive image and reduction in
information asymmetry also leads to better performance (Anderson & Frankle
1980; Shane & Spicer 1983).
Therefore, based on the concept of signalling theory, voluntary disclosure
may act as a signal. That signal may then have an effect on firm performance.
Accordingly, this study will explore the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm
performance using signalling theory within a combined theoretical framework.
3.3.2 Interrelated Concepts Among the Theories

The concepts of the considered theories (agency, legitimacy and signalling)
overlap to provide understandings as discussed below.
3.3.3.1 Interrelated Concepts of Agency and Legitimacy Theory

Agency theory mainly focuses on monitoring opportunistic behaviour
within a firm with regard to the principal and agent relationship. The goal is to
overcome conflict by ensuring the maximum interest of the principal while
affirming other stakeholders’ interests. In this scenario, voluntary disclosure may
provide extra information to a range of stakeholders. This extra information may
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encompass social, environmental and financial aspects to create real or perceived
value for the relevant stakeholder. However, agency theory leans towards the
creation of wealth as the resolution of conflict. This can attract significant costs and
the interests of the principal, as the name suggests, comes first. Non-monetary
considerations, which are no less able to be voluntarily disclosed, may not be
addressed properly (Cormier et al. 2005). In contrast, legitimacy theory focuses on
the macro-level, specifically the firm’s social contract.
There appears to be some conflict between the theories. Nevertheless, an
argument can be constructed that links the two. An establishing premise posits that
a firm should respect social norms and values while operating. Under the concept
of agency theory firms should primarily reduce information asymmetry and
maximize shareholder value while managing several stakeholders. At the same
time, ignoring social contract issues and avoiding voluntary disclosure may create
a perception that the firm is avoiding its social obligations, thus reducing social
welfare and jeopardizing its legitimacy. As a result, failure to voluntarily disclose
may affect the firm’s reputation negatively and increase litigation costs. The
satisfaction of shareholders’ interest may not be possible in this situation.
Therefore, the concept of agency theory interacts with the concept of
legitimacy theory. In other words, the ideas of one theory complement the power
of another theory to shed light on a given research topic more effectively.

3.3.3.2 Interactions between Legitimacy Theory and Signalling Theory

Based on the concept of legitimacy theory, to comply with the social
contract, a firm should respect the social values and norms. Thus, firm will focus
on more disclosure to reflect the compliance with the society. This approach
interacts with the concept of signalling theory. For instance, a firm that is focused
on reducing information asymmetry may provide sufficient signals to distinguish
itself from another firm that achieves average performance. The signalling
mechanism can create a positive impression of the firm among stakeholders (Chau
& Gray 2002; Watson et al. 2002). Therefore, the concepts of both theories suggest
that firms disclose extra information for facilitating and justifying operational
activities. Legitimacy theory focuses on voluntary disclosure as a matter of
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accountability whilst legitimizing its operational activities. Signalling theory also
considers the reaction from the signal receiver as a part of the interpretive
framework in explaining information asymmetries.
Therefore, despite having a different perspective on the role of disclosures,
legitimacy and signalling theories both emphasize the consequences of the firm’s
actions. For example, legitimacy theory considers the consequences of managing
the social contract, which is also considered as a signal of the reaction from
stakeholders.

3.3.3.3 Interactions between Signalling and Agency Theory

Signalling theory addresses information asymmetry and the probable effects
of voluntary disclosure. For instance, under signalling theory, firms reduce
information asymmetry by sending an effective signal to stakeholders for justifying
their operational activities, as well as creating a positive impression. In particular,
voluntary disclosure may reduce information asymmetry and moderate the
approach of maximizing shareholders’ interest (firm performance) by influencing
the cost of debt (Sengupta 1998) and capital (Botosan 1997; Botosan & Plumlee
2002; Dhaliwal et al. 2011). Thus, by reducing information asymmetries, firms may
ensure the maximum interest of shareholders. This concept is closely associated
with agency theory as the reduction of information asymmetry is a common feature.
Therefore, a combination of both theories is also helpful to guide the effects of
voluntary disclosure. For instance, based on the nature of the signal (voluntary
disclosure), there might be an effect on firm performance (shareholder interest).
Therefore, from an agency theory perspective, considering agent‒principal conflict,
the monitoring and controlling aspect, and maximizing shareholder value
(Eisenhardt 1989; Fama 1980; Fama & Jensen 1983), an effective signal may
facilitate a reduction in information asymmetry (Connelly 2011). Accordingly,
voluntary disclosure may play a crucial role as a signal for moderating firm
performance. On the other hand, the interaction and overlap between agency and
signalling theory have already been documented in the literature (Morris 1987;
Watson et al. 2002). In particular, due to the agent‒principal conflict, a firm may
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consider voluntary disclosure as a medium for reducing information asymmetry and
hence the conflict. In relation to this Morris (1987, p. 52) states:
Given the consistency of signalling and agency theories, it is conceivably
possible to combine them to yield predictions about accounting choices not
obtainable from either theory alone.
Therefore, integration of agency and signalling theory may also guide exploration
of the determinants of voluntary disclosure and its possible effects.
3.3.3 Theoretical Framework for this Study

The theoretical framework for this thesis is an adaption of An et al. (2011)
using a combination of agency, legitimacy, and signalling theories. In the preceding
sections, voluntary disclosure is discussed in its respective theoretical contexts and
the interactions among the theoretical concepts are also presented as summarized
in Figure 3-2:
Agency Theory
-Principal and agent conflict
-Managing stakeholders
-Maximizing shareholders interest
-Information asymmetry

Signalling Theory
-Information Asymmetry
-Signalling shareholders
other stakeholders

Legitimacy Theory
-Legitimize firm's activities
-Social contract
- Accountablity

Figure 3-2 Integration of interrelated concepts

The combination of agency, legitimacy and signalling theory is discussed in order
to outline the way in which An et al.’s (2011) theoretical framework has been
adapted.
First, the concept of agency theory interacts with the concept of legitimacy
theory. The idea of agency theory focuses on maximizing shareholders’ interest,
reducing conflicts of interest and information asymmetry, while the concept of
legitimacy theory emphasizes management of the social contract. Separately and
independently, these two theories have been widely applied in relation to
organizational decision making. As a result, in regard to the decision to make
voluntary disclosures, firms act in accordance with legitimacy theory, as well as
applying the decision-making concepts of agency theory. The complementary
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concepts that inform these respective theories are therefore integrated in the
theoretical framework for this study. This enables a more thorough interpretation
of data during the data capture and analysis phase of this thesis.
Second, the concepts of legitimacy theory and signalling theory integrate as
both theories concentrate on communicating or giving a signal to stakeholders via
voluntary disclosure. This integration allows for the effects of voluntary disclosure
to be more deeply explored.
Finally, the concepts of signalling and agency theory integrate since, by
giving a signal, a firm also intends to reduce information asymmetry. Therefore, in
regards to the determinants of voluntary disclosure, a firm’s signalling approach
may also be influential.
Therefore, the integration of agency, legitimacy and signalling theory is
associated with this study as it focuses on the examination of the determinants and
effects of voluntary disclosure. In particular, during the decision-making process of
voluntary disclosure, a firm should consider issues, such as, the maximization of
shareholder interest, principal and agent conflict, information asymmetry and the
social contract, as these issues may also have a direct effect on a firm’s operation.
Accordingly, the integration of agency and legitimacy theory guides research
question one to explore at what extent corporate governance characteristics act as
an explanatory factor for voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, a firm’s attitude
towards society and non-financial disclosure may act as a signal and affect
perceptions of the firm for stakeholders. This perception may also have an impact
on the operational context of a firm. Accordingly, the integration of legitimacy
theory and signalling guides research question two to explore the effects of
voluntary disclosure on firm performance. Finally, the effect of voluntary
disclosure is also a significant agenda for the decision-making or controlling
process to maintain operational activities. This context is aligned with the
integration of signalling and agency theory. As a result, by considering the
integration of agency, legitimacy and signalling theory, a more complete picture of
voluntary disclosure is drawn. The key concepts of the theoretical framework for
this study, along with the integration of considered theories and interrelated
concepts are shown in Figure 3- 3
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Agency Theory
-Maximize Shareholders
interest.
-Principal and Agent Conflict.
-Information Asymmetry.

Voluntary Disclosure
-Reduce information Asymetry
signalling interested parties
about various aspect of firm
-Comply with social contract as a
form of accountablity
-Signal social contract to crrate
positive impression.

Signalling Theory
-Information
Asymmetry.
-Siganalling market and
the interested parties

Signalling information to comply
with social Contract.

Legitimacy Theory
-Legitimize firm's
activities as on
compliance of
Social Contrct

Figure 3-3 Combined theoretical framework

3.4 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter review the existing theoretical frameworks within voluntary
disclosure studies and develops a combined theoretical framework for examining
the research questions for this study.
The development of an appropriate theoretical framework for this study
involves two steps. At the initial stage, individual theories were examined and
reviewed and the combined theoretical framework elucidated. After reviewing
various theories, the An et al. (2011) theoretical framework was found to be most
suitable for this study, despite its limitations. At the final stage, the theoretical
framework for this study has been constructed by following four steps. First, the
limitations of the An et al. (2011) theoretical framework have been addressed.
Second, the concepts of all the considered individual theories (agency, legitimacy
and signalling) have been discussed within the context of voluntary disclosure.
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Third, the interrelationships between agency, legitimacy and signalling theories
have been elaborated and applied in the context of voluntary disclosure. Finally, a
combined theoretical framework for this study has been developed. The developed
theoretical framework provides robust guidance to investigate the determinants and
effects of voluntary disclosure within Bangladesh, a developing country context.
Bangladesh’s historical, regulatory, social, corporate and environmental context is
discussed in the next chapter. This will provide a solid foundation from which to
develop hypotheses, also discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter Four: Research Context and Hypotheses
Development
4.1 Introduction
n Chapters Two and Three the relevant literature was reviewed and a
theoretical framework was developed to guide the selection of appropriate
hypotheses and variables for statistical analysis. Development of a literature review
and theoretical framework are indispensable components of a research project as
they represent antecedents to the development of valid conclusions Kumar (2005).
Since accounting and governance practices do not occur inherently and uniformly,
a detailed examination of the research context is also necessary. The aim of this
chapter is to investigate the research context from a national perspective and, by
drawing comparisons, illustrate the nature of corporate governance principles and
practices therein.
Bangaldesh is the research context and the two research questions relate to
an exploration of the determinants of voluntary disclosure by considering corporate
governance characterstics as a potential explanatory factor and the effects of
voluntary disclosure on firm performance. In light of the research framework,
literature review and research context, relevant hypotheses are developed to explore
these research questions.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides information on
Bangladesh as the research context, including a general overview of Bangladesh in
which the historical, economic, legal and regulatory structures are described in Subsection 4.2.1. Sub-sections 4.2.2, 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 introduce corporate voluntary
disclosure reporting, the corporate governance setting and capital market status.
Section 4.3 presents a brief discussion of the key aspects of the research setting of
this thesis. Section 4.4 expands on the research framework by investigating the
widely used variables that were identified in the literature review and theoretical
framework in Chapters Two and Three.
Section 4.5 develops hypotheses for the first research question. The
hypotheses explore the potential determinants of voluntary disclosure by
emphasizing corporate governance characteristics including CEO duality, board
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size, board composition, presence and structure of sub-committees, audit committee
independence, foreign ownership, director ownership, and institutional ownership.
Section 4.6 presents the hypotheses related to the potential effects of voluntary
disclosure on firm performance . A chapter summary and conclusion is presented
in Section 4.7.

4.2 Background of Bangladesh
This section outlines cultural, social and other environmental factors unique
to Bangladesh. This overview is necessary because cultural, social and other
environmental factors influence and guide business practices (Scholtens & Dam
2007; Husted 2000), including the historical, economic and regulatory conditions.
4.2.1 Historical Overview

Bangladesh is a developing country situated in the region of South Asia with
an area of 147,570 square kilometres and a population of 161 million people (World
Bank 2017). 16 The area now known as Bangladesh was initially part of Bengal
along with the state of West Bengal, which was a part of India (Smillie 2009). In
1757, the British company, the East India Company, seized power from
independent Muslim monarchs and progressively colonized what is now presentday Bangladesh as part of a broader effort to colonize India. In 1947, a significant
anti-colonial movement by the indigenous people of India, coupled with internal
tensions between Hindus and Muslims, prompted the British to segregate India
(Chowdhury 2004) thereby creating two different countries, namely India and
Pakistan. The segregation meant that Bengal became part of Pakistan. In 1971,
following nine months of fighting and internal political struggle, Bangladesh
became an independent country.
Bangladesh has a common language, Bengali, and culture. Bengali is the
only language in the world that a country has fought to defend and many Bengali
speakers sacrificed their lives to retain it as their official language. As Bengali was
enshrined as the national language on 21 February 1952, the date is now known as

16

Source: World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/bangladesh Visited 5/06/17 2.07 PM
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‘International Mother Language Day’.17 Besides Bengali, English is also widely
spoken in Bangladesh. Islam is followed by 85% of the population; other religions
in Bangladesh include Buddhism, Hinduism and Christianity.
4.2.2 Economic Overview

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) locates Bangladesh as the 43rd
largest economy in the world (in purchase-price-parity terms) with an inspiring
track record of progress. In particular, the Bangladeshi economy has maintained
greater than 6% growth over the decade and reached 7.1% growth in 2015/2016
allowing it to achieve the status of a lower middle-income country in 2014 (World
Bank 2017). 18 Due to this significant economic growth, Bangladesh is often
considered as a new Asian tiger (Business Insider 2017).19 The growth rate of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) also shows significant potential for economic
development in Bangladesh ( see Figure 4-1).
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Figure 4-1 GDP growth rate of Bangladesh. Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics20
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Source: UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/strengthening-educationsystems/languages-in-education/international-mother-language-day Visited 5/6/2017 2.43 pm
18
Source: World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bangladesh/overview#1 Visited
7/6/2017, 12.05 pm
19
Source: Business Insider,https://www.businessinsider.com.au/bangladesh-is-the-new-asiantiger-2017-4?r=US&IR=T Visited 5/6/2017, 2.48 pm
20
Source: Bangladesh Bureu of Statistics, http://www.bbs.gov.bd/site/page/dc2bc6ce-7080-48b39a04-73cec782d0df/Gross-Domestic-Product-(GDP) Visited 7/6/2017 1.53 pm
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Despite economic development, Bangladesh remains a relatively poor
country and many people, particularly those in isolated and rural areas, still suffer
deprivation from basic human needs; while there has been substantial progress in
poverty reduction, the proportion of poverty is still high.21 Furthermore, income
inequality pervades the social landscape and, when compared with other South and
South-East Asian nations, it is considered alarming.22 Therefore, despite substantial
economic growth, Bangladesh seeks to leverage areas where it maintains an
economic advantage and stimulate foreign investment23 to augment the well-being
of its citizens.
4.2.3 Legal and Regulatory Structure Overview

Bangladesh is regarded as a common law country and the underpinnings of
the current legal and judicial system are based on British law (Ferdous et al. 2014;
Panday & Hossain Mollah 2011). Panday and Hossain Mollah (2011, p. 6) indicate
that the judicial system in Bangladesh has,
… passed through various stages and the process of evolution has been
partly indigenous and partly foreign and the legal system of the present day
emanates from a mixed system which has structure, legal principles and
concepts modelled on both Indo-Mughal and English law.
However, the legal system is also affected by sociocultural values and
religious guidelines that vary from English law. Significant corporate legislation
includes: the Companies Act 1994; the Bank Companies Act 1991; the Financial
Institutions Act 1993; the Bangladesh Bank Order 1972; the Bankruptcy Act 1997;
the Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969; the Securities and Exchange
Commission Act 1993; the Securities and Exchange Rules 1987; the Insurance Act
1938; Insurance Corporations Act 1973; and the Income Tax Ordinance 1984.
Besides these legal and government regulations significant regulatory
bodies also play a crucial role in the corporate landscape of Bangladesh. Most
notable are the BSEC, the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies and Firms (RJSC),
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Source: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bangladesh/overview Visited 10/6/2017 11.44 am
Source: http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/2017/01/27/60297/Inequality:-A-wake-up-callfor-Bangladesh Visited 7/6/2017 7.59 pm
23
Source: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/06/05/bangladesh-needs-aproactive-strategy-to-address-increasing-jobs-challenges-world-bank-ilo-workshop Visited
7/6/2017, 8.10pm
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the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB), the Stock Exchanges,
The Institute of Cost and Management Accountants of Bangladesh (ICMAB),
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI), and Bangladesh Bank (BB) (Arif & Tuhin
2013; Reaz & Arun 2006; Solaiman 2006).
The BSEC is the primary government regulator concerned with corporate
governance (Siddiqui 2010) and is designed to oversee capital market activities.
The BSEC was established in 1993 when it replaced the office of the Controller of
Capital Issues (CCI), which was formed in 1947. In particular, the BSEC
emphasizes protection of the interests of investors, establishment of fair, transparent
and efficient securities markets, and ensuring appropriate issuance of securities and
compliance with securities laws.24 The Chairman and members of the BSEC are
selected by the Government and the institution is attached to the Ministry of
Finance. The Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969 provides the legal
framework for the securities market.
The RJSC is responsible for registering companies under the Companies
Act 1994 (Arif & Tuhin 2013). Registered firms in Bangladesh are required to
submit all financial and non-financial information to the RJSC. It is administered
by the Ministry of Commerce and responsible for monitoring a firms’ compliance
with the Companies Act 1994.
The ICAB is one of the two main professional accountancy bodies in
Bangladesh. It was created under the Bangladesh Chartered Accountants Order in
1973. The ICAB regulates the accountancy profession, supervises professional
ethics and codes of conduct of its members, and provides specialized training and
professional expertise.25 The ICAB also holds the right to conduct any disciplinary
action against ICAB members for violation of the regulation. In 1999, the ICAB
adopted International Accounting Standards (IASs), International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRSs), and International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) as
Bangladesh Accounting Standards (BASs), Bangladesh Financial Reporting
Standards (BFRSs) and Bangladesh Standards of Auditing (BSAs) respectively. It
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http://www.secbd.org/
http://www.icab.org.bd/webGeneralContent/view/14245 Visited 30-11-2017 at 3.04 pm
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should be noted that these initiatives were commenced as an outcome of a World
Bank Grant. In regards to this grant Zaman and Shiraz (2005, p. 826) state,
The IASs adoption process was initiated in August 1999 following a
US$200,000 World Bank grant to the Bangladeshi Government for the
development of Accounting and Auditing Standards in Bangladesh. The
World Bank’s Institutional Development Fund (IDF) grant was targeted at
enhancing the institutional capacity of the ICAB for the adoption of IASs in
the country. On its part, the ICAB was required to provide the additional
US$20,000 required to help accomplish this task. The Government then
delegated the process to the BSEC as the main institution responsible for
overseeing the process.
The ICMAB is the other major professional accountancy body in
Bangladesh and an independent professional body under the Ministry of Commerce
of Bangladesh. This body offers professional qualifications in Cost and
Management Accountancy, with a focus on accounting for business.
The BEI is another private organization that focuses on corporate
governance regulations in Bangladesh. In the year 2000, the BEI was established as
a non-profit organization and mainly relies on funding from donors. In 2004, the
BEI developed a code for corporate governance.
The BB is the Central Bank of Bangladesh and was established in 1972. It
operates under the provisions of the Banking Companies Act 1991, as amended in
2003 and 2013, and the Financial Institutions Act 1993. The BB is also responsible
for promoting and developing the domestic financial market. Banking and finance
companies are regulated by the BB.

4.3 The Research Setting – Voluntary Disclosure, Governance and

Market Conditions
This thesis examines the determinants and effects of voluntary disclosure
with a focus on corporate governance characteristics and firm performance. Thus,
corporate voluntary disclosure reporting, capital markets and corporate governance
are important and discussed in the following sections.
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4.3.1 Corporate Voluntary Disclosure Reporting in Bangladesh

The awareness of, and importance attributed to, voluntary disclosures has
increased in the Bangladesh corporate context in this century (Azim et al. 2009;
Sobhani et al. 2009). In particular, as mentioned in Chapter One, voluntary
disclosure of social, environmental and intellectual capital carries extra significance
within the Bangladeshi context. There are several factors that explain firms’
voluntary disclosures. First, there are external pressures, such as those from
international regulators and multinational firms (Belal & Owen 2007; Islam &
Deegan 2008), as foreign ownership is one of the dominant factors driving the
Bangladeshi capital market (Imam & Malik 2007). Second, firms may be subject to
a threat to their reputation (Azim et al. 2009) as voluntary disclosure may stimulate
positive returns and bolster a firm’s reputation. As a fast growing developing
country, firms from Bangladesh are comparably more keen to provide additional
information as a business strategy. This is advantageous as Bangladesh is anxious
to promote foreign investment and a sound corporate reputation can enhance these
possibilities. Subsequent foreign investment may also stimulate corporate
accountability and reporting, thereby increasing the demand for transparency in
business practices (Belal & Owen 2007; Muttakin & Khan 2014). Third, local
regulators in Bangladesh have started to appreciate voluntary disclosure. For
instance, Khan (2010, p. 85) states,
Recently, BB encourages commercial banks to take part CSR activities
enthusiastically, which might pave the banking sectors way to become more
structured on the ideas of CSR issues. BB also advised banking and other
financial institutions to move towards implementation of CSR programme.
Fourth, firms place an emphasis on voluntary disclosure for fear of a reputational
threat from stakeholders’ perceptions of firms (Azim et al. 2009). Therefore, by
considering voluntary disclosures, firms may discharge formal and informal
accountabilities and thereby reflect the imperatives of Western social values and
norms. Finally, although the Bangladesh economy is developing, it is also subject
to criticism for poor socio-cultural indicators and corruption at varying levels
(Azmat & Samaratunge 2009; Islam & Deegan 2008). For issues such as poverty,
human rights breaches, ineffective corporate governance and the impacts of climate
change, firms may choose to emphasize voluntary disclosures (Moyeen & West
2014).
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Voluntary disclosures of firms have therefore progressed as an important
issue within Bangladesh. Many firms have already adopted voluntary disclosure in
a bid to distinguish themselves from other firms and receive positive attention both
locally and internationally, whilst simultaneously achieving enhanced economic
benefit.
4.3.2 Capital Market of Bangladesh

In recent times, Bangladesh has significantly expanded economically with
the number of securities, trade volume and market capitalization increasing.
However, two significant capital market debacles have occurred. In 1996,
regulatory failure allowing for fraudulent activity was considered as the main
reason for a market collapse. 26 Accordingly, after the 1996 market crash,
Bangladesh introduced a significant number of regulatory reforms to protect
investors. Solaiman (2006, p. 203) states:
The disaster came as a blow to investors and regulators alike. The
government became more concerned about the market, which
prompted the authorities to bring about further reforms in securities
regulation.
In 2010, a further share market collapse occurred. Among various reasons for this
collapse was the weak enforcement capacity of the BSEC. Weak corporate
governance mechanisms may also have contributed.27 Accordingly, further reform
and regulations were put into place with the intention to ensure the interests of
investors. These two events have significantly influenced Bangladeshi corporate
regulations.
There are two stock exchanges in Bangladesh: the Dhaka Stock Exchange
(DSE) and Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE). The Stock Exchanges are also
considered as important corporate governance and firm disclosures in Bangladesh.
The DSE was established in 1954 as the East Pakistan Stock Exchange
Association Ltd. It started formal trading in 1956 and was renamed the Dhaka Stock
Exchange Ltd in 1964. Due to the war for independence, trading on the DSE was
discontinued in 1971 and resumed in 1976. The DSE is registered as a public limited
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Source: http://www.thedailystar.net/law/2006/10/01/fmr.htm Visited 19/06/2017 10.31 am
Source: https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/45253-002-sd.pdf
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company, and its operations are regulated by its articles of association, along with
the Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969, Companies Act 1994, and Securities
& Exchange Commission Act 1993. The DSE regulations must be approved by the
BSEC. As at December 2016, total market capitalization for the DSE was
3412441.493 (BDT Million).28 A summary of firms listed on the DSE is presented
in Table 4.1.
Table 4-1 Summary of DSE listed firms

Industry
Bank
Cement
Ceramics Sector
Corporate Bond
Debenture
Engineering
Financial Institutions
Food & Allied
Fuel & Power
Insurance
IT Sector
Jute
Miscellaneous
Mutual Funds
Paper & Printing
Pharmaceuticals & Chemicals
Services & Real Estate
Tannery Industries
Telecommunication
Textile
Travel & Leisure
Treasury Bond
Total Companies:

Number of firms
30
7
5
2
8
33
23
18
18
47
7
3
12
35
2
28
4
6
2
48
4
221
563

Source: http://www.dsebd.org/by_industrylisting1.php

The CSE started operations in 1995. Similar to the DSE, CSE regulations
are also subject to approval by the BSEC. It should also be noted that most of the
securities traded on the CSE are listed on the DSE. As at December 2016, total
market capitalization for the CSE was 2,741,343 (BDT Million)29. A summary of
CSE firms is presented in Table 4.2.
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Source : http://www.dsebd.org/recent_market_information.php Visited 10/6/2017 1.38 pm
Source : http://www.cse.com.bd/historical_market.php Visited 10/6/2017, 1.37 pm
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Table 4-2 Summary of CSE listed firms

Industry

Number of firms

Bank
Cement
Ceramics Sector
Corporate Bond
Energy
Engineering & Electrical
Food & Allied
General Insurance
ICT
Life Insurance
Miscellaneous
Mutual Funds
Paper & Printing
Pharmaceuticals & Chemicals
Services & Property
Telecommunication
Textile & Clothing
Leather & Footwear
Leasing & Finance
Total Companies:

29
7
5
2
16
27
12
30
7
12
14
35
4
23
7
2
43
6
22
303

Source: http://www.cse.com.bd/company_by_industry.php

4.3.3 Corporate Governance in Bangladesh

While Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that corporate governance
mechanisms do not exist in less developed countries, it can be argued that this is no
longer the case, with Bangladesh contributing to this turnaround by actively
pursuing the adoption of international standards of corporate governance practices
(Rashid et al. 2010).
From a country perspective, a major aim of adopting corporate governance
is to enhance investors’ confidence in the capital market and facilitate transparency.
Within Bangladesh, the focus on corporate governance was prompted by the share
market collaspes in 1996 and 2010. In particular, after the first stock market crash,
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) provided funding of $80 million as part of the
Capital Market Development Program (CMDP). The purpose of this project was to
improve the transparency and efficiency of the capital market and restore investor
confidence. Furthermore, the BSEC adopted corporate governance guidelines in
2006 (BSEC order No. BSEC/CMRRCD/2006-158/Admin/02-08, dated 20
February 2006). In addition, other steps were initiated by international financial
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institutions (IFI), funded by the private sector and the BEI (Sobhan 2014). The BEI
issued the corporate governance code in 2004. At the same time, the ICAB also
introduced a series of corporate governance principles and rules (Muzumdar 2006).
In 2010, the effectiveness and implications of corporate governance
practices was questioned. In response, the BSEC reformed corporate governance
guidelines of Bangladesh. In 2012, an amendment to the corporate governance
guideline was made, addressing seven important issues, including: a focus on the
number of directors; a requirement for a propotion of independent directors;
qualifications for independent directors; addressing CEO duality; and the
requirement for directors to report to shareholders. The 2012 guideline also
addresses the appointment of a chief financial officer and the formation of an audit
committee and a description for its role of its members. Moreover, reporting
requirements and compliance issues were addressed to comply with Western
corporate governance structures, as well as ensuring transparency to stimulate
investor confidence. The key features of the BSEC’s corporate governance
guidelines for 2012 are summarized in Table 4.3.
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Table 4-3 Brief summary of the key feature of Bangladesh Security Exchange Commission Corporate Governance Guidelines

BSEC’s Corporate Governance Guidelines (2012)

Description
1.1 Board Size
1.2 Board Composition

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

1.3 Qualification of
Independent Director
1.4 Chairman of the board and
chief executive officer
1.5 The Directors’ Report to
Shareholders

CHIEF FINANCIAL
OFFICER (CFO), HEAD
OF INTERNAL AUDIT
(HIA), AND COMPANY
SECRETARY (CS)

2.1 Appointment
2.2 Requirement to attend the
Board Meetings
3.1 Constitution of the Audit
Committee
3.2 Chairman of the Audit
Committee

AUDIT COMMITTEE

Board should have minimum 5 members with maximum members of 20.
At least one-fifth (1/5) of the total number of Directors shall be Independent Directors. The criteria for being an
independent director is also prescribed by BSEC.
Independent director shall be a knowledgeable individual with integrity who is capable of ensuring significant issues
including compliance with financial, regulatory and corporate laws and can make a meaningful contribution to the
business.
Chairman of the board and chief executive officer should be filled by two different people.
BSEC prescribed information should be included in Directors statements in the Directors' Report prepared under section
184 of the Companies Act, 1994 (Act No. XVIIIof 1994).
Firm should appoint CFO, HIA, CS and also define their respective roles, responsibilities.

The CFO and the CS shall attend the meeting of the Board of Directors

Firm should have an Audit committee as a sub-committee and there should be minimum 3 members
An independent member should chair the audit committee.

3.3 Role of Audit Committee

Audit committee should oversee the BSEC set roles

3.4 Reporting of the Audit
Committee

Audit committee should report to the board of directors, authorities, the shareholders and general Investors

EXTERNAL/STATUTORY AUDITORS

SUBSIDIARY COMPANY

The issuer firm should not engage its external/statutory auditors to perform the BSEC set services of the company.
For a subsidiary company, BSEC set guidelines for board compositions holding company ruling is applicable.
For a subsidiary company, at least one independent director should be from the holding company.
The audit committee of holding firm should also review the financial statement of the subsidiary firm.

DUTIES OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER (CEO) AND
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER (CFO)

The CEO and CFO should certify that they reviewed the financial statement and as on their best knowledge there are no
transactions that involved fraudulent, illegal or violation of the company’s code of conduct.

REPORTING AND COMPLIANCE OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE

The company shall obtain a certificate from a practicing Professional Accountant/Secretary (Chartered Accountant/Cost
and Management Accountant/Chartered Secretary) regarding compliance of conditions of Corporate Governance
Guidelines of the Commission and shall send the same to the shareholders along with the Annual Report on a yearly basis
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4.4 Research Framework
For any research, a coherent and robust framework that seeks effective
outcomes is essential. Kumar (2005, p. 94) emphasizes the significance of research
design (framework) by stating that,
research design is a procedural plan that is adopted by the researcher to
answer questions validly, objectively, accurately and economically … you
will need to detail in your research design the rationale and justification for
each decision that shapes your answers to the ‘how’ of the research journey.
In presenting your rationale and justification you need to support them
critically from the literature reviewed. You also need to assure yourself and
others that the path you have proposed will yield valid and reliable results.
This thesis will focus on examining the determinants and effects of
voluntary disclosure within the Bangladeshi context. For voluntary disclosure, three
dimensions, including social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosure, are
considered. In addition to exploring the determinants of voluntary disclosure, this
study relies on the characteristics of corporate governance as a core aspect of a
firms’ decision making and monitoring process. In light of the literature and
theoretical guidelines, this study considers ten characteristics of corporate
governance including: CEO duality, board size, board composition, existence of
sub-committee, audit committee composition, foreign ownership, director
ownership and institutional ownership. Furthermore, to explore the potential effect
from voluntary disclosure, firm performance is central to the second phase of this
research and must therefore be adequately conceptualized. This study considers
indicators from three different approaches including: ROA, ROS, MCAP, EPS and
Tobin’s Q. The research framework of this study is shown in Figure 4-2.
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Voluntary Disclosure
Determinants

Effect

Social Disclosure
Environmental Disclosure
Intellectual Capital Disclosure

Corporate Governance
Perspective

Firm
Performance

1.CEO Duality

Control variables

2.Board Size
4.Sub-committee

Determinants

5. Audit Committee Composiiton

Firm Size
Leverage
Industry
Profitability
Cohposition

6.Foreign Ownership
7.Director ownership
8.Institutional Ownership

Return on Asset
Return on Sales

3.Board Composiiton

Effects
Firm Size
Leverage
Industry
Board Composition
CEO Duality

Earning Per Share
Market
Capitalization
Tobin's Q

Figure 4-2 Research framework with the variables

4.5 Hypothesis: The Relationship between Corporate Governance
Characteristics (Determinants) and Voluntary Disclosure
Based on the research framework of this study (Figure 4-2) and evidence
from the literature (refer to Chapter Two), the characteristics of corporate
governance are considered to be used as an explanatory factor for the voluntary
disclosure of a firm. The following sub-sections will briefly set out the central
theoretical guideline along with existing literature relevant to each corporate
governance characteristic and voluntary disclosures for developing hypotheses.
4.5.1 CEO Duality

CEO duality refers to the dual leadership structure of a firm where one
individual performs the role of CEO and chairperson of the board (Rechner &
Dalton 1991). In other words, CEO duality denotes the existence of dominant
personalities (Ho & Wong 2001), who play two crucial leading roles
simultaneously and may dominate decision making.
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Agency theory suggests that having the same person as CEO and board
chairman may lead to opportunistic decision making (Jensen & Meckling 1976).
For example, the CEO may have additional information compared to other nonexecutive directors. As a result, having CEO duality may provide the opportunity
to use internal information for one’s own benefit instead of making decisions for
the benefit of shareholders or other stakeholders. In addition, Jensen (1993) and
Blackburn (1994) argue that CEO duality might emasculate the monitoring power
of the board. Furthermore, it could also be claimed that it ‘opens the gate’ for the
CEO to influence board members.
In line with agency theory, a large number of studies posit that CEO duality
distorts transparency as well as weakens the monitoring power of a board, for
instance, regarding the relationship between voluntary disclosure (Allegrini &
Greco 2013; Huafang & Jianguo 2007), intellectual capital disclosures (Cerbioni &
Parbonetti 2007) and social disclosure (Giannarakis 2014b). These studies concur
that CEO duality reduces the independence of the board. After considering a metaanalysis, Samaha et al. (2015) further confirms the negative association between
CEO duality and voluntary disclosure.
However, it has also been argued that CEO duality provides the benefit of a
unified leadership structure by reducing information sharing costs and conflict of
interest between the CEO and the board chairman (Anderson & Anthony 1986;
Samaha et al. 2015). Thus, there could be a positive relationship between CEO
duality and voluntary disclosure. Hidalgo et al. (2011) report a positive relationship
(by considering nonlinear relationships) between CEO duality and intellectual
capital disclosure after examining 100 Mexican firms. They note that the benefits
of CEO duality outweigh the costs and that CEO duality provides the opportunity
of effective communication in situations where it may otherwise be absent.
In contrast, Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Cheng and Courtenay (2006), and
Barako et al. (2006a) report no significant relationship with voluntary disclosure.
They argue that a CEO is more concerned about his or her own performance in the
two different roles. In addition, the CEO might be motivated to be less accountable
to the interests of all stakeholders. Thus, the emphasis is on regular firm activities
and mandatory disclosure rather than focusing on voluntary issues.
76

Within the Bangladeshi context, after examining 116 manufacturing firms
from the years 2005–2009 no significant relationship between social (Khan et al.
2013) and intellectual capital disclosure (Muttakin et al. 2015) was identified. As a
possible reason for this finding, both studies claim that within Bangladesh the CEO
and chairperson are very often from the same family and thus CEO duality may
have any impact. However, after considering 155 listed firms and considering data
from after the 2010 market collapse, Muttakin et al. (2016) reports a significant
negative association of CEO duality with social disclosure. Their study reports that
additional powers were conferred upon a CEO due to CEO duality and that CEO
preferences were prevalent. Furthermore, it was noted that other directors supported
or were otherwise influenced by the CEO’s decisions.
Consistent with this recent study from Bangladesh, it can be argued that
due to extra power, a CEO may ignore criticism or negative views from other board
members regarding voluntary disclosure items and may be more concerned about
the operational efficiency of a firm (Muttakin et al. 2015). Thus, monitoring and
transparency of a firm turn is less effective when CEO duality is in place (Gul &
Leung 2004). Within the Bangladeshi context, the relationship between CEO
duality and voluntary disclosure is not well documented, and most of the focus is
limited to social disclosure. The results of these limited studies are also
contradictory. Thus, further investigation involving a more comprehensive list of
variables may provide a more in-depth understanding and situate the current study
as a significant contributor to our understanding of corporate governance practices.
Therefore, considering mixed findings in the literature and lack of
documentation within Bangladesh, Hypothesis 1(a) is developed as follows:
H1(a): CEO duality is associated with voluntary disclosure.

4.5.2 Board Size

Board size refers to the total number of directors on the board. Board size is
a vital factor for the monitoring system of a firm and is widely considered as an
important feature of corporate governance (Fama & Jensen 1983; Giannarakis
2014a; Lee & Chen 2011).
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Based on the concept of agency theory, interested parties (e.g., shareholders,
policymakers, local stakeholders) expect adequate information (disclosure) from
the board of directors since they are nominated to represent their interests
(Davidson et al. 1996). This implies that a diverse and larger board can contribute
to the production of adequate information. A larger board size can accumulate
greater experience, knowledge (Haniffa & Cooke 2002) and expertise based on the
various backgrounds of individual members. Given this relationship, a larger board
provides an opportunity to improve the decision-making processes of a firm by
utilizing the values, skills and experience of directors, which can potentially lead to
the improvement of voluntary disclosure practices. Brown et al. (2006) advocate
larger board size. They suggest that ethics, social values and the will to perform
certain activities (such as donations for social events or helping poor people in the
community) vary from person to person, and that larger boards offer the scope to
have social values represented on the board.
A significant number of prior studies investigating this issue has suggested
that a larger board size is positively associated with voluntary disclosure, including
social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures. Allegrini and Greco
(2013) assert that a larger board may offer a wider ownership representation and
may therefore place emphasis on a broader range of stakeholders. Akhtaruddin et
al. (2009) put forward the idea that the collective expertise and experience of larger
boards facilitates the improvement of corporate control, transparency and value
creation. Transparency, in particular, implies that firms may be more attentive to
voluntary disclosure. In addition, regarding social disclosure, Esa and Anum Mohd
Ghazali (2012) suggest that larger board size contributes to a diversity of experience,
knowledge and skills. This diversity may stimulate transparency and a concern for
social issues, thereby leading to an augmented civic approach by the company. The
upshot of this scenario is that the company may be more attuned to the concerns of
a wider range of stakeholders and may, therefore, disclose a broader set of
information voluntarily. This perspective is further evidenced by Giannarakis
(2014b), who explains that a larger board stimulates board monitoring. There is also
support for the larger board in relation to intellectual capital disclosures.
Abeysekera (2010) put forward that a larger board has the potential to bring in the
various resources needed to meet global challenges more effectively. Moreover,
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after applying a meta-analysis of 64 studies, Samaha et al. (2015) strongly supports
the positive association between board size and voluntary disclosure in relation to
environmental issues, similar to that presented by Esa and Anum Mohd Ghazali
(2012)
In contrast to the supporting arguments presented above, a larger board is
criticized for a potential lack of communicative ability as it is challenging to
manage effective communication among a large number of people. Jensen (1993,
p. 865) asserts that having a small board is more efficient at monitoring and control
of the CEO. In addition, John and Senbet (1998) indicate that, due to complicated
communications, the benefit of the larger board may be outweighed by delayed
decision making. Chen (2008) further criticizes larger boards by arguing that
smaller boards encounter fewer obstacles. Furthermore, Vafeas (1999) advocate for
a smaller board since, due to poor communication, an overbearing CEO may
dominate a larger board. Consistent with the argument that a larger board may lead
to poor monitoring, for environmental disclosure, Rao et al. (2012) argue that
disclosure decisions require significant involvement and coordination, which may
be difficult to achieve with a larger board. Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) write that
a larger board is negatively associated with intellectual capital disclosure. Similarly,
Veronica and Bachtiar (2010) report a negative relationship with social disclosure.
However, it can also be argued that board size is not significantly associated
with voluntary disclosure. For example, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) report no
significant relationship after considering 104 firms listed on the Singapore Stock
Exchange (SGX) in 2000. In addition, after considering 91 Spanish firms in 1999,
Arcay and Vazquez (2005) report the same result.
Within the context of Bangladesh, the relationship between board size and
voluntary corporate disclosure is not well documented. After considering 120 listed
firms Rouf (2011) reports a positive relationship with voluntary disclosure.
Muttakin et al. (2016) further find a positive relationship with social disclosure.
Based on the above discussion, it appears that there is support for the idea
that larger board size provides an opportunity for a firm to gather expertise,
experience and knowledge that is vital for the functions of monitoring and control.
Furthermore, due to the presence of a more diverse range of people on the board,
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the values and intentions inherent in larger boards varies. This may lead to a push
for greater transparency thereby encouraging voluntary disclosure. Such positive
attitudes are tempered by another, perhaps smaller, group of researchers who
present the argument that having more people causes communication problems and
disagreement with regard to items of voluntary disclosure.
Within the Bangladeshi context, the relationship between board size and
voluntary disclosure is not well documented. With the paucity of research in this
context, it is difficult to predict how board size will influence voluntary disclosure.
The perspective adopted in the following hypothesis is consistent with the larger
group of researchers who suggest that increased board size leads to greater
transparency, which leads to the production of more voluntary disclosure
Therefore, considering mixed findings in the literature and lack of
documentation within Bangladesh, hypothesis 1(b) is developed as follows:
H1(b): There is an association between board size and voluntary disclosure.
4.5.3 Board Composition

Board composition refers to the proportion of independent directors as well
as the gender and nationality of board members. For this aspect, the proportion of
non-executive directors is considered to be the most significant factor having an
impact on decision making and control (Dalton et al. 1998).
This topic can be viewed in light of agency theory, which suggests that the
management of the firm is in the hands of directors who are potentially
opportunistic and can manipulate accounting numbers for their own interest
(Shleifer & Vishny 1997). It is argued that the presence of independent directors on
the board may improve monitoring and also reduce agency conflicts and subsequent
costs (Fama & Jensen 1983). It is further argued that the augmented monitoring
function may enhance corporate transparency by encouraging voluntary disclosure
and further reduce agency costs (Healy & Palepu 2001). Taken together, these
arguments imply that greater transparency, coupled with the potential increase in
voluntary disclosure, means that independent directors facilitate the reduction of
information asymmetry (Allegrini & Greco 2013; Porta et al. 2002). Furthermore,
independent directors emphasize the development of a positive reputation, whether
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artificially projected, genuine or perceived. In this scenario, voluntary disclosure
becomes the mechanism used to relay a signal of effective management (Patelli &
Prencipe 2007). It is expected that the presence of independent directors on the
board may therefore have a major role in policymaking regarding voluntary
disclosure.
A significant number of studies consider board composition, and the
presence of independent directors in particular, as an important factor that
contributes to the voluntary production and communication of certain social,
environmental and intellectual capital disclosures. Of these studies, many propose
that the presence of independent directors is positively associated with voluntary
disclosure. Cheng and Courtenay (2006) base their exploratory study on a data set
of 104 firms from the Singapore stock exchange for the years 1998 and 2000 and
find a positive relationship. Lim et al. (2007) also present evidence that board
composition and the presence of independent directors, in particular, is positively
related to the preparation of voluntary disclosures. After applying a meta-analysis
of 27 studies, Garcia-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2010) report that voluntary
disclosure increases as the proportion of independent directors increases. Samaha
et al. (2012) have a similar finding from their examination of 100 Egyptian listed
firms. This positive association is further confirmed by Samaha et al. (2015) in their
meta-analysis of 64 studies. These findings support the argument that an increased
proportion of independent directors increases the monitoring capability of a firm
and stimulates transparency.
However, it could also be argued that independent directors are more
concerned with firm performance and keen to reduce any additional cost to increase
profitability. Thus, independent directors may ignore any additional disclosure for
cost-efficiency reasons. Accordingly, Eng and Mak (2003) and Barako et al. (2006b)
report a negative relationship between independent directors and voluntary
disclosure. In addition, Esa and Anum Mohd Ghazali (2012) suggest a negative
relationship between independent directors and social disclosure after examining
27 Malaysian firms for the years 2005 and 2007. This study asserts that independent
directors might be more concerned with firm financial performance while social
issues are not a priority.
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Aside from these positive and negative correlations, some studies report no
significant relationship between independent directors and voluntary disclosure.
Alves et al. (2012) report an insignificant relationship after examining 140 Iberian
Peninsula (38 Portugal and 102 Spain) firms for the year 2007. Similarly, Ho and
Wong (2001) and Hidalgo et al. (2011) report no significant relationship after
examining 97 Hong Kong firms for the year 1997 and 100 Mexican firms for the
years 2005 to 2007 respectively.
In the Bangladeshi context, Muttakin et al. (2016) consider board
independence as a control variable and assert a positive relationship between the
proportion of independent directors and social disclosure. Khan et al. (2013) have
similar findings in their longitudinal study over the years 2005 to 2009 from a data
set of 116 manufacturing firms. This study asserts that independent directors are
utilized by Bangladeshi firms to manage social issues and are inserted as a
functioning element of the monitoring mechanism. Similarly, Khan (2010) also
reports a positive relationship between board composition and social disclosure
after examining 30 banks for the period 2007–2008 and determines that nonexecutive directors are keen to legitimize firm activities by considering social issues.
In addition, Rashid and Lodh (2008) document a significant positive relationship
for social disclosure. Regarding intellectual capital disclosures, Muttakin et al.
(2015) report a positive relationship with independent directors after examining 116
non-financial firms for the period 2005 to 2009.
The majority of studies above suggest that the presence of independent
directors increases the monitoring ability of a firm and stimulates the desire for
transparency. A smaller group argues that independent directors are more keen to
demonstrate their aptitude for operational efficiency whilst ignoring optional
agendas related to voluntary disclosure. From the limited set of prior studies in
Bangladesh, it was argued mainly that board composition, specifically the amount
of independent directors, is significant for monitoring and legitimizing firm
activities and that presence of independent directors is positively associated with
voluntary disclosure.
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Therefore, considering mixed findings in the literature, hypothesis 1(c) is
developed as follows:
H1(c): There is a relationship between board composition and voluntary
disclosure.
4.5.4 Sub-committee

A sub-committee facilitates the monitoring activity of a firm. From the
perspective of agency theory, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that audit,
nomination and remuneration sub-committees perform specific responsibilities in
the decision-making, as well as the control process, of a firm. Therefore, the
operational activities of firms can be monitored more intensively. This may, in turn,
stimulate voluntary disclosure and reduce information asymmetries (Collier 1993;
Fama 1980; Vafeas 2000).
Carson (2002) describes the role of the audit, nomination and remuneration
committees. The audit committee plays a key role for firm monitoring and
regulatory compliance. The nomination committee considers directors’ skills and
reviews the performance of the board on a regular basis. The remuneration
committee focuses on the terms and conditions of remuneration offered to senior
management of a firm. A firm may consider utilizing sub-committees to ensure that
monitoring activities are conducted in an efficient manner, to enforce better control
and transparency, and to reduce information asymmetry.
Consistent with the concept of agency theory, prior studies have also
documented that sub-committees play a key role in decisions relating to voluntary
disclosure, with the audit committee, in particular, considered an important factor.
Forker (1992) argues that the existence of audit committees improves internal
control and leads to better disclosure in an examination of UK firms, reporting a
positive but weak association between the existence of an audit committee and
share-option disclosure. Consistent with this argument, Ho and Wong (2001)
explore 98 Hong Kong firms and report that the existence of an audit committee
had a significant positive relationship with voluntary disclosure. Barako et al.
(2006b) finds support for this positive relationship based on a study of Kenyan
firms. Consistent with such results, Arcay and Vazquez (2005) also report that the
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existence of an audit committee is positively associated with the voluntary
disclosure of a firm. Allegrini and Greco (2013) further argue that having subcommittees, including a nomination, audit and compensation committee, provides
the opportunity to set strong internal controls and monitoring presence thereby
ensuring that the interests of all stakeholders are considered. A positive relationship
has been documented by O’Sullivan et al. (2008) based on a sample of Australian
firms.
In the context of Bangladesh, there is no regulatory requirement to establish
sub-committees, such as a nomination or remuneration committee. In the absence
of these committees, the audit committee has been the primary focus of Bangladeshi
studies. The 2006 guidelines30 (p. 4) from the BSEC highlights the audit committee
issue by stating that,
The Audit Committee should assist the Board of Directors in ensuring that
the financial statements reflect a true and fair view of the state of affairs of
the company and in ensuring a good monitoring system within the business.
A further guideline was established regarding the formation of an audit committee
in 2012 (Amendment to the Corporate Governance Guidelines). This guideline was
developed by the BSEC. Consequently, a research agenda focusing on the audit
committee has emerged. Rouf (2011) argues that firm monitoring is more effective
with the existence of an audit committee. After examining 120 non-financial firms,
this study provides evidence of a positive correlation with voluntary disclosure.
Khan et al. (2013) further suggest that the existence of an audit committee is
positively associated with corporate social disclosure.
Based on the above discussion it is argued that the presence of a subcommittee increases the monitoring capability and transparency of a firm.
However, within Bangladesh, the relationship between sub-committees,
particularly the nomination and remuneration committees, and voluntary
disclosure, are not explored adequately. To fill this gap, this study considers the
existence of two sub-committees and their respective impacts on voluntary
disclosure.

30

http://www.secbd.org/Order%20relating%20to%20Corporate%20Governance%20Guidelines9%20Jan06.pdf Visited 2/06/2015 6.20PM
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Therefore, considering limited documentation in the Bangladeshi context,
hypothesis 1(d) is expressed as follows:
H1(d): There is an association between the presence of sub-committees and
voluntary disclosure.
4.5.5 Audit Committee Composition

Audit committee composition refers to the proportion of independent
directors present, as well as the gender and nationality of committee members. The
proportion of independent directors on the board is considered to be the more
important issue as prior studies demonstrate that their presence is a more effective
mechanism for stimulating monitoring and internal control and subsequent
voluntary disclosure of a firm (Fama & Jensen 1983; Madi et al. 2014)
Agency theory suggests that the establishment of an audit committee is a
catalyst for a reduction in information asymmetry and opportunistic behaviour by
managers, and also improves disclosure quality (Akhtaruddin & Haron 2010;
Chung et al. 2004). Fama and Jensen (1983) further argue that the existence of
independent directors facilitates the effective monitoring of management behaviour.
Within contemporary corporate governance systems, it is expected that the function
of audit committees is reinforced by the presence of independent directors (Haji
2015). Independent audit members are expected to be more effective as they are
likely to be free from influence and pressure from management (Abbott et al. 2000;
Jun Lin et al. 2008) as they do not have a conflict of interest.
In prior studies, the existence of an audit committee and its relationship with
voluntary disclosure practices is widely explored (Alves et al. 2012; Arcay &
Vazquez 2005; Barako et al. 2006b; Ho & Wong 2001). Other studies extend this
understanding by considering the effects of audit committee composition on
voluntary disclosure practices. Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010) report that having
independent directors is positively associated with voluntary disclosure after
examining 124 Malaysian firms for the year 2003. They argue that having
independent directors on the audit committee helps to achieve an effective
monitoring system and reduces agency problems, as well as opportunistic
behaviours by owners. Consistent with this argument Madi et al. (2014) provide
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evidence of a positive association between audit committee composition and
voluntary disclosure after examining 146 Malaysian firms for the year 2009. Haji
(2015) further supports the finding that audit committee composition has a positive
relationship with voluntary disclosure.
However, Li et al. (2012) report no significant relationship between audit
committee composition and intellectual capital disclosure after examining 100
listed firms on the London Stock Exchange for the year 2005. A similar
insignificant relationship has been reported by Othman et al. (2014). They examine
the top 100 Malaysian firms for the year 2011.
Within the context of Bangladesh, the relationship between audit committee
composition and voluntary disclosure is not yet documented. It should be noted that
a limited set of studies considers the effects of audit committee existence on
disclosure (Khan et al. 2013; Muttakin et al. 2015; Rouf 2011) but audit committee
composition has not been the focus of Bangladeshi studies. The BSEC emphasized
audit committee composition in its 2012 corporate governance guidelines. Based
on this, it could be argued that audit committee composition may play a vital role
in improving firm transparency within the Bangladeshi context.
The limited studies above suggest that there may be a positive association
between audit committee composition and voluntary disclosure. In particular,
having independent directors may facilitate the reduction of information asymmetry
and augment the monitoring system of a firm. However, within the Bangladeshi
context, this relationship is not known yet.
Therefore, considering mixed findings in the literature and a lack of
documentation within Bangladesh, this study forms the following hypothesis:
H1(e): Audit committee composition is associated with voluntary
disclosure.
4.5.6 Foreign Ownership

Foreign ownership is the proportion of a firm owned by foreign investors.
Regarding this form of ownership, firms have to emphasize effective
communication with stakeholders to reduce information asymmetry as language
might act as a barrier (Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Huafang & Jianguo 2007).
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From the context of agency theory, Mangena and Tauringana (2007) and
Young and Guenther (2003) argue that foreign investors require more information
to have a better understanding of firm activities. Higher agency costs may therefore
be expected as foreign ownership increases. To ensure transparency, more
disclosure is required from the firms with foreign ownership.
Suchman (1995, p. 574) approaches this concept from the perspective of
legitimacy theory, which he summarizes neatly as:
Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.
Firms with foreign owners must pay extra attention to information asymmetry in an
environment where language, values and norms differ between countries. Haniffa
and Cooke (2005) reinforce this, suggesting that the existence of foreign investors
may result in an increased legitimacy gap. As a result, a firm must use voluntary
disclosure to legitimize operational activities, satisfy foreign investors and attract
investment capital. Therefore, in line with agency and legitimacy theories, firms
emphasize reducing information asymmetry and legitimizing operational activities.
Consistent with agency and legitimacy theories, a large number of prior
studies argue that foreign ownership positively influences firms’ voluntary
disclosure policies. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) suggest foreign ownership is
positively associated with voluntary disclosure and argue that the monitoring
function is a pivotal reason for this focus. Barako et al. (2006a) report similarly and
argue that, due to the geographical separation of owners and management, firm
management might be motivated to disclose more information. Huafang and
Jianguo (2007) use a data set of 599 Chinese firms to lend further weight to the
positive association between voluntary disclosure and foreign ownership.
In contrast, Laidroo (2009) argues that firms with foreign investors are
mainly controlled by foreign interests where local investors have less influence on
firm decision making. As a result, there is a negative association between foreign
ownership and voluntary disclosure as there is less incentive to maintain a positive
reputation. Laidroo considers the years 2000 to 2005 for 52 firms from three
European emerging capital markets in the Baltics – the Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius
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Stock Exchanges. A negative relationship between foreign ownership and voluntary
disclosure was reported.
Veronica and Bachtiar (2010) do not find any significant relationship
between foreign ownership and voluntary disclosure after examining 87 listed firms
on the Indonesian Stock Exchange for the year 2003. The design of this study may
be the primary reason as the proportion of foreign investors may not have been
enough to influence the results.
Within the context of Bangladesh, Khan et al. (2013) report a positive
association between foreign ownership and social disclosure after examining 116
manufacturing firms from 2005 to 2009. They argue that firms are keen to satisfy
foreign investors, thereby maintaining legitimacy by disclosing social issues. More
recently, Muttakin et al. (2015) report a positive association between foreign
ownership and intellectual capital disclosure with the argument that foreign
investors are uncertain about emerging markets like Bangladesh. As a result, extra
disclosure is demanded. This study considers 135 manufacturing firms from the
years 2005 to 2009.
The above suggests that prior studies have contradictory findings, with one
group of researchers arguing that foreign ownership stimulates firm monitoring and
positively influences firm performance, while the other argues that foreign
ownership has less influence and negatively influences voluntary disclosure.
Therefore, considering mixed findings in the literature, hypothesis 1(f) is as
follows:
H1(f): Foreign ownership is associated with voluntary disclosure.
4.5.7 Director Ownership

Director ownership refers to the proportion of shares owned by the board of
directors of a firm. The board of directors is closely associated with the formation
of the firm’s policies, and individuals on the board are collectively involved in
developing the overall strategic vision of the firm. These individuals therefore play
an important role in the controlling and decision-making processes of a firm (Eng
& Mak 2003; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Khan et al. 2013).
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In the context of agency theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that
director ownership ensures that the interests of the directors and shareholders are
aligned. Consistent with this view, it can be argued that due to director ownership
a firm may promote transparency by considering additional information. Ideally, in
an environment where shareholders voice concerns about social issues, this may
contribute to the value of a firm. However, McConnell and Servaes (1990) argue
that directors may use information asymmetries to maximize their own benefit
instead of the best interests of the firm. For instance, directors have better access to
internal information. As a result, opportunistic directors may limit available
information to gain a benefit from ownership. Thus, director ownership may, in fact,
reduce the amount of relevant voluntary disclosure offered to stakeholders.
Leung and Horwitz (2004) find a mixed relationship between board
ownership and voluntary disclosure after studying 376 Hong Kong firms for the
year 1996. They report that low director ownership (less than 25%) is positively
associated with voluntary disclosure but that this relationship is negative when
director ownership is higher (more than 25%). Other studies reported positive
relationships between managerial ownership and voluntary disclosure After
examining 100 Chinese firms, Li and Qi (2008) report a positive relationship. In
addition, Jiang and Habib (2009) reveal a positive association after examining 467
samples in a longitudinal study for the period 2001 to 2005.
Other empirical studies support a negative relationship between director
ownership and voluntary disclosure. Eng and Mak (2003), for instance, report a
negative association between managerial ownership and voluntary disclosure,
concluding that director ownership leads to agency conflicts and monitoring
problems. Ghazali and Weetman (2006) also report a negative relationship after
examining Malaysian listed firms for the year 2001. Mohd Ghazali (2007) further
report on this negative association from a social disclosure perspective, finding that
director ownership may lead to an agency problem. For instance, having director
ownership means there is relatively low interest from outsiders. Accordingly, there
is decreased firm accountability due to less pressure from external stakeholders. As
a result, directors may not be motivated to incur extra costs for the outsider.
Therefore, there is a negative relationship between director ownership and
voluntary disclosure of a firm.
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In contrast, Gul and Leung (2004), Huafang and Jianguo (2007), and
Samaha et al. (2012) fail to find any relationship between director ownership
(managerial) and voluntary disclosure after examining 385 Hong Kong, 559
Chinese and 100 Egyptian firms respectively.
In the Bangladeshi context, Khan et al. (2013) report a negative correlation
between social disclosure and managerial ownership. They argue that this form of
investor is more powerful compared to others and, thus, they ignore social
accountability. In a further analysis, they find within export oriented firms that
director ownership is positively associated with social disclosure. They argue that
Western stakeholders may exert pressure on firms to consider social issues. While
findings such as these present a reasonable base from which to develop further
studies, it should be also noted that the relationship between director ownership and
voluntary corporate disclosure has not been investigated widely within the context
of Bangladesh. For instance, the relationship between director ownership and
environmental and intellectual capital voluntary disclosure has not yet been
examined.
The above discussion demonstrates that there are mixed findings regarding
the relationship between director ownership and voluntary disclosure within the
literature. Results from the Bangladeshi context are limited to those pertaining to
social disclosure and there is no investigation that has delved into environmental or
intellectual capital issues. The current research agenda represents a step towards
filling this research gap. The following hypothesis, once tested, will provide
evidence and contribute to a much richer understanding of corporate social
disclosure in the Bangladeshi context.
Therefore, considering mixed findings in the literature and lack of
documentation within Bangladesh, the hypothesis linking director ownership and
voluntary disclosure is as follows:
H1(g): Director ownership is associated with voluntary disclosure.
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4.5.8 Institutional Ownership

Institutional ownership refers to investors of a firm that are financial
institutions including banks, corporations, mutual funds and superannuation funds
(Farrar 2008). In regards to firm ownership structure, institutional ownership is
considered to be an important factor as these investors have the capability and
resources to access more information compared to smaller shareholders (Smith
1976). Furthermore, as professional investors, institutional shareholders are more
suited to interpreting information because of their expertise in the field. Their
combined voting power provides further privilege (Bos & Donker 2004; Chung et
al. 2002; Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008). Therefore, institutional investors may
demand detailed information and play an important role in the monitoring process
of a firm as well as potentially contributing to the transparency of a firm’s actions
(Aggarwal et al. 2011; Barako et al. 2006a).
Based on the concept of agency theory, a firm’s monitoring process is a
significant factor in reducing agency–principal conflict (Jensen & Meckling 1976).
Institutional owners play a significant role in the monitoring process and can
potentially reduce monitoring costs because of their expertise, which can be applied
in a scaled fashion. A corollary to this is that institutional investors may place
greater emphasis on voluntary disclosure thereby reducing information
asymmetries (Diamond & Verrecchia 1991; Haniffa & Cooke 2002).
Regarding social and environmental disclosure, Solomon and Solomon
(2006) argue that active engagement and representation of institutional investors
enhances corporate governance mechanisms and encourages the firm to focus on
social, ethical and environmental areas. Boone and White (2015) support this view
and claim that higher institutional ownership reduces information asymmetry,
which reduces monitoring costs and the subsequent trading costs of a firm.
Similarly, Barako et al. (2006a) assert a positive association after investigating 43
Kenyan firms from the years 1992 to 2001. This study presents the argument that
institutional investors positively influence voluntary disclosure through their role
as an effective monitor and through their expert and active engagement with firm
governance. Similarly, Ntim et al. (2012) suggest a positive association after
conducting research on 169 South African firms for the period 2002 to 2006.
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Laidroo (2009) reports a positive relationship, arguing that institutional owners are
more powerful and demand additional information when compared to other
investors. Khlif et al. (2016) lend further strong support in favour of the positive
association between institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure after
reviewing 69 prior studies.
Conversely, institutional investors are often most concerned with
maximizing short term financial returns and it could be argued that institutional
investors are more likely to have direct access to the required information from a
firm; thus firms may not emphasize voluntary disclosure. In addition, the expected
return from institutional investors is not typically achieved or observable through
the discharge of informal accountabilities such as those espoused by voluntary
disclosure, hence this type of information is not the focus of institutional investors.
Consistent with these arguments, Jiang and Habib (2009) report a negative
relationship with voluntary disclosure.
In contrast, several studies report that there is no significant relationship
between institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure. For example, Haniffa
and Cooke (2002) and Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) report an insignificant
relationship after examining 167 Malaysian and 51 Irish firms respectively.
Within the context of Bangladesh, Farooque et al. (2007, p. 131) state that,
“… the institutional setting for ownership structure in Bangladesh has unique
features, an appreciation of which is important to understanding the governance
mechanisms and processes that have evolved in Bangladesh”. However, the
relationship between institutional ownership and voluntary corporate disclosure has
not been investigated widely. Institutional investor ownership and its relationship
with other forms of voluntary disclosure, like environmental and intellectual capital
disclosures, have not been explored. Regarding social disclosure, Rashid and Lodh
(2008) considered 21 firms for the periods 2003–2004 and 2006–2007 and reported
that there is no significant relationship between institutional ownership and social
disclosure. They outline possible future research agendas and encourage further
study for the post 2006 period. Despite these early and insightful attempts,
contemporary analyses on this topic are lacking and the relationship between
institutional ownership and corporate voluntary disclosure is not well documented.
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Therefore, considering mixed findings in the literature and lack of
documentation within Bangladesh, the present study considers the following
hypothesis:
H1(h): There is an association between institutional ownership and
voluntary disclosure.

4.6 Hypothesis: The Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure
and Firm Performance (Effects)
Besides the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and
voluntary disclosure, the research framework (Figure 4-2) also presents evidence
from the literature (refer to Chapter Two) that voluntary disclosure of a firm may
affect firm performance. Based on the concept of signalling theory, voluntary
disclosure of a firm is a medium of communication and acts as a signal from a firm
to stakeholders. Depending on the quality of the signal, a firm may reduce
information asymmetry and establish effective communication. Accordingly, based
on the nature of the signal (voluntary disclosure) there might be an impact on the
operational cost and reputation of a firm (Anderson & Frankle 1980; Shane &
Spicer 1983), which may subsequently affect firm performance. Legitimacy theory
is also relevant here as voluntary disclosure reflects a firm’s compliance with the
social contract, including the norms and values of a firm. By considering voluntary
disclosure, a firm may overtly display compliance with the social contract. Such
compliance may create a positive image, which may add value to a firm, thereby
positively affecting firm performance.
Within the literature, a significant number of studies has considered the
above phenomenon. There have been mixed findings between countries and the
time periods and methods adopted have varied quite significantly (Griffin & Mahon
1997; Margolis et al. 2009; Margolis & Walsh 2003; Molina-Azorín et al. 2009;
Orlitzky et al. 2003; Wang et al. 2016). By reviewing prior studies concerning the
effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance, three types of effect are
identified: positive, negative and neutral.
A large number of prior studies report that voluntary disclosure has a
positive effect on firm performance and these positive findings are supported by
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various arguments (Griffin & Mahon 1997; Margolis & Walsh 2003; MolinaAzorín et al. 2009; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Wang et al. 2016). For instance, it has been
argued that, by considering voluntary disclosure, firms may receive a positive
response regarding product or premium price (Bhattacharya & Sen 2003). Also,
some studies find that by considering voluntary disclosure (intellectual capital),
firms intend to convey good news, such as value-related information, to
stakeholders and this may lead to an increase in market capitalization (Anam et al.
2011; Uyar & Kılıç 2012). This argument suggests that voluntary disclosure acts as
a signal to convey good news to stakeholders. It is further argued that voluntary
disclosure (social disclosure) can be leveraged as a strategic mechanism used to
generate profit by complying with the expectations of different stakeholders,
thereby adhering to social imperatives (Chen & Wang 2011; Cheng et al. 2016).
It is also reported that firms with objective or extensive voluntary disclosure
are more likely to have lower financing costs (Aerts et al. 2008; Cormier & Magnan
2007), which may lead to better firm performance. Also, by disclosing voluntarily,
firms may retain quality employees and increase productivity, which may lead to a
reduction of costs (Cormier et al. 2011; Qiu et al. 2016; Siegel 2009). Voluntary
disclosure may also facilitate the reduction of information asymmetries. In addition,
voluntary disclosure is considered a potent rhetorical mechanism used to deflate
public pressure within the social/political context and demonstrate compliance with
social norms and values, (Gray et al. 1995; Patten 2002; Suchman 1995). Voluntary
disclosure may therefore act as a signal, ensuring better communication between
the firm and stakeholders (Lin et al. 2012). This signalling device may help a firm
create a better image and/or reputation (Miles & Covin 2000) ultimately leading to
better firm performance. A significant number of prior studies provide empirical
evidence that supports this line of reasoning and shows that voluntary disclosure
has a positive effect on firm performance (Abdolmohammadi 2005; Anam et al.
2011; Chen & Wang 2011; Cheng et al. 2016; Chi 2009; Choi et al. 2010; Garay et
al. 2013; Khlif et al. 2015; Montabon et al. 2007; Prado-Lorenzo et al. 2008; Uyar
& Kılıç 2012).
Although the majority of prior studies report the positive effects of
voluntary disclosure on firm performance, a significant number of studies report a
94

negative effect (Griffin & Mahon 1997; Margolis & Walsh 2003; Molina-Azorín et
al. 2009; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Wang et al. 2016). To explain these results, it has
been argued that the shareholder may perceive financial performance as more
important than voluntary disclosure and that too much emphasis on voluntary
activities will reduce the profitability of the firm (Li et al. 2017; Lima Crisóstomo
et al. 2011). It is also argued that voluntary disclosure is subject to extra costs that
lead to reduction of the competitiveness of a firm as well as financial performance
(Friedman 1970; Mathuva & Kiweu 2016). In addition, some stakeholders may
ascribe little importance to social information; thus voluntary disclosure may have
a negative influence on firm performance (Lima Crisóstomo et al. 2011) due to the
extra costs involved. In line with these arguments various prior studies report that
voluntary disclosure has a negative effect on the firm performance (Chen et al.
2016; Li et al. 2017; Lima Crisóstomo et al. 2011; Mathuva & Kiweu 2016).
Besides the positive and negative effects of voluntary disclosure on
performance, it is also reported that there is no significant effect from voluntary
disclosure to firm performance (Griffin & Mahon 1997; Margolis & Walsh 2003;
Molina-Azorín et al. 2009; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Wang et al. 2016). For example,
Aras et al. (2010) argue that voluntary disclosure is a broad issue and perhaps not
sufficiently related to firm financial and economic performance from a developing
country perspective. Cormier and Magnan (2007) report that voluntary disclosure
has a significant effect on market value in Canada; however, there is no significant
effect for Germany and France. To explain these results, authors have argued that
due to a varied socio-economic context, the significance of disclosure might be
different among users. It is further argued that investors may not rely on these
disclosures to make a decision. In particular, investors might be more concerned
with financial return than social information.
Very little investigation has taken place within the context of Bangladesh.
Hossain et al. (2015) only investigate the effects of various categories of social
disclosure on firm performance by considering three indicators: ROA, ROE and
Tobin’s Q. They report a significant positive effect on return on asset and return on
equity, explaining that voluntary disclosure may act as a competitive advantage for
firms. Whilst this study offers significant findings, there is a major limitation as the
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data set (2008 to 2012) is located within the period of the 2010 share market
collapse. As a result, the findings may be skewed. This type of study is rare in the
Bangladeshi context and focused on social comparators. The impact of other forms
of voluntary disclosure, that is, environmental and intellectual capital, on firm
performance is also scarce.
Based on the above discussions, there are mixed finding regarding the
effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance. However, it is worthwhile
noting that the majority of studies investigating the relationship between voluntary
disclosure and firm performance report a positive effect. Very few studies focus on
the Bangladeshi context. The present study attempts to address this gap by
formulating hypotheses that have not yet been considered in the Bangladeshi
context. The hypotheses are consistent with other models found in the literature and
hypothesis two is developed as follows:
H2: Corporate voluntary disclosure is positively associated with firm
performance.
Prior studies have considered several indicators of firm performance. The
indicators of firm performance are categorized as accounting, marketing and mixed.
It should be noted that a wide range of firm performance indicators considered in
the literature are potential contributors to mixed results. For a broader
understanding, this study considers indicators from each main category.
Accordingly, the significant and widely used five indicators,31 including Return on
Asset, Return on Sales, Market Capitalization, Earning per Share and Tobin’s Q,
are considered for this study. Therefore, hypothesis two is sub-categorized into five
sub-hypotheses as follows:
H2(a): Corporate voluntary disclosure is positively associated with return on asset
H2(b): Corporate voluntary disclosure is positively associated with return on sales
H2(c): Corporate voluntary disclosure is positively associated with market capitalization
H2(d): Corporate voluntary disclosure is positively associated with earnings per share
H2(e): Corporate voluntary disclosure is positively associated with Tobin’s Q

31

Further justification for considering these firm performance indicators are provided in Chapter
five.

96

4.7 Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter was to explore the research setting, provide the
research framework, and develop relevant hypotheses for this thesis. Consistent
with the research agenda this chapter exposes the key issues and a general overview
of Bangladesh, including historical, regulatory and environmental perspectives.
The status of corporate voluntary disclosure reporting and the capital market in
Bangladesh was also discussed. A brief review of corporate governance
mechanisms in Bangladesh and their relationship with the regulatory structure was
provided.
The research framework was informed by relevant models in similar
research contexts found in the literature. The development of a detailed research
framework was described, in particular, the way in which several significant
characteristics of corporate governance including CEO duality, board size, board
composition, sub-committee, audit committee independence, foreign ownership,
director ownership and institutional ownership may be considered as potential
determinants of voluntary disclosure. In addition, to explore the effect of voluntary
disclosure, return on assets, return on sales, earnings per share, market
capitalization and Tobin’s Q were considered as indicators of firm performance. .
To explore the determinants of voluntary disclosure, hypotheses were
developed by considering eight significant corporate governance characteristics.
An additional hypothesis was also constructed to examine the effects of voluntary
disclosure on firm performance, including five sub-hypotheses with relevant
indicators of firm performance. The following chapter sheds light on the research
design for this thesis. In particular, Chapter five will describe sample design, source
of data, the measurement of the dependent, independent and control variables,
research models and the statistical techniques employed to test the hypotheses
articulated in this chapter.
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Chapter Five: Research Methodology and Method
5.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the research method selected to investigate the
hypotheses developed in Chapter Four. The selection of an appropriate research
approach (method) is essential to achieve reliable results (Kothari 2004). The
significance of the research method is articulated by Kumar (2005, p. 41):
An extremely important feature of research is the use of appropriate
methods. Research involves systematic, controlled, valid and rigorous
exploration and description of what is not known and establishment of
associations and causation that permit the accurate prediction of outcomes
under a given set of conditions.
The first requirement of a quantitative approach is to select an appropriate
sample for the study. The top 200 firms (based on market capitalization) from
Bangladesh provide the sample for this study since firms with higher market
capitalization are considered more proactive in making voluntary disclosures
(Abeysekera 2010; Mohd Ghazali 2007). Data is collected for three years (2011 to
2013) from the sampled firms for voluntary disclosure practices. The year 2011 was
chosen because, after the Bangladesh share market collapse in 2010, significant
changes were made, including the Dhaka stock exchange reformation and
introduction of new guidelines to increase transparency. This study considers
annual reports of firms to investigate voluntary disclosure as they are widely
considered to be reliable (Abeysekera & Guthrie 2005; Botosan 1997; Khan et al.
2009). In addition, this study relies on a lag year of voluntary disclosure and collects
data for firm performance from the years 2012 to 2014. The Bloomberg database is
used to collect financial performance data as market-related information is not
available in annual reports.
To quantify voluntary disclosure data, a voluntary disclosure index was
constructed based on the disclosure items and rationales of pioneering studies.
Consistent with the literature, unweighted content analyses of annual reports have
been conducted to measure and quantify index items, eight significant corporate
governance characteristics, and five widely used indicators of firm performance. In
addition, consistent with the literature, Firm Size, Leverage, Industry and Current
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Year Firm Performance are considered as control variables and act as moderating
factors in this study
This study consists of two research models. Model One investigates the
determinants of voluntary disclosure by considering voluntary disclosure as the
dependent variable and corporate governance characteristics as the independent
variables. Model Two investigates the effect of voluntary disclosure by considering
voluntary disclosure as the independent variable and firm performance as the
dependent variable.
To analyse the data, several statistical analyses are applied. First,
descriptive statistics are conducted to find the mean, median and standard deviation
of variables. Second, tests of error including normality, multicollinearity,
heteroscedasticity and endogeneity are conducted as these are essential before
proceeding with statistical analysis (Rashid 2015a). Third, panel data analysis by
applying pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to investigate the
research questions. To confirm the results, two stage least squares (2SLS)
regression is applied. Finally, to ensure robustness, two different tests have been
considered for each research model: an additional endogeneity test, considering
alternative measurement for corporate governance characteristics, by replacing the
classification of voluntary disclosure with three special categories (social,
environmental, intellectual capital).
The remainder of Chapter Five is organized in the following manner.
Section 5.2 outlines the sample design, sources of data and collection process for
this study. Section 5.3 elaborates on the voluntary disclosure measurement process.
The measurement process of corporate governance characteristics is examined in
Section 5.4. Section 5.5 presents the measurement process of firm performance
variables. Section 5.6 presents the measurement process of the control variables for
this study. Section 5.7 presents the research models for this study. Section 5.8
discusses the statistical analyses that are applied in this study. Finally, the
conclusion of the chapter is provided in Section 5.9.
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5.2 Sample Design and Sources of Data
According to Kothari (2004, p. 56), a “(r)esearcher must select/prepare a
sample design which should be reliable and appropriate for his research study”.
Details of sampling design and sources of data for this study are outlined below.
5.2.1 Firm Selection

The reason for exploring the determinants and effects of voluntary
disclosure for the top 200 listed firms (based on market capitalization at 31
December 2013) on the Dhaka Stock Exchange is that it is expected that the top
firms voluntarily disclose financial and non-financial information proactively
(Belal 2001). In addition, firms with higher marker capitalization are considered to
have extra resources compared to other firms (Adams et al. 1998; Andrew et al.
1989) and this allows them to focus on voluntary disclosure. This is particularly
relevant for firms in a developing country context. Furthermore, sampling based on
the market capitalization approach is consistent with prior studies (Belal 2001;
Guthrie & Parker 1990; Rashid & Lodh 2008).
Within the top 200 firms, there are a few sectors, including the bond,
insurance and mutual funds sectors, which have significantly different reporting
structures. Thus, the data (financial performance) may not be consistent with other
sectors. As a result, the bond, insurance, and mutual funds sectors are excluded
from this study, leaving 157 top firms (77% of total market equity and 67.0% of
total sample). In addition, 23 firms have been omitted due to missing information.
Therefore, the final sample consists of 134 firms (68% of total market equity and
45.0% of total sample). Sectorial sampling information along with sectorial
disaggregation is shown in Table 5.1.
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Table 5-1 Sectorial sample details

Sector
Bank
Cement
Ceramic
Engineering
Food & Allied
Fuel & Power
IT
Miscellaneous
NBFI
Pharmaceutical
Service & Real Estate
Tannery
Telecommunication
Textile
Travel & Leisure
Bond
Insurance
Mutual Fund
Paper & Printing
Jute
Total
*

Total Firms
30
7
5
26
17
15
6
9
23
24
3
5
2
31
3
3
46
41
1
3
300

Firms within
Top 200
30
7
3
18
9
13
2
6
22
19
3
3
2
18
2
2
31
10
0
0
200*

Firms Included
in Sample
30
6
3
12
8
12
1
4
19
16
3
3
2
13
2
0
0
0
0
0
134**

(77% of Total Market Equity & 67% of Total Sample Size), ** (68% of Total Market Equity &
45% of Total Sample Size)

5.2.2 Year Selection

Within the Bangladeshi context, the years 2011 onwards are considered to
be significant for two reasons. First, the BSEC suffered a severe stock market
collapse due to a price bubble in 2010 (Barua et al. 2014). The stock market adjusted
and returned to normal in 2011. As a result, considering data from 2011 onward
avoids distortions from the share market collapse.
Second, following the share market collapse, the Bangladeshi government
initiated reform of the SEC and introduced various guidelines to improve firm
transparency.32 It should also be noted that very few studies on voluntary disclosure
have considered the years 2011 and onwards.
Finally, most prior studies within the Bangladeshi context are limited to a
particular year (Belal 2000, 2001; Khan et al. 2009). However, studying multiple
periods can produce stronger findings (Akhtaruddin & Haron 2010). To explore the
effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance, a lag year concept has been
32

http://www.secbd.org/AR2010-2011English.pdf.P. 16
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considered to avoid a causality problem between voluntary disclosure and firm
performance (Chen & Wang 2011; Waddock & Graves 1997) as it could be argued
that disclosure might not effect firm performance immediately. It should also be
noted that consideration of a lag year for disclosure is consistent with the research
design adopted in prior studies (Chen & Wang 2011; Cheng et al. 2016; Veronica
& Bachtiar 2010). Therefore, to explore the effects of voluntary disclosure, firm
performance data are collected from the years 2012 to 2014.
Based on the selected 134 firms, a final sample yielded 402 firm-year
observations. The summary of the sampling years is presented in Table 5.2.
Table 5-2 Summary of sampling period

Variables
Voluntary Disclosure

Period
Data collection period 2011 to 2013.

Corporate Governance Characteristics
Firm Performance as Effect
Control Variables

Data collection period 2011 to 2013.
Data collection period 2012 to 2014.
Data collection period 2011 to 2013.

5.2.3 Sources of Data

This study relies on secondary data from two different sources including
annual reports and information retrieved from the Bloomberg Database. In the
following, sources are discussed along with justification for their use.
5.2.3.1 Annual Report as a Source of Data

This study considers annual reports as a source of voluntary disclosure.
There are some significant reasons to consider the annual report as a source of data.
First, the annual report is a common and trusted source of both financial and nonfinancial information from a firm (Botosan 1997) where significant issues and
concerns are expressed comprehensively (Abeysekera & Guthrie 2005; Khan et al.
2009). Second, the annual report is readily available as a source of reliable
information (Unerman 2000), both in hard copy and electronically. Finally, the
measurement of voluntary disclosure in this study is achieved through content
analysis. Voluntary disclosure that is published in other forms (i.e., web) is not
helpful for content analysis as it is quite difficult to retrieve the publication date.
Furthermore, online publications encompassing voluntary disclosures are not
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commonly used within every sector in Bangladesh (Michelon & Parbonetti 2012;
Rashid 2015a). Within the context of Bangladesh, annual reports are considered to
be the most extensive and recognized document for a firm’s communication on a
regular basis (Belal 2000; Khan & Ali 2010; Khan et al. 2009).
Nonetheless, the annual report does not necessarily encompass all aspects
of firm performance indicators and pertinent information on financial performance,
for example, market-related indicators, in particular, may not be included.
5.2.3.2 Bloomberg Database as a Source of Data

The Bloomberg Database is used to gather firm performance data as it
provides access to current and historical financial information, including
accounting and market-based data for local and international firms.

5.3 Voluntary Disclosure
There are various ways to identify and measure a firm’s voluntary
disclosures. According to Hassan and Marston (2010, p. 9):
... we present measures of disclosure provided in prior studies classified into
two approaches. The first approach includes proxies for disclosure, which
are not directly based on examining the original disclosure vehicle(s). The
second approach provides measures of disclosure obtained by inspecting the
original disclosure vehicle(s).
The first approach does not assess the original disclosure and is dependent on the
perceptions of an individual or group regarding the disclosure. A disclosure index
is widely considered as appropriate within the literature (Cerf 1961; Guthrie et al.
2004; Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Khan et al. 2013; Lim et al. 2007; Marston & Shrives
1991; Muttakin et al. 2015). Moreover, Marston and Shrives (1991, p. 195) state:
One research instrument that has been used in numerous publications is an
index of disclosure of particular information in company reports. Such an
index aims to show the level of disclosure in a set of company accounts.
Therefore, consistent with the literature, this study also considers a disclosure index
as a measurement process of voluntary disclosure as discussed in the following
section.
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5.3.1 Voluntary Disclosure Index

Implementing the measurement of the level of disclosure is a scientific
approach. To describe the disclosure index Coy et al. (1993,p. 122 ) states:
A qualitative-based instrument designed to measure a series of items, which
when aggregated, gives a surrogate score indicative of the level of
disclosure in the specific context for which the index was devised.
Measuring disclosures by considering a disclosure index was first introduced by
Cerf (1961). It should be noted that, for the construction of a voluntary disclosure
index, no ingrained or agreed upon theoretical direction has been established,
therefore, the development of a new index should be based on the objectives of a
research problem (Artiach & Clarkson 2011; Samaha et al. 2015).
There are two different procedures for gathering items that comprise a
voluntary disclosure index. One approach is to construct an entirely new index. The
other approach is to develop an index in light of existing index items (used in prior
studies) and possibly alter these based on methodological requirements and a
particular research context (Vu 2012). Developing an index in light of an existing
index is a procedure that is widely considered (Anam et al. 2011; Barako et al.
2006a, 2006b). On the other hand, development of an entirely new index can be
risky in terms of the researcher’s time constraints and may be subject to criticism.
Therefore, this study employs and tailors an existing voluntary disclosure index that
has been deemed to measure voluntary disclosure reliably (Abeysekera 2007; Belal
et al. 2010; Clarkson et al. 2008; Hackston & Milne 1996; Haniffa & Cooke 2005;
Kamal & Deegan 2013; Khan et al. 2013; Muttakin et al. 2015; Nurunnabi et al.
2011; Ullah et al. 2013).
In summary, voluntary disclosure of Bangladeshi firms sampled in this
study is measured using a voluntary disclosure index. The measurement of
voluntary disclosure is achieved by the following four steps. First, preliminary
items for the voluntary disclosure index based on the existing literature are selected.
Second, these initially selected items are reviewed and altered to ensure there is no
ambiguity. Third, the score for the voluntary disclosure index is calculated. Finally,
several tests to confirm the reliability and validity of the index are conducted and
the construction of a voluntary disclosure index is completed. All four steps are
discussed in the following sections.
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5.3.2 Select Preliminary Items for Voluntary Disclosure Index

This study emphasizes important types of voluntary disclosure used in
business enterprises and researched in the literature. Accordingly, social and
environmental disclosures are considered important types of voluntary disclosure
and it is well documented that firms utilize social and environmental disclosures to
legitimize their operational activities (Meek et al. 1995). Gray et al. (2001, p. 330)
also notes the significance of corporate social and environmental disclosure by
stating that, “… a substantial body of literature from a wide spectrum of theoretical
positions concludes that social and environmental disclosures are an important
phenomenon employed by corporations for a variety purposes”. Corporate social
and environmental disclosures also carry extra significance as the local community,
policymakers and various social and environmental organizations are important
stakeholders and therefore require or desire this type of disclosure. In addition to
the social and environmental features of voluntary disclosure, information related
to the intellectual capital of a firm is also considered as vital. The intellectual capital
of a firm is located in the firm’s associations, structures and people, and adds value
to the firm by creating and maintaining creativity, innovation, information
technology, interpersonal activities and competitive advantage (Appuhami &
Bhuyan 2015; Guthrie 2001). Intellectual capital also has the potential to enhance
the efficiency of applied capital and labour (Petty & Guthrie 2000, p. 156).
Information related to intellectual capital that is voluntarily disclosed is therefore
considered to be similarly vital for assessing and evaluating the future prospects of
a firm.
A firm may provide an extensive array of extra information from different
aspects – social, environmental and intellectual – and communicate with a diverse
range of users. The significance of these three types of voluntary disclosure has also
been observed in prior studies. In particular, several meta-analyses have found that
social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures are the most significant
and widely used voluntary disclosures (Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010;
Samaha et al. 2015).
Therefore, this study gathers voluntary disclosure items from these three
important types of voluntary disclosures. Items are collected based on previous
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studies in the voluntary disclosure literature. Studies from the Bangladeshi context
have been considered to ensure that disclosure items are relevant and applicable.
Figure 5-1 presents the relevant studies that are considered for gathering social,
environmental and intellectual capital disclosure items.

Voluntary

Disclosure

Social Disclosure
(Hackston and Milne 1996,
Haniffa and Cooke 2005,
Kamal and Deegan 2013,
Khan et al. 2013)

Environmental Disclosure
(Belal et al. 2010, Clarkson et
al. 2008, Kamal and Deegan
2013, Ullah et al. 2013)

Intellectual Capital
Disclosure
(Abeysekera 2007,
Muttakin et al. 2015,
Nurunnabi et al. 2011)

Figure 5-1 References for the Categories of voluntary disclosure

5.3.2 Review Selected Items for Voluntary Disclosure Index

After gathering various voluntary disclosure items from the selected prior
studies, a total of 119 disclosure items has been selected. It should also be noted
that prior studies have considered various sub-categories for social, environmental
and intellectual capital disclosures. In particular, social, environmental and
intellectual capital disclosures are sub-categorized into 8, 11 and 3 categories
respectively. Figure 5-2 presents details of all the sub-categories.
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Governance Structure and
Management System

Governance Structure and
Management System

Vision and Strategy
Vision and Strategy
Financials on Environmental
Issues
Human Rights and Child Labour

Social

Environmental Initiatives

Employee Management, Labour
Practice and Fair Work

Environmental Audit
Environmental

Disclosure

Disclosure
Social and Community

Affiliation with Standard/
Guidelines
Environmental Pollution

Product and Service Information
Environmental Energy
Focus on Customer Service
Environmental Award

and Satisfaction

Negative or Potential
Negative Data

General Social Information

General Environmental
Information

Internal Capital
Intellectual Capital
Disclosure

External Capital
Human Capital

Figure 5-2 Categories of voluntary disclosure

Based on Figure 5-2, social and environmental disclosures are divided into
a wide range of sub-categories. For instance, social and community, environmental
audit, environmental initiatives, vision and strategy, and so on. These subcategories focus on the nature of the disclosure only. However, social and
environmental disclosure could be sub-categorized from the context of decision
making as well. For instance, firm disclosures is an outcome of the strategic
decision-making process, and such a concept might be applied for categorizing
social and environmental disclosures. Accordingly, the main focus is placed on both
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long and short term issues (Banks & Wheelwright 1979). In addition, Carroll (1991,
p. 44) notes that, when considering social aspects, a firm must manage several
stakeholders and make decisions in both long and short-term contexts. However,
there might be some disclosures that may not fall within these two types but cover
basic information or general comment. By considering the focus of the
aforementioned decision-making process, a firm’s social and environmental
disclosures could be sub-categorized into three categories: strategic/long term
focused disclosure, current/short-term focused disclosure and generic focused
disclosure. Several insights and details of the sub-categorization are discussed in
the following:
First, some disclosures emphasize the strategic agenda of a firm with a
long-term focus. Such strategic disclosure may be considered as critical and
requires in-depth attention from the firm’s strategic decision makers. A large
number of costs may also be involved. For instance, based on a firm’s governance
structure, its vision and strategy regarding social issues is considered to be the most
critical component. Consequently, for a long-term focus, firms may have to redirect
resources accordingly by deploying relevant staff members or employing experts in
the field. Consideration of this type of disclosure may add value in the future and
may not necessarily attract an immediate payoff. As a result, it could be argued that
a firm considers such disclosures as a strategic response with a long-term focus.
Social disclosures such as this, though arduous and potentially costly, represent an
important legitimizing tool of business Summerhays and de Villiers (2012) have
demonstrated that long-term disclosures, in this case environmental with aspirations
of gaining social legitimacy, played a vital role for the six largest oil producers in
the wake of the Gulf of Mexico oil spill of 2010. Their study noted that these
companies focused on carefully planned, strategic and positive environmental
responses to draw attention to their business cause while simultaneously avoiding
litigation.
Second, other types of voluntary disclosure simply outlay the current status
of social/environmental issues in the company or relay information on decisions
regarding disclosures. Such actions may be considered as short-term strategic
decision making. An example of this is reporting on the decision to donate in
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response to a social or environmental event. Such disclosure is considered to be a
short-term effort to attract customers or deflect criticism. A firm’s involvement in
society and local communities can be mediated. For example, firms are particularly
aware of issues related to pollution that can affect their short-term profitability.
Finally, besides specific strategic/long term and current/short-term
strategies relating to social and environmental issues, there are other types of
disclosures that limit social and environmental concerns by expressing a general or
moral initiative. This type of disclosure practice could be seen as isolated, require
little or no significant investment or initiative, for example, if a firm makes a moral
statement or a statement for public awareness. However, it might still convey a
positive impression of the firm to stakeholders. The concept of general disclosure
is also argued by De Villiers and Van Staden (2006) for environmental disclosures.
Therefore, in line with the strategic context of a firm, the final category of social
and environmental disclosures is termed generic disclosure.
In light of the above, this thesis has extended sub-categories in relation to
voluntary disclosure and strategic management: long-term, short-term, and generic
voluntary disclosure (See Figures 5-3 & 5-4).
Governance Structure and
Management System
Vision and Strategy

Strategic / Long Term
Social Disclosure (SSD)

Human Rights and Child
Labour
Social

Employee Management,
Labour Practice and Fair Work

Disclosure
Social and Community
Product and Service
Information

Current /Short Term
Social Disclosure (CSD)

Focus on Customer Service
and Satisfaction
General Social Information
Figure 5-3 Categories of social disclosure
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Generic Social
Disclosure (GSD)

Governance structure and
Management System
Vision and Strategy
Financials on Environmental
Issues
Environmental Initiatives

Environmental
Disclosure

Strategic / Long
Term
Environmental
Disclosure (SED)

Environmental Audit
Affiliation with Standard/
Guidelines
Environmental Pollution
Environmental Energy
Environmental Award
Negative or Potential Negative
Data
General Environmental
Information

Current /Short
Term
Environmental
Disclosure (CED)
Generic
Environmental
Disclosure (GED)

Figure 5-4 Categories of environmental disclosure

Intellectual capital disclosure is not sub-categorized based on the concept of
strategic decision making. Intellectual capital of a firm exists within activities such
as value adding, human structure, relationships in developing and maintaining
creativity, innovation, information technology, interpersonal activities, and
competitive advantage (Appuhami & Bhuyan 2015; De Santis & Giuliani 2013).
As a result, internal, external and human capital might add value to the firm.
Accordingly, there is scope to consider any capital from a generic perspective.
Therefore, the sub-categorization of intellectual capital disclosures for this study is
consistent with prior studies (Abeysekera 2007; Muttakin et al. 2015; Nurunnabi et
al. 2011).
Initially, 119 voluntary disclosure items have been identified. A further
review identifies three important constraints for the voluntary disclosure items.
First, some of the disclosure items might be considered in the context of mandatory
disclosure policies. Items that appear in the mandatory requirements are excluded
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as this study particularly focuses on voluntary disclosure with regards to legitimacy
(social contract), signalling (decision usefulness) and agent‒principal relationships.
Second, items in the various sub-categories should not be duplicated. A further
check is performed to ensure this does not happen. Finally, all items are assessed
and evaluated within the context of Bangladesh. For instance, the items are based
on those used within a Western country context and there might be some items that
are not applicable to Bangladesh. To avoid these pitfalls, all the items have been
reviewed to confirm that they are applicable to the research context.
A final list of 80 items is considered including 30 social, 28 environmental
and 22 intellectual capital disclosure items. Table 5.3 provides a summary of
voluntary disclosure items; detailed lists of all the voluntary disclosure items are
shown in Appendix E.

Table 5-3 Summary of voluntary disclosure index category

Disclosure Name
Social Disclosure
(Total 30 items)
Environmental Disclosure
(Total 28 items)
Intellectual Capital Disclosure
(Total 22 items)
Voluntary Disclosure

Sub-category
Strategic or long-term social disclosure
Current or short –term social disclosure
Generic social disclosure
Strategic or long-term environmental disclosure
Current or short-term environmental disclosure
Generic environmental disclosure
Internal capital disclosure
External capital disclosure
Human capital disclosure
Social + environmental+ intellectual capital
disclosure

Number
of items
19
9
2
13
12
3
5
9
8

5.3.3 Calculating Scores for the Voluntary Disclosure Index

Content analysis is “… a research technique for making replicable and valid
inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use”
Krippendorff (2004, p. 18). In other words, content analysis is a technique of data
collection and analysis that codes information into several groups and makes cogent
and relevant inferences regarding those groups.
Within the context of voluntary disclosure, several calculation techniques
of content analysis have been employed to transform language used in annual
reports into quantitatively analyzable numbers. Word counting (Deegan & Gordon
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1996; Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Rashid & Lodh 2008),
counting the number of sentences (Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007; Deegan et al. 2000;
Hackston & Milne 1996) and calculation of the percentage of pages or number of
sentences covering relevant information (Adams et al. 1998; Belal 2000; Unerman
2000) are examples of this technique. Within the various counting approaches, the
nomination of only one approach to abstract the ‘unit of analysis’ is a difficult
process (Gray et al. 1995). For example, the main obstacle to using a coding method
based on the proportion of page, or number of words or sentences is the varying
formats of annual reports from firm to firm. There are many variations in regards
to font style, size, expression and syntax. In addition, the page size of the annual
report varies from firm to firm. It is also important to mention that the coding
method by proportion of page, or number of words or sentences is not helpful for
understanding the meaning of the disclosure. Thus, from the unit of analysis aspect,
proportion of page, or counting words or sentences may not be adequate for
capturing the appropriate information.
The focus on a particular word may also be an inadequate abstraction as the
precise meaning of the disclosure may not be revealed. To resolve this issue,
Unerman (2000) asserts that, after finding a word, focusing on the whole sentence
to understand its meaning may be a necessary step to appropriately interpret the
information and subsequently categorize data correctly. This reduces the chance of
including data that does not accurately reflect the intended meaning, thereby giving
us a more robust method of analysis (Hackston & Milne 1996; Milne & Adler
1999). This study utilizes this approach and explores voluntary disclosure by
focusing on both the words that are listed in the index and the whole sentence
surrounding that word to understand the disclosure context.
After finding the disclosure item, the allocation of a score is required for the
voluntary disclosure index. There are two techniques for allocating scores:
weighted and unweighted. The weighted method assigns a score to every disclosure
item from a range (e.g., 1 to 5) after assessing the significance of the disclosure
item. In contrast, unweighted disclosure considers every disclosure item to be
equally significant and allocates the same value. The unweighted approach has been
widely used in prior studies (Khan et al. 2013; Khan 2010; Muttakin & Khan 2014)
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and is deemed to be preferable to the weighted index (Lim et al. 2007). In particular,
there are some distinct features of an unweighted index that make it superior. The
unweighted approach is appropriate for all user groups (Cooke 1989) as the
weighted index is generated by various users and may reflect the bias of a specific
group (Marston & Shrives 1991). A weighted technique is more appropriate if the
research emphasizes particular users of voluntary disclosures instead of diversified
users. A potential scoring bias and scaling problems may also results in a
misleading perception (Chow & Wong-Boren 1987) and firms better at disclosing
significant items are also better at disclosing less significant items (Meek et al.
1995). Advocating an unweighted index, Cooke (1989, p. 182) argues;
[t]he additive model used here is unweighted. The implied assumption is
that each item of disclosure is equally important. Clearly one class of user
will attach different weights to an item of disclosure than another class of
user. However, the focus of this research is not on one particular user group
but rather all users of corporate annual reports. An approach which tried to
encapsulate the subjective weights of a multitude of user groups would be
unwieldy and probably futile.
Since the research context of this thesis is not limited to a particular group, every
disclosure item is regarded as equally important; prior studies on voluntary
disclosure that employ both weighted and unweighted approaches find no notable
difference between the two approaches (Barako 2004; Chow & Wong-Boren 1987).
Based on the preceding discussions, the benefits of the unweighted approach were
greater than the benefits of the weighted approach for the research context of this
thesis. Therefore, unweighted is more appropriate for this research and has been
adopted for measuring voluntary disclosure index. For example, ‘1’ is awarded for
disclosing one item, otherwise ‘0’. Accordingly, a firm is awarded based on total
number of disclosure while the maximum possible score is 80 as there are 80
disclosure items.
Some disclosure items may not be applicable for every sector and this may
also distort the score for the voluntary disclosure index. This complication is more
relevant for environmental disclosures. For example, the scope of the
environmental disclosure may not be same for the service and manufacturing
industries and in the service and leisure sector no significant environmental impact
based on their operations occurs, therefore, this sector may come with minimal
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disclosures. To resolve this potential problem, this study omits irrelevant items for
a particular firm (sector) and deems them to be ‘Not Applicable’. The voluntary
disclosure index (VDI) is calculated by considering the proportion of disclosures
made by the firm and maximum possible score for that firm. Accordingly, the
measurement of voluntary disclosure is based on the following formula,
n

VDI t 


i 1

SDI it  EDI it  ICDI it
Ni

Where,
VDIt = Voluntary Disclosure Index of ith firm categories,.
SDIit = Sum of the total number of points awarded for social disclosure to the firm i.
EDIit = Sum of the total number of points awarded for environmental disclosure to the firm i,
ICDIit =Sum of the total number of points awarded for intellectual capital disclosures to the
firm i,
Ni = the maximum number of items which the firm is expected to disclosure. For instance,
N <80

5.3.4 Reliability and Validity Test of the Voluntary Disclosure Index

Personal judgment is required to create a voluntary disclosure index. The
subjectivity involved in the method is considered a major limitation of content
analysis (Allegrini & Greco 2013; Healy & Palepu 2001). However, this limitation
is overcome through rigorous and careful assessment. Several in-depth assessments
of the disclosure index are found in prior studies (e.g., Botosan 1997; Cheng &
Courtenay 2006). Assessments of reliability, defined as a reasonable quantitative
abstraction of reality, and validity of the index are both important (Allegrini &
Greco 2013; Saunders 2011).
Reliability of the measurement index implies that results can be reproduced
in a consistent manner. Marston and Shrives (1991, p. 197) assert that
[t]he index scores awarded to companies can be considered to be reliable if
the results can be replicated by another researcher. Since the scores are
extracted from printed annual reports which remain constant over time there
is no obstacle to repetition.
There are three common ways to achieve this, including inter-coder reliability,
test‒retest and assessment of internal consistency (Hassan & Marston 2010). These
common procedures for assessing reliability are discussed below.
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In cases where there is a single coder, inter-coding reliability is ensured if
the disclosure items are well explained and the decision of the coder is made after
a sufficient period of training (Guthrie et al. 2003; Guthrie et al. 2004; Milne &
Adler 1999). This study uses disclosure items tested in previous studies along with
precise sub-categories and the coder has undergone continuous training with an
expert supervisor over an extended period.
Assessing reliability by applying the test‒retest approach is implemented by
following several steps. First, the whole annual report was read and understood
before initiating the coding process. This is a necessary step to ensure that the coder
has an adequate understanding and knowledge about the disclosure of the annual
report. This approach further facilitates identification of the applicable and nonapplicable items in the annual reports (Omar & Simon 2011). Second, the coding
for the entire sample has been completed by spending around six months
investigating the data. This is a sufficient amount of time to deem the coding
process reliable, assuming the researcher is well trained. Finally, a random sample
of several firms has been coded again to compare with the previous score. Since,
the results from the random check aligned with the initial coding, the test‒retest
process supports the conclusion that the voluntary disclosure index measurement is
reliable.
Assessing reliability by examining internal consistency among the
disclosure items has been implemented through the statistical approach of
Cronbach’s alpha. Cronbach's coefficient alpha (Cronbach 1951) has been widely
used in prior voluntary disclosure studies to assess the reliability of the constructed
voluntary disclosure index (Allegrini & Greco 2013; Bontis et al. 2007; Botosan
1997). In particular, Cronbach’s alpha assesses whether various categories of the
measurement complement each other to ensure the reliability of the measurement
(Hassan and Marston 2010). Cronbach’s alpha expresses a value between 0 to 1,
and an alpha value over .80 confirms internal consistency for the measurement
(Allegrini & Greco 2013; Field 2005). Accordingly, this study considers
Cronbach’s alpha tests to assess internal consistency as a part of reliability for the
constructed index. This study explored the Cronbach’s alpha for three broad
categories of voluntary disclosure, and the result is demonstrated in Table 5.4
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Table 5-4 Summary of Cronbach’s alpha test for main categories

Disclosure Name
Social Disclosure
Environmental Disclosure
Intellectual
Capital Disclosure

Number of
items
30
28
22

Cronbach’s
alpha

Cronbach’s alpha
(if item deleted)
0.810
0.889
0.886

0.904

From Table 5.4, Cronbach’s alpha value 0.904 demonstrates that the
reliability of this index is strong (Allegrini & Greco 2013; Botosan 1997; Field
2005; Gul & Leung 2004; Khan et al. 2013). To ensure further assurance of internal
consistency, three sub-categories of each of the main categories are also assessed.
Cronbach’s alpha 0.882, along with a higher value ‘Cronbach's alpha if item
deleted’, for each sub-category supports the conclusion that every aspect of this
voluntary disclosure index is reliable (see Table 5.5).

Table 5-5 Summary of Cronbach’s alpha test for voluntary disclosure categories

Disclosure Name
Social
Disclosure

Environmental
Disclosure

Intellectual
Capital
Disclosure

Disclosure
sub-category
Strategic or long-term Social
Current or short-term Social
Generic Social
Strategic or long-term
Environmental
Current or short-term
Environmental
Generic Environmental

Number
of items
19
9
2

Cronbach’s
alpha

Cronbach’s alpha
(if item deleted )
0.873
0.857
0.871

13

0.885

12

0.871

3

Internal Capital

5

External Capital
Human Capital

9
8

0.882

Based on the results, it is concluded that all the necessary requirements for
a reliable disclosure index have been satisfied. Accordingly, the measurement of a
voluntary disclosure index in this study is deemed reliable and operable.
Ensuring the validly of a disclosure index is another important factor.
Saunders et al. (2007) p. 614) defines validity as: “the extent to which data
collection methods accurately measure what they were intended to measure”. In
other words, the validity of an index can be established when the purpose of the
study is reflected accurately within the index (Marston & Shrives 1991; Omar &
Simon 2011). Marston and Shrives (1991, p. 198) recommend that an index could
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0.859
0.872
0.867
0.860

be considered valid if the index scores “mean what the researchers intended. That
is to say, do the index scores have any meaning as a measure of information
disclosure?” Accordingly, the collection of accurate data that aligns with the
research objective is considered a major contributor to validity.
There are significant reasons to ensure that the constructed voluntary
disclosure index is valid. First, all the disclosure items are based on established
prior studies with an extensive focus on voluntary disclosure and within a
Bangladeshi context (Abeysekera 2007; Belal et al. 2010; Clarkson et al. 2008;
Hackston & Milne 1996; Khan et al. 2013; Muttakin et al. 2015; Saunders 2011).
Second, the construction of the disclosure index was completed under the
supervision and guidance of the research supervisors. Finally, validity of the
voluntary disclosure index is further enhanced by presenting the first draft of the
index at doctoral conferences.33

5.4. Corporate Governance Variables
To explore the determinants of voluntary disclosure, it is important to
consider factors that are associated with the decision, capacity and control processes
of a firm as this type of disclosure is not enforced by law. Within the literature, the
determinants of voluntary disclosure have been categorized into two branches:
corporate governance and firm characteristics.
Corporate governance is extensively emphasized as it plays a significant
role in the operational, control and decision-making processes of a firm (Dalton et
al. 1998). Weimer and Pape (1999, p. 152) articulate, the concept of corporate
governance as a “[…] framework of legal, institutional and cultural factors shaping
the patterns of influence that stakeholders exert on managerial decision-making”.
Accordingly, corporate governance may play a significant role in disclosure
decisions of a firm (Ho & Wong 2001).
The significance of corporate governance is also observable in the
voluntary disclosure literature as a significant number of studies also considered
33

Bhuyan, M 2016, ‘Determinants and Effects of Voluntary Disclosure – Corporate Governance and Firm
Performance: Evidence from Bangladesh’, in Faculty of Business, Higher Degree Research Student
Conference, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, 15-16 September.
From the conference the researcher benefitted from feedback from academics and experienced researchers
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corporate governance as an important determinant. Emphasis is placed on the
specific features of corporate governance including board structure, committees and
ownership structure (Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010; Samaha et al. 2015).
It should also be noted that these three features play a crucial role in a firm’s
decision making and monitoring. Therefore, this study considers these aspects of
corporate governance as potential explanatory factors for voluntary disclosure.
Board structure of a firm is considered an important factor in corporate
governance structure as it is the centre of decision-making processes in relation to
monitoring, controlling and directing a firm to achieve its goals (Dalton et al. 1998;
Dalton et al. 1999; Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010; Khlif & Souissi 2010;
Samaha et al. 2015). Board structure is also considered as a core concept of reducing
agency conflict, information asymmetry and promoting transparency within the
firm. Within the literature, some features of the board have been widely considered
as an explanatory factor for voluntary disclosure; in particular, CEO duality
(Allegrini & Greco 2013; Hidalgo et al. 2011), board size (Abeysekera 2010;
Akhtaruddin et al. 2009; Hidalgo et al. 2011) and board composition (Cheng &
Courtenay 2006; Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008; Eng & Mak 2003).
The existence of a committee, or the particular features thereof, are
considered as a significant factor for monitoring, controlling and compilation of
statutory factors within the firm, as well as ensuring transparency (Allegrini &
Greco 2013; Haji 2015). Various studies identify that committee features act as an
explanatory factor for voluntary disclosure, in particular, the existence of a subcommittee (Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007) and audit committee composition
(Akhtaruddin & Haron 2010; Li et al. 2012; Othman et al. 2014).
Besides the above features, the ownership structure of a firm is also
necessary to formulate and implement the vision and strategy of the business and
align with the preference of stakeholders. Effective communication of these factors
contributes to legitimacy and accountability in relation to decision making.
Ownership structure is also relevant because the interests of investors may vary;
thus investors’ preferences are not necessarily the same. Within the literature,
ownership structure has been extensively considered as an explanatory factor for
voluntary disclosure, in particular, foreign ownership (Haniffa & Cooke 2005;
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Huafang & Jianguo 2007), director ownership (Ghazali & Weetman 2006; Mohd
Ghazali 2007) and institutional ownership (Barako et al. 2006a; Ntim et al. 2012).
In light of the above discussions, and consistent with prior studies, eight
characteristics of corporate governance are deemed important and likely to have an
impact on voluntary disclosure. Consequently, CEO Duality, Board Size, Board
Composition, Sub-committee, Audit Committee Composition, Foreign Ownership,
Director Ownership and Institutional Ownership are considered. The detailed
measurement of each corporate characteristic is discussed below.
5.4.1 CEO Duality

CEO duality refers to the dual leadership structure of a firm. Especially it
relates to the arrangement by which the CEO acts both as the CEO of the firm and
as chairperson of the board of directors (Rechner & Dalton 1991). Various studies
have considered CEO Duality as a determinant of voluntary disclosure within the
literature (Barako et al. 2006a; Huafang & Jianguo 2007; Khan et al. 2013).
Throughout these studies, a consistent measurement process involving a dummy
variable is used to measure CEO duality, that is 1 is awarded if the CEO is also the
chairman of the board, otherwise 0. Consistent with prior studies, CEO duality is
measured by using a dummy variable (Barako et al. 2006a; Huafang & Jianguo
2007; Khan et al. 2013).
5.4.2 Board Size

Board size refers to the number of members on the board of directors of a
firm. In the literature, board size is considered to be an influential factor for
voluntary disclosure (Samaha et al. 2015) but the findings are contradictory. Board
size is mostly measured as a sum of board members (Abeysekera 2010; Barako et
al. 2006a; Esa & Anum Mohd Ghazali 2012; Hidalgo et al. 2011) but some studies
consider the logarithm of the total number of board members to derive relevant
findings (Carter et al. 2003). The second approach is more pragmatic as the number
of board members varies from company to company and use of a log may reduce
heteroscedasticity 34 (Brooks 2014). It also facilitates the validity of a variable

34

Heteroscedasticity is a statistical issue, the details of which are discussed in 4.8.1.3.
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measurement. Therefore, consistent with the literature, board size is measured as
the logarithm of the total number of board members (Carter et al. 2003).
5.4.3 Board Composition

Board composition refers to the make-up or characteristics of directors
regarding responsibilities, independence, race, gender and so on. Among these, the
presence of independent directors is considered as the most pivotal factor.
Independent directors have the ability to maintain objectivity because they have less
incentive to act in their own interests. Because they are divorced from the financial
performance goals of a firm they are better able to contribute to the monitoring and
decision-making processes (Cheng & Courtenay 2006; Fama 1980). Accordingly,
in the literature, board composition is widely measured as the proportion of
independent directors and considered to be significant for firm monitoring and
control, and an important factor for voluntary disclosure (Eng & Mak 2003; Ho &
Wong 2001; Khan et al. 2013). Consistent with the literature, this study measures
board composition as the proportion of independent directors.
5.4.4 Sub-committee

The sub-committee variable encompasses the presence of the various
committees to review and implement board decisions of a firm in an efficient
manner. The existence of sub-committees (i.e., Nomination Committee and Audit
Committee) may facilitate the controlling function by presiding over important
tasks (Fama & Jensen 1983). Vafeas (1999, p. 220) describes this function by
focusing on the role of the nomination committee:
The nominating committee can influence, however, the independence of
outsider directors since, given the number of outsiders, the committee
influences the degree of independence among those by selecting fewer
`grey' directors. This evidence is partly consistent with better boards
forming nominating committees or, alternatively, with the use of
nominating committees improving board quality.
The audit committee is another example of a sub-committee that performs a vital
corporate governance role. Its monitoring function can prevent serious commercial
malfeasance by ensuring companies adhere to regulatory requirements and
corporate imperatives, such as voluntary disclosure (Appuhami & Tashakor 2017;
Karamanou & Vafeas 2005; Kolk & Pinkse 2010). Consequently, the presence of
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sub-committees, such as the nomination and audit committee, is a significant
contributor to sound corporate governance practices and is therefore considered as
a relevant variable for this study. A range of prior studies confirm that the presence
of a sub-committee can shape voluntary disclosure (Allegrini & Greco 2013;
Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007; Karamanou & Vafeas 2005). Consistent with these
studies, this study measures sub-committees by considering a dummy variable (1 is
awarded if a firm has both Nomination and Audit Committee, otherwise 0.)
5.4.5 Audit Committee Composition

Audit committee composition can be measured by focusing on particular
features, including race, gender, background, role, independence and so on. Among
these, the independence of audit committee members is considered to be one of the
most significant factors as it influences the monitoring function. The independence
of members is an important factor to ensure active monitoring and it has also been
noted that it is an explanatory factor for the inclusion of voluntary disclosure (Madi
et al. 2014; Othman et al. 2014). Consistent with prior studies, this study uses the
proportion of independent directors within the audit committee as the relevant
variable (Akhtaruddin & Haron 2010; Li et al. 2012).
5.4.6 Foreign Ownership

Foreign ownership refers to the proportion of shares owned by foreigners.
Foreign ownership may shape the decision to voluntarily disclose as transparency
and compliance with international standards is expected under such conditions. It
has been reported that foreign owners might be sufficiently dominant to moderate
the monitoring, controlling and decision-making process of a firm (Barako et al.
2006a; Haniffa & Cooke 2002) especially within Bangladesh as foreign owners are
considered a powerful group (Islam & Deegan 2008). In line with such arguments,
a large number of prior studies claim that the proportion of foreign ownership may
moderate the voluntary disclosure practices of a firm (Barako et al. 2006a; Belal &
Owen 2007; Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Islam & Deegan 2008; Khan et al. 2013).
Consistent with prior studies, this study also measures foreign ownership as the
percentage of shares owned by foreigners.
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5.4.7 Director Ownership

Director ownership refers to the proportion of shares owned by the firm’s
directors. Due to director ownership, an agency conflict issue may mean that
monitoring activity will not be performed appropriately (Jensen & Meckling 1976;
McConnell & Servaes 1990). Accordingly, directors may negatively influence the
transparency of a firm’s activities since they gain access to firm information. In line
with this argument, a large number of prior studies claim that the proportion of
director ownership may moderate the voluntary disclosure practices of a firm
(Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008; Eng & Mak 2003; Khan et al. 2013; Mohd Ghazali
2007). Consistent with prior studies, this study also measures director ownership as
percentage of shares owned by the directors.
5.4.8 Institutional Ownership

Institutional ownership refers to the proportion of shares owned by
institutional investors. Among the diverse range of owners, this group of investors
is considered more professional with greater expertise on matters that may influence
firm disclosure and performance. Their expertise means that these investors are
privileged regarding corporate governance operations, including monitoring, firm
management and decision-making processes (Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008; Hope
2013). In light of these arguments, a large number of prior studies claim that the
proportion of institutional ownership may moderate the voluntary disclosure
practices of a firm (Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008; Khlif et al. 2016; Laidroo 2009;
Rashid & Lodh 2008). Consistent with prior studies, this study also measures
institutional ownership as a percentage of shares owned by institutions.
5.4.9 Summary of Corporate Governance Characteristics Measurement

The above discussion has demonstrated the relevance of certain corporate
governance variables and the various relationships pertaining to voluntary
disclosure and firm performance. The list of variables, measurement processes and
relevant prior research in relation to corporate governance characteristics is
presented in Table 5.6.
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Table 5-6 List of corporate governance variables and measurement process

Variable

Sub-committee
(SCOM)
Audit Committee
Composition (ACC)

Measurement
Dummy variable (value 1 = CEO and
Chairman, value 0 = otherwise)
Logarithm of total number of directors
on the board
Percentage of independent directors
within total number of directors on the
board.
Dummy variable by awarding 1 for
Existence of a Nomination and Audit
committee, otherwise 0
Proportion of independent directors on
the Audit Committee.

Foreign ownership
(FNO)

Percentage of shares owned by the
foreign investors

Director Ownership
(DO)

Percentage of shares owned by
directors

Institutional
Ownership (INO)

Percentage of shares owned by the
Institutions

CEO Duality (CD)
Board Size (BS)
Board Composition
(BC)

References
(Barako et al. 2006a; Huafang & Jianguo
2007; Khan et al. 2013)
(Carter et al. 2003)
(Eng & Mak 2003; Ho & Wong 2001; Khan
et al. 2013)
(Allegrini & Greco 2013; Cerbioni &
Parbonetti 2007; Karamanou & Vafeas
2005)
(Akhtaruddin & Haron 2010; Li et al. 2012)
(Barako et al. 2006a; Haniffa & Cooke
2005; Khan et al. 2013)
(An et al. 2011; Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008;
Eng & Mak 2003; Khan et al. 2013; Mohd
Ghazali 2007)
(Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008; Khlif et al.
2016; Laidroo 2009)

5.5 Firm Performance Variables
The assessment of firm performance is a complex matter as various
contingent factors are related to the measurement process (Orlitzky et al. 2003;
Peloza 2009; Richard et al. 2009; Wu 2006). In the literature, a significant number
of indicators has been considered. This wide range of indicators can be categorized
into three main groups: accounting-based measurements (e.g., ROA, ROS), marketbased measurements (e.g., MCAP, EPS) and mixed measurements (e.g., Tobin’s
Q).
Among the categories, accounting measurement is the most common, valid
and easily available measure and reflects the internal efﬁciency of a firm (Cochran
& Wood 1984; Richard et al. 2009). Orlitzky et al. (2003, p. 408) describe
accounting-based measure in the following way,
Accounting returns are subject to managers’ discretionary allocations of
funds to different projects and policy choices, and thus reﬂect internal
decision-making capabilities and managerial performance rather than
external market responses to organizational (non-market) actions.
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However, accounting measures are also open to criticism. For instance, a firm may
manipulate accounting numbers or select a particular method of measurement
(Azim 2012; Richard et al. 2009) that leads to inconsistency in performance
measurement systems. Wiwattanakantang (2001) also indicates that accounting
performance measurements may not reveal all relevant agency costs.
Market-based measures are forward looking and also incorporate the
intangible assets of a firm (Fisher & McGowan 1983; Lev 2000). However, this
feature does not mean that market measurement is free from limitations as marketbased measurements are not alienated from efficiency effects (Bacidore et al. 1997;
Joh 2003).
Besides accounting and marked-based performance measurements, a mixed
method is available. Richard et al. (2009, p. 732) consider Tobin’s Q as a popular
mixed measurement:
An advantage of mixed accounting/financial market measures is that they
are better able to balance risk (largely ignored by accounting measures)
against operational performance issues that are sometimes lost in market
measures. Examples of mixed measures are given in Table 4. Tobin’s q is
perhaps the earliest and most popular hybrid measure of firm performance.
However, Tobin’s Q is also subject to criticism as it considers proxies to measure
firm performance and these proxies might not be calculated accurately (Varaiya et
al. 1987).
In light of the above, selection of a particular method for measuring firm
performance can be problematic as every category of firm performance
measurement method has both limitations and some useful features (Deegan &
Faux 2005; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Richard et al. 2009). Consequently, consideration
of multiple indicators may resolve this quandary as each indicator can supplement
and mitigate potential limitations. A review and meta-analysis of a large number of
prior studies suggests that consideration of a multiple measurement indicator
approach is justified (Dalton et al. 1998; Dalton et al. 1999; Griffin & Mahon 1997;
Orlitzky et al. 2003). Therefore, this study measures firm performance based on
widely used measurements from each category (e.g., accounting, market and mixed
measurement) (Griffin & Mahon 1997; Lu et al. 2014; Margolis & Walsh 2003;
Orlitzky et al. 2003; Richard et al. 2009). In particular, Return on Asset and Return
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on Sales as accounting measures, Market Capitalization and Earnings per Share as
marketing measures, and Tobin’s Q as mixed measurement are indicator of firm
performance for this study. The significance of each indicator and measurement
process are discussed below.
5.5.1 Return on Asset

Return on Asset is an accounting measure of firm performance used to
assess the profitability of a firm’s assets. In the literature, among several accounting
measurements, ROA is considered as the most common, widely used and
significant variable (Aerts et al. 2008; Choi et al. 2010; Eng & Mak 2003; Khan et
al. 2013; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Patelli & Prencipe 2007; Teoh et al. 1998; Yusoff et
al. 2013). In addition, ROA has been considered as an important factor for voluntary
disclosure within various research contexts, including developed as well as
developing countries.
Some distinct features of ROA make it a pertinent and operational indicator
of firm performance. First, assets are a fundamental element to cover liability and
equity. A higher level of ROA means the firm has invested efficiently and has the
capability of managing firm debt and equity in an efficient manner. As a result, a
stakeholder may receive a signal that the firm is being managed well. Second, ROA
is an ultimate profitability measurement used to assess the efficiency of a firm’s
assets or to calculate a firm’s ability to generate profit.
ROA is calculated as Net Profit after Tax scaled by book value of the total
assets of the firm for a particular year. This measurement process is consistent with
prior studies (Aerts et al. 2008; Eng & Mak 2003; Patelli & Prencipe 2007).
5.5.2 Return on Sales

Return on Sales is another accounting measure of firm performance used to
calculate profitability in relation to a firm’s sales. Prior studies considered ROS as
a significant indicator of firm performance (Orlitzky et al. 2003; Richard et al.
2009) and it is widely considered within disclosure-related studies (Aras et al. 2010;
Chen & Wang 2011).
Some distinct feature of ROS makes it a widely used indicator of firm
performance. First, ROS measures performance on the basis of return on sales.
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Therefore, a better understanding regarding profitability might be achieved by
considering this indicator. Second, customers’ perception of the price of a firm’s
product or service influences their decision to pay for that product or service. In
particular, it should be noted that having a positive impression may provide the
flexibility of charging a higher price to improve ROS. As a firm performance
indicator, ROS is particularly relevant for voluntary disclosure as customer
perception is directly reflected in the measurement of ROS.
Therefore, consistent with prior studies, ROS is considered as an indicator
of firm performance and is calculated as Net Profit after Tax scaled by total sales
of the firm for a particular year (Aras et al. 2010; Chen & Wang 2011; Chen et al.
2016).
5.5.3 Market Capitalization

Market capitalization is a market-based firm performance metric and
represents the total value of a firm’s common stock. Although it is not widely used
as an indicator of firm performance (Mathews 1997; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Richard
et al. 2009), this indicator has some distinct features. First, market capitalization
may cover potential pitfalls of accounting-based measurements as this measurement
integrates intangible assets more effectively (Lev 2000). Forbes (2002) advocates
market capitalization as a relevant firm performance metric and argues that it may
capture the long-term effects of a firm’s operational activities. Therefore, market
capitalization can provide insight into the potential future prospects of the firm.
Second, market capitalization represents the total value of a firm’s common stock
and symbolizes the residual worth of the firm’s resources. In other words, it reflects
the satisfaction of shareholders (e.g., willingness to pay for the share) and
shareholders’ satisfaction (Cochran & Wood 1984). Therefore, this study is
consistent with prior studies and calculates market capitalization by multiplying
total common shares outstanding with the current value of common stock for the
year ending day of the financial year (Abdolmohammadi 2005; Anam et al. 2011;
Brammer et al. 2006)
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5.5.4 Earnings per Share

Earnings per share is a market-based firm performance indicator and
represents the firm’s earnings allocated to each outstanding share of common stock.
In other word, EPS assesses the profitability of the firm (Orlitzky et al. 2003;
Richard et al. 2009). Accordingly, EPS is widely used in studies related to voluntary
disclosure and firm performance and is calculated as earnings after tax divided by
total number of outstanding shares at the end of each financial year (Kwanbo 2011;
Nor et al. 2016; Oeyono et al. 2011).
5.5.5 Tobin’s Q

Tobin’s Q is a mixed measurement proxy of firm performance. Originally,
Tobin (1969) described the ratio of market value of the firm to the replacement
value of the firm’s assets. Regarding the assessment of Tobin’s Q, if the value of
this measurement is within 0 and 1 then the reproduction cost of a firm’s assets is
higher than the price of equity. If the value is above 1 then the market value of stock
is more than the replacement cost of the firm’s assets and this represents a better
position. The use of a mixed measurement allows the researcher to overcome the
limitations of an assessment process that omits important factors. In prior studies,
the use of Tobin’s Q is popular and since replacement value is difficult to ascertain
in the Bangladeshi context, consistent with prior studies and with the Bangladeshi
context this study measures Tobin’s Q (Agrawal & Knoeber 1996; Rashid et al.
2010; Rashid 2009).
Tobin’s Q = (MV Equity+ BV Debt + BV Preferred Stock)/BV Assets

Where,
MV Equity= Market value of the Equity;
BV Debt =Book value of debt;
BV Preferred Stock= Book value of Preferred Stock;
BV Assets= Book value of Assets;

5.5.6 Summary of Firm Performance Measurement

Based on the preceding discussion, the variables, measurement processes
and relevant literature in relation to firm performance indicators are summarized in
Table 5.7.
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Table 5-7 List of firm performance variables with measurement process

Variable
Return on
Asset
Return on
Sales
Market
Capitalization
Earnings per
Share
Tobin’s Q

Measurement
Net Profit after Tax
Book value of total asset
Net Profit after Tax
Total Sales
Multiplying total common share
outstanding with the current value of
common stock
Earnings after tax f
Total number of outstanding shares at the
end of each financial year
(Market Value of the Equity+ Book value
of the debt + Book value of Preferred
Stock) / Book value of Assets

References
(Aerts et al. 2008; Eng & Mak
2003; Patelli & Prencipe 2007)
(Aras et al. 2010; Chen & Wang
2011; Chen et al. 2016)
(Abdolmohammadi 2005; Anam
et al. 2011; Brammer et al. 2006)
(Kwanbo 2011; Nor et al. 2016;
Oeyono et al. 2011)
(Agrawal & Knoeber 1996;
Rashid et al. 2010; Rashid 2009)

5.6 Control Variables
Other variables that may moderate voluntary disclosure and firm
performance have been identified in the literature. Thus, this study considers these
factors as control variables.
Prior studies have established that firm characteristics play a crucial role in
determining voluntary disclosures of a firm (Ahmed & Courtis 1999; Alsaeed 2006;
Orlitzky 2001; Raffournier 1995) A significant number has been reported and
Alsaeed (2006) suggests that they may be separated into three categories: structurerelated variables (e.g., firm size and leverage), market-related variables (e.g.,
industry type) and performance-related variables (e.g., return on asset, Earnings per
share, Tobin’s Q). Prior studies also consider firm size, leverage, industry type and
firm performance as potential significant determinants of voluntary disclosure
(Ahmed & Courtis 1999; Alsaeed 2006; Cooke 1992; Fifka 2013). Consistent, with
the literature, this study considers firm size, leverage, industry type and firm
performance indicators as control variables.
To examine the effects of voluntary disclosure, prior studies have also
reported that firm characteristics may moderate firm performance (Orlitzky 2001;
Ullmann 1985; Waddock & Graves 1997). Within the literature, a large number of
prior studies has considered firm size, leverage and industry type as potential
explanatory factors for firm performance (Anam et al. 2011; Choi et al. 2010;
Mishra & Suar 2010; Qiu et al. 2016). Accordingly, this study considers firm size,
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leverage and industry type as a control variable for examining the effects of
voluntary disclosure on firm performance. It should also be noted that a large
number of prior studies argue that the features of a board (e.g., CEO duality, board
independence) may moderate firm performance (Dalton et al. 1998). Thus, to
examine the effects of voluntary disclosure a large number of prior studies has
considered CEO duality and board independence as an explanatory factor of firm
performance (Dalton et al. 1998; Farooque et al. 2007; Nahar Abdullah 2004;
Rashid et al. 2010; Rechner & Dalton 1991). In line with these studies, this study
considers CEO duality and board independence as a control variable for model 2.
Therefore, to investigate the determinants and effects of voluntary
disclosure, this study selects firm size, leverage and industry type as control
variables. Besides these variables, firm performance is considered as a control
variable for examining the determinants of voluntary disclosure. Similarly, board
size and board independence are considered to examine the effects of voluntary
disclosure. Details of these control variables are presented below.
5.6.1 Firm Size (SIZE)

Firm size is one of the widely considered explanatory factors that may
moderate voluntary disclosure (Ahmed & Courtis 1999) as well as firm
performance (Capon et al. 1990).
Regarding firm size as a determinant of voluntary disclosure, Firth (1979)
and Singhvi and Desai (1971) argue that there are significant reasons to consider
larger firm size as an explanatory factor. First, larger firms may have the capability
to afford extra costs to manage voluntary disclosure. Similarly, a larger firm has the
potential to address issues efficiently through scaled economic activity and this may
significantly reduce costs. Second, larger firms rely more on the stock market for
financing. As a result, extra disclosure may reduce the cost of finance. Third, larger
firms are more sensitive towards political costs. Therefore, to avoid public criticism
or government involvement, larger firms disclose more. Finally, smaller firms may
prefer to keep internal information secret as it may be key to providing competitive
advantage. As a result, they may be reluctant to disclose more. Conversely, it could
be argued that smaller firms may be more proactive in voluntary disclosure
compared to larger firms, particularly because smaller firms have limited
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information to disclose. Hence, smaller firms can easily legitimize their activities
with less cost by considering voluntary disclosure while larger firms attract higher
costs to manage large amounts of information. Therefore, firm size may play a
critical role in decisions to disclose information but the decision to do so voluntarily
depends, to a certain extent, on the context and circumstances of the firm. The
significance of firm size is observable in prior studies. A significant number of prior
studies explore the influence of firm size on voluntary disclosure and the
contributions and results are varied based on the research context (Adams 2002;
Eng & Mak 2003; Hackston & Milne 1996; Haji 2013; Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Ho
& Wong 2001; Li et al. 2008; Patten 2002; Stanwick & Stanwick 1998).
Besides voluntary disclosure, firm size is also significant for firm
performance. It could be argued that larger firms may have the ability to access
finance to enhance performance (Majumdar & Chhibber 1999; Short & Keasey
1999). However, a larger firm may suffer from lack of coordination (Williamson
1967) or from higher costs, which can be detrimental to firm performance.
Accordingly, firm size is considered as a control variable to explore the effects of
voluntary disclosure on firm performance (Anam et al. 2011; Cheng et al. 2016;
Choi et al. 2010; Mishra & Suar 2010)
From the above discussion, firm size is deemed to be a relevant factor for
examining the determinants and effects of voluntary disclosure and is therefore
considered as a control variable for this study. Consistent with prior studies, total
revenue (natural log of revenue) is used as a reasonable proxy for firm size (Haji
2013; Li et al. 2008; Patten 2002; Stanwick & Stanwick 1998).
5.6.2 Leverage

Firm leverage refers to the ratio of debt to equity. Firm leverage reflects the
capital structure of a firm and may moderate the voluntary disclosure decision
(Naser 1998; Xiao et al. 2004) as well as firm performance.
From a disclosure perspective, higher leverage may increase monitoring
costs (Jensen & Meckling 1976) and increase information asymmetry as creditors
may require extra information about firm activities. Conversely, it could also be
argued that voluntary disclosure may reduce information asymmetry and facilitate
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several investors or creditors since, in order to access finance, a firm must ensure
transparency. As a result, leverage may act as an explanatory factor for voluntary
disclosure. Within the literature, leverage is widely considered as a control variable
for exploring the determinants of voluntary disclosure (Barako et al. 2006a, 2006b;
Cheng & Courtenay 2006; Khan et al. 2013; Muttakin & Khan 2014; Muttakin et
al. 2015).
However, a more leveraged firm may also have to incur extra costs (interest
expense) and this may mitigate or overturn potential benefits to firm performance.
In any case, the agency costs of the firm can be addressed through the threat of
liquidation (Berger & Di Patti 2006) and the responsibility attached to leveraging
activities can lead to better performance. Thus, leverage is widely considered as a
control variable in prior studies to examine the effects of voluntary disclosure on
firm performance (Anam et al. 2011; Cheng et al. 2016; Lima Crisóstomo et al.
2011; Qiu et al. 2016).
Therefore, firm leverage (debt to equity ratio) is included as a control
variable for examining the determinants and effects of voluntary disclosure.
Leverage is measured as the ratio of total debt to total equity and this measurement
is consistent with prior studies (Anam et al. 2011; Cheng & Courtenay 2006;
Muttakin et al. 2015; Qiu et al. 2016).
5.6.3 Industry

Industry type can be an important factor for exploring the determinants of
voluntary disclosure as well as for the effects on firm performance as the level of
information, activities, revenue and expenses are not the same across industries.
To examine the determinants of voluntary disclosure, it could be argued that
industries such as cement are heavily regulated in relation to environmental
disclosure and may have to report voluntarily on this issue to mitigate societal
concerns; whereas many service industries, such as banks do not warrant such
attention. Hence, in the context of voluntary disclosure, firm disclosure depends on
the type of operating activities. Consistent with this argument, a wide range of prior
studies has considered industry context as an important contributing factor for the
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determinants and effects of voluntary disclosure (Brammer et al. 2006; Cooke 1992;
Haniffa & Cooke 2002).
To examine the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance, due to
varied capital requirements, revenue and operational cost, firm performance may
vary from industry to industry as expenses also vary widely from industry to
industry. As a result, a large number of prior studies has considered industry as a
control variable to explore the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance
(Khlif et al. 2015; Qiu et al. 2016).
Therefore, industry type is considered as a control variable. Consistent with
the literature, industry type is measured by using a dummy variable (Alsaeed 2006;
Cooke 1992). In particular, 1 is awarded if a firm belongs to the financial industry,
otherwise 0.
5.6.3 Profitability (Firm Performance): Additional Control Variable for
Research Model 1

The concept of agency and signalling theory indicates that a firm with better
firm performance intends to convey a message to stakeholders to distinguish it from
other firms (Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Owusu-Ansah 1998; Singhvi & Desai 1971;
Wallace & Naser 1995). A large number of prior studies has reported that there is
a positive relationship between firm performance and voluntary disclosure (Ghazali
& Weetman 2006; Mangena & Tauringana 2007). Alternatively, it is also argued
that firms with better performance may not disclose more as less disclosure may
avoid legal costs (e.g., tax) and protect competitiveness (Prencipe 2004; Verrecchia
1983)
A large number of prior studies considered firm performance as a control
variable for examining the determinants of voluntary disclosure (Allegrini & Greco
2013; Bacidore et al. 1997; Barako et al. 2006a, 2006b; Eng & Mak 2003; Ho &
Wong 2001). Therefore, consistent with the literature, as a firm performance
indicator Tobin’s Q (mixed method indicator) is considered.
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5.6.4 Corporate Governance Characteristics: Additional Control Variables for
Research Model 2

The concept of agency theory suggests that managing firm performance or
maximizing a principal’s interests are paramount A large number of prior studies
has documented board independence and CEO duality as a moderator of firm
performance (Dalton et al. 1998; Nahar Abdullah 2004; Rechner & Dalton 1991),
including studies within Bangladesh (Farooque et al. 2007; Rashid et al. 2010).
Accordingly, board independence and CEO duality are also considered as control
variables to examine the effects of voluntary disclosure (Li et al. 2017). Therefore,
in line with the literature, board independence and CEO duality are considered as
control variables for examining the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm
performance.
5.6.4 Summary of Control Variables Measurement

To investigate the determinants and effects of voluntary disclosure,
considered control variables, measurement process and literature references have
been summarized in Table 5.8.
Table 5-8 Control variables with measurement process

Control Variables for Research Models 1 & 2
Variables
Measurement
Firm Size
Leverage

Natural logarithm of total Revenue
Total Debt/ Equity

Industry

Dummy variable (value 1 = firm
belongs to financial industry, value 0
= otherwise)
Additional Control Variables for Research Model 1
Profitability
(Market Value of the Equity + Book
Tobin’s Q
value of the debt + Book value of
Preferred Stock) / Book value of
Assets
Additional Control Variables for Research Model 2
Board
Percentage of independent directors
Composition
within total number of directors on
(BC)
the board.
CEO Duality
Dummy variable (value 1 = CEO
(CD)
and Chairman, value 0 = otherwise)
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References
(Haji 2013; Li et al. 2008; Patten 2002;
Stanwick & Stanwick 1998)
(Cheng & Courtenay 2006; Ho &
Wong 2001)
(Alsaeed 2006; Cooke 1992)

(Agrawal & Knoeber 1996; Rashid et
al. 2010; Rashid 2009)

(Eng & Mak 2003; Ho & Wong 2001;
Khan et al. 2013)
(Barako et al. 2006a; Huafang &
Jianguo 2007; Khan et al. 2013)

5.7 Research Models
To derive sound conclusions based on the research questions, this study
considers two research models. Model 1 focuses on the determinants of voluntary
disclosure by considering corporate governance characteristics and firm
performance as explanatory variables. Model 2 examines the effects of voluntary
disclosure by considering firm performance as a dependent variable. Details of each
model are provided below.
5.7.1 Research Model 1

Model 1 examines the relationship between corporate governance
characteristics and voluntary disclosure. In this model, voluntary disclosure is
considered as the dependent variable and corporate governance characteristics re
the independent variables. Details are presented as follows:

𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7 𝐷𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
(1)
Where,
VDIit = Total score on Voluntary disclosure,
CDit = CEO Duality,
BSit = Board Size,
BCit = Board Composition,
SCit = Sub-committee,
ACCi t =Audit Committee Composition,
FNOit = Foreign Ownership,
DOit = Director Ownership,
INOit = Institutional Ownership,
Control variables FSit = Firm size, INDUSit = Industry type, LEVit = Leverage and Tobin’s
Qit = Firm Performance
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = error term

5.7.2 Research Model 2

Model 2 investigates the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm
performance in the following year. In regards to firm performance measurement,
this study considers five different firm performance indicators. Hence, model 2
consists of five sub-models.
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The basic model is presented as s follows:

𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5
∗ 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … .2
Where,
FPit+1 = Firm performance for the following year,
VDIit = Total score on voluntary disclosure,
Control variables: FSit = Firm size, INDUSit = Industry type, LEVit = Leverage,
CDit = CEO Duality and BCit = Board Composition

𝜀𝑖𝑡 = error term
As on the considered five firm performance indicators, the five sub-models are as
follows,

𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … .2.1
𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … .2.2
𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … .2.3
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … .2.4
𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … .2.5

5.8 Statistical Tests
Various statistical tests have been applied to investigate the determinants
and effects of voluntary disclosures and discussed in the following.
5.8.1 Test of Assumptions of Model

Before proceeding with any statistical analysis, an investigation of several
assumptions including normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and
endogeneity is advisable (Gujarati 2003; Rashid 2015a, 2015b, 2015c) to achieve a
bias free result. Thus, this thesis considers these tests before proceeding towards
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statistical analyses. In the following, details of these tests are discussed
respectively.
5.8.1.1 Normality

This assumption is based on the view that all observations will be distributed
normally within the population. Whilst this is true Brooks (2008, p. 164) has stated
that, “for sample sizes that are sufficiently large, violation of the normality
assumption is virtually inconsequential”. Coakes and Steed (2001) also note that
violation of normality is not a significant concern if the sample size is large (greater
than 30). Therefore, having a large sample (402 firm-year observations) provides
the researcher with confidence that normality should not be a concern for this study.
However, Residual Test/Histogram–Normality Test of the regression equation is
considered to confirm normality in this study.
5.8.1.2 Multicollinearity

Multicollinearity refers to the situation of having a high or significant
correlation among independent variables (Brooks 2008, p. 171) and making it
difficult to assess the effect of independent variables on dependent variables.
Therefore, this study considers Pearson correlation coefficients (parametric),
Spearman correlation coefficients (non-parametric), 35 and Variance Inflation
Factor (VIF)36 tests for multicollinearity. These tests contribute to the validity of
the method adopted in this study.
5.8.1.3 Heteroscedasticity

Heteroscedasticity refers to the presence of an error term in the estimated
model that is not constant. The existence of heteroscedasticity may lead to a
distorted result. To investigate the presence of heteroscedasticity, this study plots
standardized residuals (ZRESID) versus the standardized predicted value
(ZPRED). In addition, based on the guidance of (Cooke 1998) a further assessment
using the Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test is conducted.

35

Multicollinearity may be a problem when the correlation exceeds 0.80 (Gujarati, 2003, p. 359).
Multicollinearity may be a problem when VIF is above 10 or tolerance level is close to 0
(Gujarati, 2003, p. 362).
36

136

5.8.1.4 Endogeneity

Endogeneity refers to the presence of high correlation between dependent
and explanatory variables and the error term (Wooldridge Jeffrey 2002, p. 50). It
has been noted that, in the context of corporate governance, voluntary disclosure
and firm performance may be affected by an endogeneity problem (Ammann et al.
2011).
Therefore, this study primarily applies an endogeneity test for research
models 1 and 2 by employing well established techniques, (Elsayed 2011; Rashid
2015a, 2015b, 2015c). Moreover, to examine research model 2, a lagged structure
has been applied to investigate the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm
performance to avoid the concern of endogeneity (Larcker & Rusticus 2010). A
further endogeneity test has been applied to research models 1 and 2 while
implementing a robustness test (details are discussed in the robustness test section).
5.8.2 Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics include the basic features of the collected data for the
study and provide a simple summary of the data set, at the initial analytical stage.
In addition, it is important to offer descriptions or inferences about a data set
(Tabachnick & Fidell 2007). Cooper and Schindler (2008) note that descriptive
statistics help to explain the centre, spread, and shape of data distributions.
Therefore, this study adopts descriptive statistics for all the variables (independent,
dependent and control) to provide an overview and analytical resource for further
investigation (results are illustrated in Chapters Six and Seven).
5.8.3 Statistical Methods

In order to achieve an effective result, this study proceeds with a panel data
analysis using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. A further analysis is
also conducted by using a two stage least squares (2SLS) regression. Details of
these are discussed below.
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5.8.3.1 Panel Data Analysis

Collection data from an individual sample over a specified period is referred
to as ‘panel data’ and this study considers 134 firms for the period 2011 to 2013
yielding a total firm-year sample of 402. Use of panel data has advantages such as
the ability to interpret complicated behavioural models compared to others
(Gujarati 2003; Wooldridge 2015).
5.8.3.2 Pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS)

Within statistical analyses, ordinary least squares (OLS) is one of the most
powerful and popular methods of regression if some assumptions (e.g.,
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity) are satisfied (Gujarati 2003). Rashid (2015b)
advocates that OLS is a suitable approach if multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity
and endogeneity issues are addressed properly.
It should also be noted that OLS has been widely used in corporate
governance, voluntary disclosure (Eng & Mak 2003; Huafang & Jianguo 2007;
Wang & Claiborne 2008) and firm performance-related studies (Qiu et al. 2016;
Scholtens 2008). Accordingly, considering the research context and consistent with
the literature, this study considers OLS in conjunction with retrieved panel data.
5.8.3.3 Two Stage Least Square (2SLS)

Cooke (1998, p. 209) states “… no one procedure is the best but that
multiple approaches are helpful to ensure the results are robust across methods”.
Within prior studies, two stage least squares regression has been considered as an
alternative statistical method for exploring the relationship between corporate
governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure (Lim et al. 2007; Ntim et al.
2013), and firm performance and voluntary disclosure (Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004).
Therefore, to examine the determinant and effects of voluntary disclosure as an
alternative statistical approach, this study considers 2SLS to confirm the result.

5.8.4 Robustness Test

Two robustness tests have been applied for every research model and details
are discussed below.
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5.8.4.1 Robustness Test for Research Model 1

Endogeneity is a concern for the results related to corporate governance,
performance and social responsibility-related studies (Jo & Harjoto 2012; Larcker
et al. 2007; Larcker & Rusticus 2007, 2010; Wintoki et al. 2012). Thus, to ensure a
strong result, a further endogeneity test has been applied by considering an
alternative measurement process for a few corporate governance variables. This
alternative measurement approach is consistent with prior studies (Jiang & Habib
2009; Vu 2012). Within the literature, ownership variables have been measured by
considering a dummy variable, for example, for the presence of ownership, 1 is
awarded, otherwise 0 (Gelb 2000; Ho & Wong 2001; Huafang & Jianguo 2007; Vu
2012) or ownership is examined in low and high ownership concentration levels
(above and below 20 per cent level) (La Porta et al. 2000). Accordingly, this study
measures foreign, director and institutional ownership by considering dummy
variables for low and high ownership concentration levels (above and below 20 per
cent level). In addition, consistent with this approach, this study also applies an
alternative measurement for board composition and audit composition (above and
below 20 per cent level). Within model 1, alternative measurement for board
composition and audit composition, and foreign, director and institutional
ownership have been applied.
This study considers three different categories of voluntary disclosure
including social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures. A large number
of studies also explored the determinants of voluntary disclosure by considering
these categories separately. In particular, the effects of social disclosure (Haniffa &
Cooke 2005; Khan et al. 2013; Khan 2010), environmental disclosure (Halme &
Huse 1997; Iatridis 2013; Rao et al. 2012) and intellectual capital disclosure
(Abeysekera 2010; Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007; Li et al. 2008). Therefore, as a
robustness test, this study investigates the determinants and effects of voluntary
disclosure by replacing voluntary disclosure variables (VDIit) with social
disclosures (SDIit), environmental disclosures (EDIit) and intellectual capital
disclosures (ICDIit) within research model 1. Details of the additional research
models for robustness test 2 are presented below:
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𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐷𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
37
+ 𝛽12𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑀.1.𝑅2.1
𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐷𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑀.1.𝑅2.2
𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐷𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑀.1.𝑅2.3
5.8.4.2 Robustness Test for Research Model 2

Consistent with research model one, two robustness tests have been applied
for research model two and the details are discussed below.
To ensure the results are free of endogeneity, a further test has been applied.
In particular, with regard to the relationship between firm performance and
voluntary disclosure, an alternative view that firm performance may moderate
voluntary disclosure exists. Thus, the result for model 2 might be subject to a
reverse causality problem. In addition to adopting a lag year concept, research
model two is further sub-categorized (Rashid, 2015a):

𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.138
𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.2
𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.3
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.4
𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.5
37

M1 refers to Model One.R.2 refers to Robustness test Two. Therefore, M1.R.2.1 means first sub
model to examine Second Robustness test of Model One.
38
Consistent with previous explanation, M2 refers to Model Two.R.1 refers to Robustness test
One. Thus, M2.R.1.1 means first sub model to examine First Robustness test of Model Two.

140

𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.6
𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.7
𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.8
𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.9
𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.10
To extend the understanding of the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm
performance, a second robustness test has been applied by replacing voluntary
disclosure with three main categories separately. Accordingly, as a second
robustness test, this study investigates the effects of voluntary disclosure by
replacing voluntary disclosure variables (VDIit) with social disclosures (SDIit),
environmental disclosures (EDIit) and intellectual capital disclosures (ICDIit) within
research model 2. Details of the additional research models for robustness test 2 are
as follows:

𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.139
𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.2
𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.3
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.4
𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.5
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.6
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Consistent with the previous explanation, M2 refers to Model Two. R.2 refers to Robustness test
Two. Thus, M2.R.2.1 means first sub model to examine Second Robustness test of Model Two.
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𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.7
𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.8
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.9
𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.10
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.11
𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.12
𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.13
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.14
𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.15

5.9 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter presents the research methodology for this study. Section 5.2
presents justification for the sample design and data selection. Data for the threeyear period from 2011 to 2013 is used, yielding a total firm-year sample of 402. In
regards to sampling, this study considers the top 200 firms listed on the Dhaka Stock
Exchange. Annual reports obtained for the period 2011 to 2013 are used as the main
source of data. In addition, as a source of firm performance data, the Bloomberg
database is used. It is expected that the results from these respective periods may

provide interesting findings as there are very few studies that consider examining
voluntary disclosure from a Bangladeshi perspective following the severe stock
market collapse and the reformation of the SEC. Annual reports are considered a
relevant source of voluntary disclosure as these are regularly published and are
reliable documents, utilized by most firms to communicate financial and non-
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financial information to those who are deemed to be the most important
stakeholders.
Section 5.3 describes the measurement process of voluntary disclosure by
constructing a disclosure index. The process of constructing a voluntary disclosure
index is completed in four steps. First, a list of voluntary disclosure items was
gathered based on prior studies as well as studies within the Bangladeshi context.
By doing so this study relies on three significant categories of voluntary disclosure
including social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures. Second,
selected items were reviewed and altered within the context of this study. In
particular, several sub-categories for social and environmental disclosures were
combined within the frame of the strategic/long-term, current/short-term, and
generic focus. Furthermore, a total of 80 items was considered for the voluntary
disclosure index including 28 social, 30 environmental and 22 intellectual capital
disclosures items. Third, by considering content analysis, selected items were
measured and the allocated score unweighted. Finally, the reliability and validity
of this index was confirmed by applying several tests.
Section 5.4 describes the measurement process of corporate governance
characteristics variables, including CEO duality, board size, board composition,
sub-committee, audit committee composition, foreign ownership, director
ownership and institutional ownership. Section 5.5 presents the measurement
process of various firm performance indicators. Firm performance indicators were
within the category of accounting-based measurement (return on asset, return on
sales), market-based measurement (market capitalization, earnings per share) and
mixed measurement (Tobin’s Q). In addition, the measurement process of
considered control variables including firm size, leverage and industry were
presented in Section 5.6.
The research models for this study were discussed in Section 5.7. Research
model 1 considers corporate governance characteristics as a determinant of
voluntary disclosure. In addition, model 2 emphasizes the effects of voluntary
disclosure by considering firm performance as an effect variable.
Finally, various statistical approaches were applied, including descriptive
statistics, normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity tests. In
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addition, this study considers pooled ordinary least squares and two stage least
squares regressions to explore the determinants and effects of voluntary disclosure.
Finally, two robustness tests, including an additional endogeneity test and a test in
which voluntary disclosures were replaced with social, environmental and
intellectual capital disclosures, for research models one and two were applied. The
following Chapters Six and Seven presents the results of the study.
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Chapter Six: Results – The Relationship between
Corporate Governance Characteristics and Voluntary
Disclosure
6.1 Introduction
Chapters Two to Five outline the literature, develop research questions and
the theoretical framework, describe the background of research within the context
of Bangladesh, develop relevant hypotheses and demonstrate the research approach
utilized in this thesis. This chapter presents the findings related to the first research
question: To what extent do corporate governance characteristics affect voluntary
disclosure of social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures in
Bangladesh listed firms? It does so in relation to corporate governance
characteristics as a potential determinant. This chapter presents and analyses the
results and the remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.
Section 6.2 provides details of the descriptive statistics of dependent,
independent and control variables pertaining to research question one. The
dependent variable is Voluntary Disclosure Index (VDI). The independent variables
consist of CEO Duality, Board Size, Board Composition, Sub-committee, Audit
Committee Composition, Foreign Ownership, Director Ownership and Institutional
Ownership. The control variables consist of firm size, leverage, industry and firm
performance. Section 6.3 conducts diagnostic analyses including normality,
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity tests relating to the variables
used in examining the relationship between corporate governance characteristics
and voluntary disclosure. Section 6.4 presents the results obtained from the
statistical analyses including OLS and 2SLS to assess the determinants of voluntary
disclosure to answer research question one. Section 6.5 discusses the robustness of
the results by conducting further analysis of an additional endogeneity test and
replacing the current dependent variable VDI with Social Disclosure Index (SDI),
Environmental Disclosure Index (EDI) and Intellectual Capital Disclosure Index
(IDI). Finally, Section 6.6 presents a summary and conclusion of this chapter.
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6.2 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics concerning research question one (research model 1)
are presented in this section. Descriptive statistics (mean, median and standard
deviation) for the dependent variable, independent variables and control variable
are provided in Sub-sections 6.2.1, 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 respectively.
6.2.1 Descriptive Statistics – Dependent Variable: Voluntary Disclosure Index

Table 6.1 reports descriptive statistics for voluntary disclosures, including
three main categories: social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures. It
also presents the sub-categories of disclosures, that is, social (SSD, CSD, GSD),
environmental (SED, CED, GED) and intellectual capital disclosures (INCD, EC,
HC).
Table 6-1 Descriptive statistics for Voluntary Disclosure

Voluntary Disclosure
Social Disclosure
Environmental Disclosure
Intellectual Capital Disclosure
Long-term Social Disclosure
Short-term Social Disclosure
General Social Disclosure
Long-term Environmental Disclosure
Short-term Environmental Disclosure
General Environmental Disclosure
Internal Capital Disclosure
External Capital Disclosure
Human Capital Disclosure

Mean
0.1616
0.1692
0.13
0.1914
0.0864
0.226
0.6977
0.0359
0.1323
0.5961
0.1213
0.1627
0.2674

Median
0.1375
0.1333
0.1071
0.1363
0.0526
0.1111
1.0000
0.0000
1.0000
0.6666
0.000
0.1111
0.25

Std. Dev.
0.1293
0.1411
0.1177
0.1657
0.1142
0.2235
0.3852
0.0736
0.17
0.3843
0.1658
0.1765
0.228

Observations
402
402
402
402
402
402
402
402
402
402
402
402
402

As per Table 6.1, the average corporate voluntary disclosure index is 0.16
and a median of 0.13 reflects that there are very limited voluntary disclosure
discharges from the firms and most of the firms are limited to discharging a small
number of voluntary disclosures. In addition, within the main categories, the
average of social disclosure, environmental disclosure and intellectual capital
disclosure is 0.16, 0.13 and 0.19 respectively with a median of 0.13, 0.10 and 0.13
respectively. Thus, compared to social and environmental disclosures, firms are
more focused on intellectual capital disclosure while environmental disclosure is
less emphasized. Furthermore, regarding the sub-categories of social disclosure,
average SSD, CSD and GSD, are 0.08, 0.22 and 0.69 respectively with a median
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0.05, 0.11 and 1 respectively. Similarly, for sub-categories of environmental
disclosures, SED, CED and GED average 0.03, 0.13 and 0.59 respectively with a
median of 0, 1 and 0.66 respectively. Therefore, from a social and environmental
disclosure perspective, long-term disclosure is mostly ignored and generic
disclosure emphasized. Thus, it can be claimed that firms do not consider social and
environmental disclosures as relevant to the strategic agenda of the firm but are
keen to seek legitimacy by disclosing information that is general in nature. Finally,
for the sub-categories of intellectual capital disclosure, INCD, ECD and HCD
average is 0.12, 0.16 and 0.26 respectively with a median of 0, 0.11, 0.25
respectively, reflecting that human capital is more focused while internal capital is
mostly ignored.
Therefore, based on the above, it is concluded that within Bangladeshi firms
voluntary disclosure is not widely practised. Firms do not adopt voluntary
disclosure as a long-term strategy but as a short-term means to deal with an
immediate issue.
6.2.2 Descriptive Statistics – Independent Variables: Corporate Governance
Characteristics

For research model 1, as a potential determinant of voluntary disclosure,
eight corporate governance characteristics: CEO Duality, Board Size, Board
Composition, Sub-committee, Audit Committee Composition, Foreign Ownership,
Director Ownership and Institutional Ownership are considered as independent
variables. Table 6.2 presents the mean, median and standard deviation of
independent variables.
Table 6-2 Descriptive statistics for corporate governance characteristics

Mean
CEO Duality
Board Size
Board Composition

2.1888
0.1684

Median
Std. DEV.
Dummy Variable
2.1972
0.3782
0.1538
0.113

Observations
402
402

Sub-committee
Audit Committee
Composition
Foreign Ownership

Dummy Variable
0.2938

0.3333

0.1591

402

0.0899

0

0.2161

402

Director Ownership

0.1802

0.15

0.1778

402

Institutional Ownership

0.0683

0.01

0.1112

402
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As per Table 6.2, descriptive statistics for CEO duality are not considered
as a dummy variable is used for measuring this variable. Average Board Size is
2.18 with a median of 2.19. This means board number of directors is 9 as board size
is measured as a logarithm. Therefore, most of the firms align with the corporate
governance guideline.40 Average board composition is 0.15 with a median of 0.15.
This suggests that the guideline’s minimum requirement of independent directors
on a board has not yet been adopted by firms. Similarly, the guideline’s requirement
in relation to sub-committee has not been adopted. Average audit committee
composition is 0.29 with a median of 0.33, reflecting that firms are mostly aligned
with the guideline. An average .08 foreign investors with a median of 0 suggests
that within listed firms foreign investors are not common. In contrast, average
director ownership is 0.18 with a median of 0.15. Thus, director ownership is
common among the listed firms in Bangladesh. Finally, average institutional
ownership is 0.06 with a median of 0.01. Thus, institutional investors are very
limited among the Bangladeshi listed firms.
6.2.3 Descriptive Statistics – Control Variables

For exploring the relationship between corporate governance characteristics
and voluntary disclosure firm size, leverage, industry and firm profitability are
considered as control variables and Table 6.3 presents the mean, median and
standard deviation of these variables.
Table 6-3 Descriptive statistics for control variables

Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Observations

Firm Size

Leverage

Industry

21.8904

1.2420

1.3432

21.8430

0.4674

1.0576

1.5290
402

4.3119
402

Dummy
Variable

Firm Profitability

1.3005
402

As per Table 6.3, average firm size is 21.89 with median 21.84. This 2.18
or 2.19 reflects that average and median firm size is 306 million as this variable is
measured as a logarithm. The average for leverage is 1.24 with a median of 0.46,
which means a significant number of firms have debt. Descriptive statistics for
industry is not considered as a dummy variable is used for measuring this variable.
Finally, average firm profitability is 1.34 with median of 1.05. It should be noted
40

Corporate Governance Guideline for Bangladeshi firms is discussed in Chapter Five.
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that profitability is measured by Tobin’s Q; any value equal to or less than 1 reflects
that the cost of a firm is higher than the price of equity. Similarly, it is considered
that the firm is earning more than the cost or managing profit if the value of Tobin’s
Q is more than 1. Therefore, from an average value of 1.34 or a median of 1.05 for
Tobin’s Q, it can be concluded that within the Bangladeshi contexts most of the
firms are closer to cover the firm cost marginally or managing profit at a minimum
level as the average and median value of Tobin’s Q is close to 1.

6.3 Diagnostic Analyses Relating to the Assumptions of Models and Validity
of Variables
Prior to proceeding with any statistical analysis, some diagnostic tests are
advisable to meet the assumptions of statistical analyses including: normality,
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity (Rashid 2015a; Gujarati
2003).
6.3.1 Testing for Normality

This study examines the normality of data by using probability‒probability
(P‒P) plots of the dependent variable (voluntary disclosure index). The result
ensures that the normality assumption is not violated (see Appendix F (a) for result).
The normality assumption is further checked by considering a Residual
Test/Histogram–Normality Test of the regression equation (in Appendix F (a)).
Both results recommend that the assumption of normality is violated for model 1.
However, Coakes and Steed (2001) suggest that violation of normality is
not a significant concern if the sample size is large (greater than 30). Brooks (2008,
p. 164) further advocates as follows:
For sample sizes that are sufficiently large, violation of the normality
assumption is virtually inconsequential. Appealing to a central limit
theorem, the test statistics will asymptotically follow the appropriate
distributions even in the absence of error normality.
Therefore, the results from relevant normality tests and the existence of a large
sample (402 firm-year observations) provide confidence that the assumption of
normality is not a concern for this study.
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6.3.2 Testing for Multicollinearity

Multicollinearity refers to the situation in which two or more of the
explanatory variables used in the regression model are highly correlated. Regarding
multicollinearity, Brooks (2008, p. 171) states
In any practical context, the correlation between explanatory variables will
be non-zero, although this will generally be relatively benign in the sense
that a small degree of association between explanatory variables will almost
always occur but will not cause too much loss of precision. However, a
problem occurs when the explanatory variables are very highly correlated
with each other, and this problem is known as multicollinearity.
Therefore, it is essential to assess multicollinearity. Consistent with the literature,
this study considers correlation coefficients and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
tests for multicollinearity (Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007; Eng & Mak 2003; Haniffa
& Cooke 2005; Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Ho & Wong 2001). Detailed results are
presented in Table 6.4.
As per Table 6.4. the correlation matrix of the explanatory variables are not
strongly correlated (correlation coefficients less than 0.62); correlation exceeding
0.80 might be considered as a problem (Gujarati 2003).p 359. Therefore, this test
suggests that multicollinearity is not a concern for this study.
In addition, the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of all the variables are less
than 2.11. It is argued that the concern of multicollinearity arises if the value of VIF
is greater than 10 (Dielman 2001; Gujarati 2003). Thus, there is no potential
problem for this study from the VIF perspective. Therefore, based on the results of
the diagnostic tests, it is concluded that there is no multicollinearity problem for
model 1.
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Table 6-4 Correlation coefficient matrix and Variance Inflation factor (VIF) of the explanatory variables

CEO
Duality

Board
Size

Board
Composition

Subcommittee

Audit
Committee
Composition

Foreign
Ownership

Director
Ownership

Institutional
Ownership

Firm
Size

Leverage

Industry

CEO Duality

1.0000

Board Size

-0.0725

1.0000

Board
Composition

-0.0270

-0.3712

1.0000

Sub-committee

-0.0397

0.0281

0.0851

1.0000

-0.0065

-0.1361

0.6170

0.0016

1.0000

-0.0435

-0.0688

0.0672

0.1991

0.0676

1.0000

0.0461

0.0081

-0.0244

-0.1922

0.0008

-0.3061

1.0000

-0.0869

0.0358

-0.0922

-0.0178

-0.1083

-0.0926

-0.0157

1.0000

Firm Size

-0.0484

0.4204

-0.1117

0.1358

0.0496

0.1497

-0.2342

0.0364

1.0000

Leverage

-0.0341

-0.0520

0.0520

-0.0497

0.0575

-0.0546

0.0723

-0.0616

-0.0634

1.0000

Industry

-0.1148

0.6281

-0.2310

0.0313

-0.1546

-0.1027

0.0044

0.0347

0.2632

0.0399

1.0000

Firm
Performance

-0.0428

-0.3743

0.0620

0.0665

0.0079

0.2827

-0.0597

0.0050

-0.3240

-0.0311

-0.5179

Audit committee
Composition
Foreign
Ownership
Director
Ownership
Institutional
Ownership

Firm
Performance

VIF

1.0459
2.1153
1.9347
1.0966
1.7136
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1.2907
1.1839
1.0395
1.4851
1.0289
2.0594
1.0000

1.6752

6.3.3 Testing for Heteroscedasticity

Heteroscedasticity refers to the variance of the errors that do not have a
constant variance (Brooks 2008), In other words, the assumptions of
heteroscedasticity occur when the variance of the error terms differ across
observations. It is essential to test this assumption as Gujarati (2003) warns that the
presence of heteroscedasticity can lead to incorrect standard errors; thus, any
interpretations made could be misleading. To investigate the presence of
heteroscedasticity, this study plots standardized residuals (ZRESID) versus the
standardized predicted value (ZPRED). Based on the result, the model does not
completely dismiss the possibility of heteroscedasticity (see Appendix F (b)) for
result). Cooke (1998) advises that the Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test can also be
applied for assessing the presence of heteroscedasticity. Accordingly, this study
applies the Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test, the results of which are presented in Table
6.5.
Table 6-5 Heteroscedasticity test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey

F-statistic

6.714790 Prob. F(12,389)

0.0000

Obs*R-squared

68.98147 Prob. Chi-Square(12)

0.0000

Scaled explained SS

66.98439 Prob. Chi-Square(12)

0.0000

Table 6.5 shows a significant (0.000) chi-square for observed R Square.
Accordingly, the chi-square statistics and corresponding p-value of the Breusch–
Pagan–Godfrey test suggest that heteroscedasticity is present in the model.
Therefore, based on both tests, there is a concern in relation to
heteroscedasticity. Accordingly, the presence of heteroscedasticity is corrected by
using White’s (1980) correction technique for unknown heteroscedasticity; this
approach is consistent with prior studies (Rashid 2015a, 2015b, 2015c).
6.3.4 Testing for Endogeneity

An endogeneity problem is considered a significant pitfall for corporate
governance-related studies as its presence may lead to distorted results (Larcker et
al. 2007; Larcker & Rusticus 2007, 2010; Rashid 2015b). However, while some
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earlier studies did not place much emphasis on this issue, this study tests whether
endogeneity exists. In so doing, the following established techniques by Gujarati
(2003) have been applied.
The predicted values for the independent variables were checked against the
dependent variable (see Appendix F (c) for result). In particular, the F test for the
predicted value of CEO duality (F= 0.01 and relevant p = 0.9218), board
composition (F = 0.24 and relevant p = 0.6210), board size (F = 0.04 and relevant
p = 0.8351), sub-committee (F = 1.01 and relevant p = 0.3166), audit committee
composition (F = 1.69 and relevant p = 0.1945), foreign ownership (F= 1.15 and
relevant p = 0.2844), director ownership (F = 2.33 and relevant p = 0.1281) and
institutional ownership (F = 1.27 and relevant p = 0.2601). The F test for the
predicted value of every individual variable is insignificant.
Therefore, ﬁndings from these tests indicate that there are no signs of
potential endogeneity between corporate governance characteristics and voluntary
disclosure, suggesting that both the OLS and independent variables are consistent.
Detailed results of the endogeneity test are in Appendix F.

6.4 Results: The Relationship Between Corporate Governance
Characteristics and Voluntary Disclosure
After addressing the basic assumptions, this study proceeds to investigate
the determinants of voluntary disclosure or research model one. It should be noted
that besides corporate governance characteristics, this model also considers four
control variables, including firm size, leverage, industry and firm profitability.
Accordingly, the research model is as follows:

𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 CD𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 BS𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 BC𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 SC𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 ACC𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6 FO𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐷𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 INO𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 FSit + 𝛽10 IND𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11 LEV𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12 TOBINQ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
( 1)
For investigating this model OLS and 2SLS have been applied. The adjusted R2
for OLS is 56.40% and 2SLS is 56.0%. This indicates that the independent and
control variables explain 56.0% of the variation in the extent of voluntary
disclosure. It should be noted that explanatory power is higher than the prior
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studies within the Bangladeshi context (Khan et al. 2013; Khan 2010; Muttakin et
al. 2016) as well as other developing countries (Gul & Leung 2004; Haji 2015;
Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Ho & Wong 2001; Mohd Ghazali 2007). Detailed results
of the statistical analyses are presented in Table 6.6.
Table 6-6 Results: Relationship between corporate governance characteristics & voluntary disclosure

Voluntary Disclosure Index
Independent Variables
CEO Duality
Board Size
Board Composition
Sub-committee
Audit Committee
Composition
Foreign Ownership
Director Ownership
Institutional Ownership
Firm Size
Leverage
Industry
Firm Performance

Pooled OLS
Coefficient
-0.073

t-Statistic
-2.182

-0.000

-0.017

-0.072
0.057

Coefficient
-0.072

t-Statistic
-2.140

Prob.
0.033***

0.861

-5.5690

-0.036

-1.536

0.125

-0.074

-1.577

0.115

2.882

0.004***

0.053

2.723

0.006***

0.070

2.188

0.029***

0.072

2.262

0.024***

0.133

4.230

0.000***

0.124

3.848

0.000***

-0.102

-4.397

0.000***

-0.146

-4.085

0.000***

-0.036

-1.256

0.209

-0.038

-1.330

0.184

0.042

13.416

0.000***

0.041

12.402

0.000***

0.000

0.487

0.625

0.000

0.643

0.520

0.049

3.727

0.000***

0.048

3.628

0.000***

-0.002

-0.751

0.453

-0.002

-0.800

0.424

R- 0.564
Adjusted R2 0.550
**

2SLS
Prob.
0.029***

0.971

R2 0.560
Adjusted R2 0.546

Indicates statistically significant at the 5% level
Indicates statistically significant at the 1% level

***

Based on Table 6.6, the results show a significant negative relationship
(OLS: coeff = -0.073, p<0.02 and 2SLS: coeff = -0.072, p<0.03) and supports
hypothesis 1(a).
Regarding the relationship between board size and voluntary disclosure, the
results show an insignificant association (OLS: coeff = -0.000, p<0.86 and 2SLS:
coeff = -5.569, p<0.97); thus, hypothesis1(b) is rejected.
Regarding the relationship between board composition and voluntary
disclosure, the results show an insignificant association (OLS: coeff = -0.072,
p<0.12 and 2SLS: coeff = -0.074, p<0.11); thus, hypothesis 1(c) is not supported.
Regarding the relationship between sub-committee and voluntary
disclosure, the results show a significant positive association (OLS: coeff = 0.057,
p<0.00 and 2SLS: coeff = 0.053, p<0.00), thus a the arguments of hypothesis1 (d).
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Regarding the relationship between audit committee composition and
voluntary disclosure, the results show a significant positive association (OLS: coeff
= 0.070, p<0.02 and 2SLS: coeff = 0.072, p<0.02); thus supporting hypothesis1(e).
Regarding the relationship between foreign ownership and voluntary
disclosure, the results show a significant positive association (OLS: coeff = 0.133,
p<0.00 and 2SLS: coeff = 0.124, p<0.00), supporting hypothesis1(f).
Regarding the relationship between director ownership and voluntary
disclosure, the results show a significant negative association (OLS: coeff = -0.102,
p<0.00 and 2SLS: coeff = -0.146, p<0.00); thus supporting hypothesis1(g).
Regarding the relationship between institutional ownership and voluntary
disclosure, the results show an insignificant association (OLS: coeff = -0.036,
p<0.20 and 2SLS: coeff = -0.038, p<0.18); thus rejecting hypothesis1(h).
Besides the corporate governance characteristics, regarding the relationship
between firm size and voluntary disclosure, the results show a significant positive
association (OLS: coeff = 0.042, p<0.00 and 2SLS: coeff = 0.041, p<0.00).
Regarding the relationship between firm leverage and voluntary disclosure,
an insignificant association (OLS: coeff = 0.000, p<0.62 and 2SLS: coeff = 0.000,
p<0.52) is observed.
Regarding the relationship between industry and voluntary disclosure, the
results show a significant positive association (OLS: coeff = 0.042, p<0.00 and
2SLS: coeff = 0.041, p<0.00).
Regarding the relationship between firm performance and voluntary
disclosure, an insignificant association (OLS: coeff = -0.002, p<0.45 and 2SLS:
coeff = -0.002, p<0.42) is observed.
Therefore, based on the above discussions, some characteristics of corporate
governance and control variables act as a significant explanatory factor for
voluntary disclosures. Accordingly, a summary of the eight hypotheses and results
are presented in Table 6.7.
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Table 6-7 Summary – Results of the hypotheses regarding the relationship between corporate
governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure

Hypothesis

Results
Expected
Result

Hypotheses

Based on
OLS

Based on
2SLS
Negative
Relationship
No
Significant
Relationship
No
Significant
Relationship
Positive
Relationship

Rejected
/ Not
Rejected

Hypothesis 1:

CEO duality is negatively associated
with voluntary disclosure.

Hypothesis 2:

There is an association between Board
size and voluntary disclosure.

Significant
Relationship
Significant
Relationship

Hypothesis 3:

Board composition is positively
associated with voluntary disclosure.

Significant
Relationship

Hypothesis 4:

There is an association between subcommittee and voluntary disclosure.

Significant
Relationship

Negative
Relationship
No
Significant
Relationship
No
Significant
Relationship
Positive
Relationship

Significant
Relationship

Positive
Relationship

Positive
Relationship

Significant
Relationship
Significant
Relationship
Significant
Relationship

Positive
Relationship

Positive
Relationship

Supported

Negative
Relationship

Negative
Relationship

Supported

No
Significant
Relationship

No
Significant
Relationship

Not
Supported

Hypothesis 5:
Hypothesis 6:
Hypothesis 7:
Hypothesis 8:

Audit Committee Composition is
positively associated with voluntary
disclosure.
Foreign Ownership is positively
associated with voluntary disclosure.
Director ownership is negatively
associated with voluntary disclosure.
There is an association between
Institutional ownership and voluntary
disclosure.

Supported
Not
Supported
Not
Supported

Supported
Supported

6.5 Robustness Check
To

understand

the

relationship

between

corporate

governance

characteristics and voluntary disclosure more rigorously and to contribute a robust
result, the main result findings are tested further. In so doing two different
robustness tests have been applied for model 1. Initially, to ensure the results are
free from endogeneity, a further test considering an alternative measurement with
some corporate governance characteristics is applied. Finally, the relationship of
corporate governance characteristics with voluntary disclosure has been assessed
by replacing voluntary disclosure with three main categories (social, environmental
and intellectual capital).
6.5.1 Robustness Test 1: Additional Endogeneity Test

Alternative measurements of variables representing several corporate
governance characteristics, including board composition, audit committee
composition, foreign ownership, director ownership and institutional ownership,
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have been applied. Results from this alternative measurement for the relationship
between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure are presented in Table 6.8.
Table 6-8 Results: Relationship between corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure
from alternative measurement

Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C

-0.860

0.070

-12.222

0.000

CEO Duality

-0.075

0.034

-2.163

0.031***

Board Size

-0.002

0.015

-0.154

0.877

Board Composition

-0.010

0.011

-0.974

0.330

Sub-committee

0.065

0.018

3.510

0.000***

Audit Committee Composition 0.022

0.011

1.912

0.056**

Foreign Ownership

0.084

0.018

4.477

0.000***

Director Ownership

-0.029

0.008

-3.340

0.000***

Institutional Ownership

-0.015

0.013

-1.152

0.249

Firm Size

0.045

0.003

14.696

0.000***

Leverage

0.000

0.000

0.357

0.720

Industry

0.046

0.013

3.436

0.000***

Firm Performance

0.000

0.003

0.104

0.916

R-squared

0.562523

Adjusted R-squared

0.549028

As for Table 6.8, CEO duality (regression coefficient is -0.075 and the p
value is 0.031) and director ownership (regression coefficient is -0.029 and the p
value is 0.000) have a significant negative relationship with voluntary disclosure.
In contrast, sub-committee (regression coefficient is 0.065 and the p value is 0.000),
audit committee composition (regression coefficient is 0.022 and the p value is
0.056) and foreign ownership (regression coefficient is 0.084 and the p value is
0.000) have a significant positive relationship. No significant relationship has been
reported for board size (regression coefficient is -0.002 and the p value is 0.877),
board composition (regression coefficient is -0.010 and the p value is 0.330) and
institutional ownership (regression coefficient is -0.015 and the p value is 0.249).
In addition, from control variables, firm size (regression coefficient is 0.045 and the
p value is 0.000) and industry (regression coefficient is 0.046 and the p value is
0.000) have a significant positive relationship and no significant relationship has
been reported for leverage (regression coefficient is 0.000 and the p value is 0.720)
and firm performance (regression coefficient is 0.065 and the p value is 0.916). For
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alternative measurement of the variables, 2SLS is also considered (see Appendix H
for result) and a consistent result has been reported. Therefore, the results from the
robustness test one are consistent with the main findings and further dismiss the
potential endogeneity problem.
6.5.2 Robustness Test 2: Relationship between Corporate Governance
Characteristics and Three Main Categories of Voluntary Disclosure

Within the literature, a significant number of prior studies examines the
relationship of corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure by
considering individual categories including social (Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Khan et
al. 2013; Mohd Ghazali 2007; Saleh et al. 2010), environmental (Brammer &
Pavelin 2008; Halme & Huse 1997; Rao et al. 2012) and intellectual capital
(Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007; Li et al. 2012; Li et al. 2008). In studies from other
countries, as well as Bangladesh, a varied result has been observed. Thus, further
investigation will provide a strong understanding of the relationship between
corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure.
Hence, as a test of robustness, this study replaces voluntary disclosure
(dependent variable) with social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosure
individually. Research model 1 is altered into the following three models.

𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐷𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑀.1.𝑅2.1
𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐷𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑀.1.𝑅2.2
𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐷𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑀.1.𝑅2.3
As on the above models, the relationship of corporate governance characteristics
with social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures are examined within
pooled OLS and 2SLS. Detailed results are presented in Table 6.9.
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Table 6-9 Results: Relationship of the corporate governance characteristics of with social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosure individually

Voluntary Disclosure
Social Disclosure
OLS

Environmental Disclosure
2SLS

OLS

Intellectual Capital Disclosure
2SLS

OLS

2SLS

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Prob.

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Prob.

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Prob.

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Prob.

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Prob.

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Prob.

CEO Duality

-0.083

-2.325

0.020***

-0.081

-2.263

0.024***

-0.075

-2.304

0.021***

-0.074

-2.267

0.023***

-0.058

-1.683

0.093*

-0.058

-1.661

0.097*

Board Size

-0.001

-0.091

0.927

-0.000

-0.035

0.971

0.017

1.071

0.284

0.017

1.092

0.275

-0.028

-1.339

0.181

-0.028

-1.306

0.192

Board
Composition

-0.079

-1.426

0.154

-0.084

-1.493

0.136

-0.072

-1.531

0.126

-0.075

-1.575

0.116

-0.064

-0.922

0.357

-0.066

-0.950

0.342

Subcommittee

0.077

3.549

0.000***

0.072

3.366

0.000**

0.049

2.298

0.022***

0.046

2.145

0.032***

0.038

1.365

0.172

0.036

1.286

0.199

Audit
Committee
Composition

0.057

1.532

0.126

0.061

1.645

0.100*

0.075

2.120

0.034***

0.077

2.183

0.029***

0.079

1.769

0.077*

0.081

1.797

0.073*

Foreign
Ownership

0.106

2.891

0.004***

0.094

2.513

0.012***

0.085

2.675

0.007***

0.077

2.379

0.017***

0.230

5.720

0.000***

0.224

5.425

0.000***

Director
Ownership

-0.111

-4.207

0.000***

-0.173

-4.440

0.000***

-0.069

-2.790

0.005***

-0.109

-2.806

0.005***

-0.132

-4.232

0.000***

-0.160

-3.432

0.000***

Institutional
Ownership

-0.081

-2.312

0.021***

-0.084

-2.411

0.016***

-0.058

-2.019

0.044***

-0.059

-2.098

0.036***

0.051

1.294

0.196

0.050

1.261

0.208

2

R 0.519
Adjusted R2 0.504

2

R 0.514
Adjusted R2 0.499

2

2

R 0.476
Adjusted R2 0.460

R 0.473
Adjusted R2 0.457

** Indicates
***

statistically significant at the 5% level
Indicates statistically significant at the 1% level
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2

R 0.481
Adjusted R2 0.465

2

R 0.480
Adjusted R2 0.464

Based on the results in Table 6.9, the relationship between corporate
governance characteristics and the categories of voluntary disclosure (social,
environmental, intellectual capital) are similar, with some exceptions as discussed
below.
CEO duality is significantly negatively associated with social (OLS:
coefficient = -0.083 and p value = 0.020; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.081 and p value =
0.024), environmental (OLS: coefficient = -0.075 and p value = 0.021; 2SLS:
coefficient = -0.074 and p value = 0.023) and intellectual capital (OLS: coefficient
= -0.058 and p value = 0.093; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.058 and p value = 0.097)
disclosures. This finding is also consistent with the main result and provides a
strong argument that CEO duality reduces the monitoring power of a firm and may
reduce the transparency of a firm.
Board size is insignificantly associated with social (OLS: coefficient =
-0.001 and p value = 0.927; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.971 and p value = 0.000),
environmental (OLS: coefficient = 0.017 and p value = 0.284; 2SLS: coefficient =
0.017 and p value = 0.275) and intellectual capital (OLS: coefficient = -0.028 and
p value = 0.181; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.028 and p value = 0.198) disclosures. This
is also consistent with the main result, indicating that having more directors causes
a coordination problem, or scope to emphasize or make a decision regarding
voluntary disclosure.
Board composition has an insignificant relationship with social (OLS:
coefficient = -0.079 and p value = 0.154; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.084 and p value =
0.136), environmental (OLS: coefficient = -0.072 and p value = 0.126; 2SLS:
coefficient = -0.075 and p value = 0.116) and intellectual capital (OLS: coefficient
= -0.064 and p value = 0.357; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.066 and p value = 0.342)
disclosures. These findings are consistent with the main result and further suggest
that independent directors might be focused on operational efficiency and not
interested in voluntary disclosure. In addition, within Bangladesh, the mandatory
provision to maintain a minimum number of independent directors influenced this
insignificant result. In particular, in order to comply with the minimum independent
director requirements of the guidelines, independent directors have less flexibility
to implement their own preferences.
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The presence of a sub-committee has a positive significant relationship with
social (OLS: coefficient = 0.077 and p value = 0.000; 2SLS: coefficient = 0.072 and
p value = 0.000; ), environmental (OLS: coefficient = 0.049 and p value = 0.022;
2SLS: coefficient = 0.046 and p value = 0.032), and insignificant significant
relationship with intellectual capital (OLS: coefficient = 0.038 and p value = 0.172;
2SLS: coefficient = 0.036 and p value = 0.199) disclosures. Although this finding
is consistent with social and environmental disclosure, it is different for intellectual
disclosure. This finding indicates that Bangladeshi firms might focus on social and
environmental issues as a monitoring and controlling mechanism. In contrast, due
to poor social and economic conditions, stakeholders may not be familiar with
intellectual capital disclosure.
Audit committee composition has an insignificant relationship with social
(OLS: coefficient = 0.057 and p value = 0.126; 2SLS: coefficient = 0.061 and p
value = 0.100) but a significant positive relationship with environmental (OLS:
coefficient = 0.075 and p value = 0.034; 2SLS: coefficient = 0.077 and p value =
0.029) and intellectual capital (OLS: coefficient = 0.079 and p value = 0.077; 2SLS:
coefficient = 0.081 and p value = 0.073) disclosures. This finding for environmental
and intellectual capital disclosures is consistent with the main result and provides
strong support for the argument that independent directors on an audit committee
stimulate monitoring and controlling of a firm and increase transparency. It should
also be noted that due to environmental issues stakeholders might be affected by
legal problems caused by pollution. In addition, for intellectual capital disclosure,
investors are keen to know about the potential for value creation and reducing
information asymmetry. Accordingly, audit committee composition is more
concerned with environmental and intellectual capital disclosure. In contrast, an
insignificant result with social disclosure supports the argument that independent
directors are more concerned with legal issues and firm performance.
Foreign ownership has a significant positive relationship with social (OLS:
coefficient = 0.106 and p value = 0.004; 2SLS: coefficient = 0.094 and p value =
0.012), environmental (OLS: coefficient = 0.085 and p value = 0.007; 2SLS:
coefficient = 0.077 and p value = 0.017) and intellectual capital (OLS: coefficient
= 0.230 and p value = 0.000; 2SLS: coefficient = 0.224 and p value = 0.000)
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disclosures. This finding is also consistent with the main result and provides a
strong argument that foreign investors are powerful enough to stimulate
transparency as well as compliance with Western values. In addition, having foreign
investors reflects the interest in operational activities and transparency of a firm.
Director ownership has significant negative relationship with social (OLS:
coefficient = -0.111 and p value = 0.000; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.173 and p value =
0.000), environmental (OLS: coefficient = -0.069 and p value = 0.005; 2SLS:
coefficient = -0.109 and p value = 0.005) and intellectual capital (OLS: coefficient
= -0.132 and p value = 0.000; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.160 and p value = 0.000)
disclosures. This finding is also consistent with the main result and provides a
strong argument that director ownership may stimulate an agency problem and
increase information asymmetry by ignoring voluntary disclosure. Directors are
privileged to have additional access to the internal information of a firm. Thus,
director ownership may facilitate the opportunistic behaviour of limiting additional
information within directors only; therefore, firms disclose minimum additional
information.
Institutional ownership has a significant negative relationship with social
(OLS: coefficient = -0.081 and p value = 0.021; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.084 and p
value = 0.016) and environmental (OLS: coefficient = -0.058 and p value = 0.044;
2SLS: coefficient = -0.059 and p value = 0.036) but an insignificant relationship
with intellectual capital (OLS: coefficient = 0.051 and p value = 0.196; 2SLS:
coefficient = 0.050 and p value = 0.208) disclosures. A significant negative
relationship with social and environmental disclosure provides a strong argument
that institutional owners are focused on firm performance and avoid additional costs
or agendas like social and environmental disclosures. On the other hand, an
insignificant positive relationship with intellectual capital disclosure is consistent
with the main findings. Institutional owners are more interested in potential value
creation activities than social and environmental issues.
Based on the above discussion, most of the corporate governance
characteristics are consistently associated with voluntary disclosure as well as
social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosure. However, a varied result
from sub-committee, audit committee composition and institutional ownership
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suggests that the emphasis on corporate governance characteristics is not unique in
relation to all the categories of voluntary disclosure. Therefore, corporate
governance characteristics of a firm play a significant role for voluntary disclosure
while managing monitoring and controlling a firm. A summary of the findings from
robustness tests one and two is presented in Table 6.10.
Table 6-10 Summary of the robustness test
Corporate Governance
Characteristics
CEO Duality
Board Size (BS)
Board Composition
Sub-committee
Audit Committee
Composition
Foreign ownership
Director Ownership
Institutional Ownership

Robustness Test_1

Robustness Test_2

Voluntary Disclosure

Social Disclosure

Environmental
Disclosure

Intellectual Capital
Disclosure

NEG &CRD
NSR & CRD
NSR & CRD
POS & CRD

NEG &CRD
NSR & CRD
NSR & CRD
POS & CRD

NEG &CRD
NSR & CRD
NSR & CRD
POS & CRD

NEG &CRD
NSR & CRD
NSR & CRD
NSR & NCRD

POS & CRD

NSR & NCRD.

POS & CRD

POS & CRD

POS & CRD
NEG &CRD
NSR & CRD

POS & CRD
NEG &CRD
NEG & NCRD

POS & CRD
NEG &CRD
NEG & NCRD

POS & CRD
NEG &CRD
NSR & NCRD

POS= Positive relationship
NEG= Negative relationship
NSR= No significant relationship
CRD= Consistent with main result
NCRD= Not Consistent with Main Result

6.6 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter reported the empirical results of whether characteristics of
corporate governance act as a determinant of voluntary disclosure. Specifically, it
sought to achieve three main objectives.
First, this chapter conducted some diagnostic tests including: normality,
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity. As a test for normality
assumptions, probability‒probability (P‒P) plots of the dependent variable
(voluntary disclosure index) and a Residual Test/Histogram–Normality test were
applied and both tests suggest that the assumption of normality is not violated.
Multicollinearity was checked by considering the matrix of the explanatory
variables and VIF, finding no major violation of multicollinearity assumptions. By
plotting standardized residuals (ZRESID) versus the standardized predicted value
(ZPRED) and applying the Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test, assumptions of
heteroscedasticity were assessed, finding a concern in relation to heteroscedasticity.
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By applying White’s (1980) correction technique for unknown heteroscedasticity,
this issue was resolved. Finally, no endogeneity issue was observed.
Second, this chapter presents the empirical results for the eight hypotheses.
Accordingly, OLS and 2SLS have been applied and a consistent result reported for
both analyses. In particular, the findings suggest that CEO duality and director
ownership are significantly negatively associated with voluntary disclosure. In
contrast, the presence of sub-committee, audit committee composition and foreign
ownership are significantly positively associated with voluntary disclosure.
However, no significant relationship was found for board size and board
composition. In addition, the characteristics of corporate governance, firm size and
financial industry were found to be significantly positively associated with
voluntary disclosure, while an insignificant relationship was observed for leverage
and profitability.
Finally, this chapter discussed the tests used to check robustness. Two tests
were employed to check whether the results are robust: (1) further endogeneity test;
(2) voluntary disclosure was replaced with social, environmental and intellectual
capital disclosures. The first robustness test, a further endogeneity test using a
different measurement (dummy variable) for ownership variables, including board
composition, audit composition, foreign, director and institutional ownership, was
applied. Results from these tests were consistent with the main findings. The second
robustness test replaced the dependent variable voluntary disclosure with three
categories including social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosure. A
majority of the results was consistent with the main result.
The next chapter discusses the results of the second research question: To
what extent does voluntary disclosure affect firm performance in Bangladeshi listed
firms? Consistent with Chapter Six, the assumptions of normality, multicollinearity,
heteroscedasticity and endogeneity are applied initially, then OLS and 2SLS
regression analysis is used to investigate the question. Finally, the findings from
two robustness tests are presented.
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Chapter Seven: Results – The Effects of Voluntary
Disclosure on Firm Performance
7.1 Introduction
Chapter Six provides the findings related to the first research question: To
what extent do corporate governance characteristics affect voluntary disclosure of
social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures in Bangladesh listed
firms? This chapter focuses on the result of other research question: To what extent
does voluntary disclosure affect firm performance in Bangladeshi listed firms?
Section 7.2 of this chapter provides details of the descriptive statistics for
dependent, independent and control variables. The dependent variables include firm
performance (Return on Asset, Return on Sales, Market Capitalization, Earning Per
Share and Tobin’s Q). The independent variable, the voluntary disclosure index
(VDI) and the control variables are firm size, leverage, industry, CEO Duality and
Board Composition. Consistent with Chapter Six, Section 7.3 conducts diagnostic
tests, including normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity
assumptions.
Section 7.4 presents the results obtained from the statistical analyses,
including OLS and 2SLS to assess the effects of voluntary disclosure to answer
research question two. As an indicator of firm performance, five indicators,
including ROA, ROS, MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q, have been considered in order
to assess this relationship. Then Section 7.5 discusses the robustness of the results
by conducting further analysis of an additional endogeneity test and replacing the
current independent variable VDI with three categories, including SDI, EDI and
IDI. Finally, Section 6.6 presents a summary and conclusion of this chapter.

7.2 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics concerning research question two (research model 2)
are presented in this section. Descriptive statistics report the mean, median,
maximum, minimum and standard deviation for the dependent variable,
independent variables and control variable and are provided in Table 7.1.
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Table 7-1 Descriptive statistics for the variables of Research Model 2

Variable
Category

Dependent
Variables

Independent
Variable

Control
Variables

Mean

Median

Return on Asset (ROA)

0.0473

0.0258

Std.
Dev.
0.0571

Return on Sales (ROS)

0.1377

0.0942

0.2566

402

Market Capitalization
(MCAP)

22.5835

22.5436

1.19687

402

Earnings Per share (EPS)
Tobin’s Q

6.0310
1.2982

2.2929
0.9831

1.4273
1.2982

402
402

VDI

0.1616

0.1375

0.1293

402

Firm Size

21.8904

21.8430

1.5290

402

Leverage
Industry

1.2420

0.4674
4.3119
Dummy Variable

Variables

CEO Duality
Board Composition

Observations
402

402

Dummy Variable
0.1684

0.1538

0.1130

402

As per Table 7.1, regarding the dependent variables, including ROA, ROS,
MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q, the average is 0.047, 0.1377, 22.583, 6.031 and 1.298
respectively with a median 0.025, 0.094, 22.543, 2.292 and 0.983 respectively.
These results of average and median reflect that most of the firms are performing
below the average. An independent variable voluntary disclosure is considered and,
as per Table 7.1, the average voluntary disclosure index is 0.16 and a median of
0.13. Thus, there are very limited voluntary disclosures from the firms and most of
these are small. In addition, five control variables have been considered as a control
variable, including firm size, leverage industry, board composition and CEO
duality, as an explanatory factor for firm performance. As per Table 7.1, average
firm size is 21.89 with median 21.84. This 2.18 or 2.19 reflects that average and
median firm size is 306 million as this variable is measured as a logarithm. The
average for leverage is 1.24 with a median of 0.46, suggesting that a significant
number of firms has debt. Descriptive statistics for industry are not considered as a
dummy variable is used for measuring this variable. Average board composition is
0.15 with a median of 0.15. This suggests that the minimum requirement of
independent directors on board is not yet followed. Descriptive statistics for CEO
duality are not considered as a dummy variable is used for measuring this variable
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7.3 Diagnostic Analyses Relating to the Assumptions of Models and
Validity of Variables
Consistent with the arguments for model 1 (from Chapter Six), this chapter
also applies four diagnostic tests: normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity
and endogeneity. Results from these assumptions are discussed below.
7.3.1 Testing for Normality

Consistent with Chapter Six, the assumptions of normality of data have been tested
using probability‒probability probability (P‒P) plots of each dependent variable
(Return on Asset, Return on Equity, Market Capitalization, Earning Per Share and
Tobin’s Q). The results are available in Appendix G (a). The normality assumption
is further checked by considering a Residual Test/Histogram–Normality Test of the
regression equation (in Appendix G (a)). Although, the result did satisfy the
normality assumption completely, having a larger sample (more than 30
observations) provides the confidence that the assumption of normality should not
be a concern for this study (Brooks 2008; Coakes & Steed 2001).
7.3.2 Testing for Multicollinearity

Consistent with Chapter Six, multicollinearity assumptions for model 2
have been assessed by two diagnostic tests, including implementing correlation
coefficients and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) tests. Detailed results from tests
are presented in Table 7.2. As per Table 7.2, the explanatory variables are not
strongly correlated (correlation coefficients less than 0.65); if correlation exceeds
0.80 this might be considered a problem (Gujarati 2003). In addition, the variance
inflation factors (VIFs) of all the variables are less than 1.81, thus, there is no
potential problem for this study from the VIF perspective (Dielman 2001; Gujarati
2003).

167

Table 7-2 Correlation coefficient matrix and Variance Inflation factor (VIF) of the explanatory variables

Voluntary
Disclosure

Firm Size

Leverage

Industry

CEO
Duality

Board
Composition

VIF
1.817

Voluntary
Disclosure
Firm Size

1.000
1.740
0.6513

1.000000

-0.034271

-0.063422

1.000000

0.314455

0.263263

0.039962

-0.145399

-0.048451

-0.034146

-0.074367

-0.111795

0.052050

1.008

Leverage

1.185

Industry
CEO Duality
Board Composition

1.000000
0.114898
0.231062

1.034
1.000000
1.073
-0.027074

1.000000

7.3.3 Testing for Heteroscedasticity

Consistent with Chapter Six, the assumption of heteroscedasticity is
assessed by considering two tests. The first test is conducted by plotting
standardized residuals (ZRESID) versus the standardized predicted value
(ZPRED). Based on the results of each dependent variable (see Appendix G (b) for
result), the heteroscedasticity problem cannot be dismissed. Second, a further
assessment for heteroscedasticity is conducted by using the Breusch–Pagan–
Godfrey test. Accordingly, for every dependent variable for model 2, the results of
the Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test are discussed in Tables 7.3 to 7.7.
As per Table 7.3, ROA is the dependent variable for model 2 and chi-square
for observed R square is significant (.00031). Accordingly, the chi-square statistics
and corresponding p-value of the Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test suggest that
heteroscedasticity is present in the model.
Table 7-3 Heteroscedasticity test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey (ROA)

F-statistic
Obs*R-squared
Scaled explained SS

3.393089 Prob. F(6,395)
19.70378 Prob. Chi-Square(6)
107.6352 Prob. Chi-Square(6)

0.0028
0.0031
0.0000

As per Table 7.4, ROS is the dependent variable for model 2 and chi-square
for observed R square is insignificant (.2789). Accordingly, the chi-square statistics
and corresponding p-value of the Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test rejects that
heteroscedasticity is present in the model.
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Table 7-4 Heteroscedasticity test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey (ROS)

F-statistic
Obs*R-squared
Scaled explained SS

1.247837 Prob. F(6,395)
7.477961 Prob. Chi-Square(6)
208.7273 Prob. Chi-Square(6)

0.2809
0.2789
0.0000

As per Table 7.5, MCAP is the dependent variable for model 2 and chisquare for observed R square is significant (.0000). Accordingly, the chi-square
statistics and corresponding p-value of the Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test suggest
that heteroscedasticity is present in the model.

Table 7-5 Heteroscedasticity test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey (MCAP)

F-statistic
Obs*R-squared
Scaled explained SS

5.746716 Prob. F(6,395)
32.27407 Prob. Chi-Square(6)
43.36571 Prob. Chi-Square(6)

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

As per Table 7.6, EPS is the dependent variable for model 2 and chi-square
for observed R square is significant (.0000). Accordingly, the chi-square statistics
and corresponding p-value of the Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test suggest that
heteroscedasticity is present in the model.
Table 7-6 Heteroscedasticity test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey (EPS)

F-statistic
Obs*R-squared
Scaled explained SS

8.056552 Prob. F(6,395)
43.83190 Prob. Chi-Square(6)
401.8503 Prob. Chi-Square(6)

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

As per Table 7.7, Tobin’s Q is the dependent variable for model 2 and chisquare for observed R square is significant (.00113). Accordingly, the chi-square
statistics and corresponding p-value of the Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test suggest
that heteroscedasticity is present in the model.
Table 7-7 Heteroscedasticity test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey (Tobin’s Q)

F-statistic
Obs*R-squared
Scaled explained SS

2.816214 Prob. F(6,395)
16.49127 Prob. Chi-Square(6)
130.2424 Prob. Chi-Square(6)
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0.0107
0.0113
0.0000

Therefore, as per the results from Tables 7.3 to 7.7, there is a concern in
relation to heteroscedasticity for all the models except for ROS as a dependent
variable. In addition, concern was also observed from initial graphs.
Consistent with Chapter Six, the presence of heteroscedasticity is corrected
by using White’s (1980) correction technique for unknown heteroscedasticity and
this approach is consistent with prior studies (Rashid 2015a, 2015b, 2015c).
7.3.4 Testing for Endogeneity

An endogeneity test for the predicted value for the independent variable
(voluntary disclosure) was checked against each dependent variable (firm
performance indicator) (see Appendix G (c) for result).
The F test for the predicted value of voluntary disclosure is insignificant for
each indicator: ROA (F = 0.58 and relevant p value = 0.4482), ROS (F = 7.60 and
relevant p value = 0.006, Market Capitalization (F = 1.52 and relevant p value =
0.2188), EPS (F = 0.31 and relevant p value = 0.5770) and Tobin’s Q (F = 1.24 and
relevant p value = 0.265). Therefore, an insignificant P value dismisses the potential
endogeneity problem for all the firm performance indicators except for ROS.
Detailed results of the endogeneity test are in Appendix G.

7.4 Results: The Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Firm
performance
After addressing the basic assumptions, this study proceeds to investigate
the effects of voluntary disclosures on firm performance indicators including ROA,
ROS, MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q along with five control variables: firm size,
leverage, industry, CEO duality and board composition. Accordingly, five subresearch models have been considered for research model two and the results of
each sub-model are discussed in Sub-sections 7.4.1 to 7.4.5, while Sub-section 7.4.6
presents the results for the control variables regarding all the sub-models for the
second research model.
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7.4.1 Results: The effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Return on Assets

As a firm performance indicator, ROA is considered to examine the effects
of voluntary disclosure on firm performance and the research model is as follows,

𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
(2.1)
Based on research model 2.1, the detailed results from OLS and 2SLS are presented
in Table 7.8.
Table 7-8 Results: The effects of voluntary disclosure on Return on Asset

Independent Variables
Voluntary Disclosure
Firm Size
Leverage
Industry
CEO Duality
Board Composition

Return on Asset
2SLS

OLS
Coefficient

t-Statistic

Prob.

0.092

3.777

0.000***

0.093

3.842

0.000***

0.001

0.803

0.421

0.001

0.768

0.442

-0.000

-1.749

0.081

-0.000

-1.772

0.077

-0.066

-12.780

0.000***

-0.067

-11.949

0.000***

-0.039

-5.591

0.000***

-0.039

-5.575

0.000***

-0.016

-0.814

0.415

-0.037

-0.823

0.411

2-

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Prob.

2

R 0.292
Adjusted R2 0.281

R 0.294
Adjusted R2 0.283

** Indicates
***

statistically significant at the 5% level
Indicates statistically significant at the 1% level

Regarding the effects of voluntary disclosure on ROA, OLS reports that the
regression coefficient is 0.092 and the p value is 0.000. In addition, as on 2SLS the
regression coefficient is 0.093 and the p value is 0.000. Therefore, voluntary
disclosures have a significant positive effect on ROA. Accordingly, hypothesis 2(a)
is supported and hypothesis 2(a) is not rejected. In addition, the adjusted R2 for OLS
is 28.16% and 2SLS is 28.33%. This indicates that the independent and control
variables explain 28% of the variation in the effects of voluntary disclosure. It
should also be noted that the explanatory power is higher than the prior studies
(Garay et al. 2013; Mishra & Suar 2010).
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7.4.2 Results: The Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Return on Sales

As a firm performance indicator, ROS is considered to examine the effects
of voluntary disclosure on firm performance and the research model is as follows,

𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
(2.2)
Based on research model 2.2, the detailed results from OLS and 2SLS are presented
in Table 7.9.
Table 7-9 Results: The effects of voluntary disclosure on Return on Sales

Return on Sales
Independent
Variables

Pooled OLS
Coefficient

Voluntary Disclosure
Firm Size
Leverage
Industry
CEO Duality
Board Composition

0.146
-0.035
-0.001
-0.015
-0.054
-0.094

t-Statistic
1.242
-2.918
-0.945
-0.616
-2.036
-1.304

R2- 0.032
Adjusted R2 0.017

2SLS
Prob.
0.214
0.003***
0.345
0.538
0.042***
0.192

Coefficient
0.156
-0.035
-0.001
-0.014
-0.051
-0.155

t-Statistic
1.318
-2.992
-0.706
-0.514
-1.980
-0.610

Prob.
0.188
0.002***
0.480
0.607
0.048***
0.541

R2 0.029
Adjusted R2 0.015

** Indicates
***

statistically significant at the 5% level
Indicates statistically significant at the 1% level

Regarding the effects of voluntary disclosure on ROS, OLS reports that the
regression coefficient is 0.146 and the p value is 0.214. In addition, as on 2SLS the
regression coefficient is 0.156 and the p value is 0.188. Therefore, voluntary
disclosures have an insignificant positive effect on ROS. Accordingly, hypothesis
2(b) is not supported and hypothesis 2(b) is rejected. In addition, the adjusted R2 for
OLS is 1.78% and 2SLS is 1.15%. This indicates that the independent and control
variables explain 1% (approximately) only of the variation in the effects of
voluntary disclosure. Therefore, a low R2 and the concern of endogeneity reflects
that there might be some other significant contingent factors that may act as an
explanatory variable for ROS.
7.4.3 Results: The Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Market Capitalization

As a firm performance indicator, MCAP is considered to examine the
effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance and the research model is as
follows,
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𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
(2.3)
Based on research model 2.3, the detailed result from OLS and 2SLS are presented
in Table 7.10.
Table 7-10 Results: The effects of voluntary disclosure on Market Capitalization

Market Capitalization
Independent Variables
Voluntary Disclosure
Firm Size
Leverage
Industry
CEO Duality
Board Composition

Pooled OLS
Coefficient
2.308
0.482
-0.019
-0.185
-0.285
-0.532

t-Statistic
5.559
15.64
-5.433
-2.384
-1.072
-1.796

R2- 0.638
Adjusted R2 0.633
**

2SLS
Prob.
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.017***
0.284
0.073

Coefficient
2.364
0.481
-0.017
-0.199
-0.281
-1.043

t-Statistic
5.710
15.507
-5.628
-2.289
-1.038
-1.444

Prob.
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.022***
0.299
0.149

R2 0.647
Adjusted R2 0.642

Indicates statistically significant at the 5% level
Indicates statistically significant at the 1% level

***

Regarding the effects of voluntary disclosure on MCAP, OLS reports that
the regression coefficient is 2.308 and the p value is 0.000. In addition, as on 2SLS
the regression coefficient is 2.364 and the p value is 0.000. Therefore, voluntary
disclosures have a significant positive effect on MCAP. Accordingly, hypothesis
2(c) is supported and hypothesis 2(c) is not rejected. In addition, the adjusted R2 for
OLS is 63.31% and 2SLS is 64.24%. This indicates that the independent and control
variables explain 63% of the variation in the effects of voluntary disclosure. It
should also be noted that the explanatory power is higher than prior studies
(Abdolmohammadi 2005; Anam et al. 2011; Uyar & Kılıç 2012) and a higher R2
reflects that voluntary disclosure plays a crucial role for MCAP within the
Bangladeshi context.

7.4.4 Results: The Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Earnings per Share

As a firm performance indicator, EPS is considered to examine the effects
of voluntary disclosure on firm performance and the research model is as follows,

𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
(2.4)
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Based on research model 2.4, the detailed result from OLS and 2SLS have been
presented in Table 7.11.
Table 7-11 Results: The effects of voluntary disclosure on Earning Per Share

Earnings per Share
Independent
Variables

Pooled OLS
Coefficient

Voluntary Disclosure
Firm Size
Leverage
Industry
CEO Duality
Board Composition

26.671
1.008
-0.059
-9.249
-3.656
1.770

t-Statistic
3.112
2.746
-0.720
-6.717
-2.516
0.472

2SLS
Prob.
0.002***
0.006***
0.471
0.000***
0.012***
0.637

Coefficient
26.591
1.005
-0.060
-9.268
-3.694
1.785

R2- 0.203
Adjusted R2 0.1909

t-Statistic
3.131
2.772
-0.711
-6.691
-2.447
0.183

Prob.
0.001***
0.005***
0.477
0.000***
0.014***
0.854

R2 0.2029
Adjusted R2 0.1907

** Indicates
***

statistically significant at the 5% level
Indicates statistically significant at the 1% level

Regarding the effects of voluntary disclosure on EPS, OLS reports that the
regression coefficient is 26.671 and the p value is 0.002. In addition, as on 2SLS
the regression coefficient is 26.591 and the p value is 0.001. Therefore, voluntary
disclosures have a significant positive effect on EPS. Accordingly, hypothesis 2(d)
is supported and hypothesis 2(d) is not rejected. In addition, the adjusted R2 for OLS
is 19.09% and 2SLS is 19.07%. This indicates that the independent and control
variables explain 19% of the variation in the effects of voluntary disclosure.

7.4.5 Results: The Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Tobin’s Q

As a firm performance indicator, Tobin’s Q is considered to examine the
effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance and the research model is as
follows,

𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
(2.5)
Based on research model 2.4, the detailed results from OLS and 2SLS are presented
in Table 7.12.
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Table 7-12 Results: The effects of voluntary disclosure on Tobin’s Q

Tobin’s Q
Independent
Variables
Voluntary Disclosure
Firm Size
Leverage
Industry
CEO Duality
Board Composition

Pooled OLS
Coefficient
2.099
-0.197
-0.007
-1.466
-0.989
-0.014

t-Statistic
3.624
-3.361
-1.664
-12.923
-5.964
-0.029

R2- 0.272
Adjusted R2 0.261

2SLS
Prob.
0.000***
0.000***
0.096*
0.000***
0.000***
0.976

Coefficient
2.045
-0.181
-0.009
-1.315
-0.868
2.353

t-Statistic
3.502
-2.973
-1.668
-12.152
-5.468
1.976

Prob.
0.000***
0.003***
0.095*
0.000***
0.000***
0.048***

R2 0.241
Adjusted R2 0.230

** Indicates
***

statistically significant at the 5% level
Indicates statistically significant at the 1% level

Regarding the effects of voluntary disclosure on Tobin’s Q, OLS reports
that the regression coefficient is 2.099 and the p value is 0.000. In addition, as on
2SLS the regression coefficient is 02.045 and the p value is 0.000. Therefore,
voluntary disclosures have a significant positive effect on Tobin’s Q. Accordingly,
hypothesis 2(e) is supported and hypothesis 2(e) is not rejected In addition, the
adjusted R2 for OLS is 26.19% and 2SLS is 23.01%. This indicates that the
independent and control variables explain 23% (approximate) of the variation in the
effects of voluntary disclosure. It should also be noted that explanatory power is
higher than in prior studies (Garay et al. 2013; Lima Crisóstomo et al. 2011).
7.4.6 Results: The Effects of Control Variables on Firm Performance Indicators

Firm Size has a mixed effect on the five firm performance indicators. There
is a positive effect on the market-based firm performance indicators including
market capitalization (OLS: coefficient = 0.482 and p value = 0.000; 2SLS:
coefficient = 0.481 and p value = 0.000) and Earnings per Share (OLS: coefficient
= 1.008 and p value = 0.006; 2SLS: coefficient = 1.005 and p value = 0.005).
Investors might favour larger firms. Thus, larger firms receive a better response
from the market. In contrast, larger-sized firms also require a higher amount of
return to cover their larger costs. Thus, there might be a negative or insignificant
effect from firm size to accounting or mixed indicators. Consistent with this
argument, firm size might have a negative effect on ROS (OLS: coefficient = -0.035
and p value = 0.003; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.035 and p value = 0.002), Tobin’s Q
(OLS: coefficient = -0.197 and p value = 0.000; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.181 and p
value = 0.003) where no significant effect has been revealed for ROA (OLS:
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coefficient = 0.001 and p value = 0.421; 2SLS: coefficient =0.001 and p value =
0.442).
Leverage reveals the debt structure of a firm. Accordingly, higher leverage
may incur an increased cost of capital for the firm and may have a negative effect
on firm performance. In addition, having more debt might be a concern for
investors. Consist with this perception, a negative relationship has been
demonstrated for ROA (OLS: coefficient = -0.000 and p value = 0.081; 2SLS:
coefficient = -0.000 and p value = 0.077), MCAP (OLS: coefficient = -0.019 and p
value = 0.000; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.017 and p value = 0.000) and Tobin’s Q (OLS:
coefficient = -0.007 and p value = 0.096; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.009 and p value =
0.095). In contrast, no effect has been revealed for ROS (OLS: coefficient = -0.001
and p value = 0.345; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.001 and p value = 0.480) and EPS
(OLS: coefficient = -0.059 and p value = 0.471; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.060 and p
value = 0.477). This mixed finding may be explained by the fact that the calculation
process of every firm performance indicator is not unique. Thus, cost of leverage
may not have a consistent effect on every indicator.
Financial industry has a negative relationship with firm performance
indicators including ROA (OLS: coefficient = -0.066 and p value = 0.000; 2SLS:
coefficient = -0.067 and p value = 0.000), MCAP (OLS: coefficient = -0.185 and p
value = 0.017; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.199 and p value = 0.022), EPS (OLS:
coefficient = -9.249 and p value = 0.000; 2SLS: coefficient = -9.268 and p value =
0.000) and Tobin’s Q (OLS: coefficient = -1.466 and p value = 0.000; 2SLS:
coefficient = -1.315 and p value = 0.000), but not ROS (OLS: coefficient = -0.015
and p value = 0.5381; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.014 and p value = 0.607). This
negative effect for the financial industry can be explained by this industry being
subject to extra monitoring as a requirement for additional capital. Due to extra
monitoring, additional cost might be incurred for this industry and that may lead to
an adverse effect on firm performance. Therefore, firms in financial services may
struggle to develop firm performance compared to other industries. In addition, an
insignificant relationship with ROS might occur because the financial industry is
services oriented and it may be difficult to relate sales to cost of sales.
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CEO duality primarily has a negative relationship with firm performance
indicators including ROA (OLS: coefficient = -0.039 and p value = 0.000; 2SLS:
coefficient = -0.039 and p value = 0.000), ROS (OLS: coefficient = -0.054 and p
value = 0.042; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.051 and p value = 0.048), EPS (OLS:
coefficient = -3.656 and p value = 0.012; 2SLS: coefficient = -3.694 and p value =
0.014) and TOBIN’S Q (OLS: coefficient = -0.989 and p value = 0.000; 2SLS:
coefficient = -0.868 and p value = 0.000), but not MCAP (OLS: coefficient = -0.285
and p value = 0.284; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.281 and p value = 0.299). This negative
effect may mean that having this leadership structure is not recognised by
stakeholders due to a lack of transparency. In addition, according to the
recommendations of the BSEC, firms should avoid this leadership style. However,
an insignificant effect on MCAP may occur due to poor socio-economic conditions
and a lack of concern regarding this leadership structure. Therefore, CEO duality
has a minimal effect on MCAP.
Board composition mostly does not have a significant relationship with the
firm performance indicators, including ROA (OLS: coefficient = -0.016 and p value
= 0.415; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.037 and p value = 0.411), ROS (OLS: coefficient =
-0.094 and p value = 0.192; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.155 and p value = 0.541) and
EPS (OLS: coefficient = 1.770 and p value = 0.637; 2SLS: coefficient = 1.785 and
p value = 0.854). This insignificant result may be a result of the new corporate
governance guidelines to maintain one third independent directors. Thus, board
composition from an independent director perspective is less a matter of choice but
rather compliance with the regulatory guideline. However, a contradictory result
has been observed for MCAP (OLS: coefficient = -0.532 and p value = 0.0733;
2SLS: coefficient = -1.043 and p value = 0.149) and Tobin’s Q (OLS: coefficient =
-0.014 and p value = 0.976; 2SLS: coefficient = -2.359 and p value = 0.048) as the
results of OLS and 2SLS are not consistent. Although for both indicators only one
statistical result is significant, it can be concluded that mostly, there is no significant
relationship between firm performance and board composition within the
Bangladeshi context. Therefore, consistent with the argument of compliance, it can
also be explained that firm performance might not be directly moderated by board
composition and there might be some other contingent factor that acts as an
explanatory variable for such a relationship.
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7.4.7 Overall Findings: The Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Firm
Performance

The results of the effects from voluntary disclosures on firm performance
are provided above in Sub-sections 7.4.1 to 7.4.5. A summary of all the subhypotheses regarding hypothesis two and their status is presented in Table 7.13.
Table 7-13 Summary of all the sub-hypotheses for Hypothesis Two

Hypotheses

Based on
OLS

Based on
2SLS

Hypothesis
Rejected/
Not
Rejected

Positive
Relationship

Positive
Relationship

Not
Rejected

No
Significant
Relationship

No
Significant
Relationship

Positive
Relationship

Positive
Relationship

Positive
Relationship

Not
Rejected

Positive
Relationship

Positive
Relationship

Positive
Relationship

Not
Rejected

Positive
Relationship

Positive
Relationship

Positive
Relationship

Not
Rejected

Results
Expected
Result

Hypothesis
2

Hypothesis
2(a):
Hypothesis
2(b):

Hypothesis
2(c):

Hypothesis
2(d):

Hypothesis
2(e):

Corporate Voluntary
Disclosure is positively
associated with Return on
Asset
Corporate Voluntary
Disclosure is positively
associated with Return on
Sales
Corporate Voluntary
Disclosure is positively
associated with Market
Capitalization
Corporate Voluntary
Disclosure is positively
associated with Earning per
Share.
Corporate Voluntary
Disclosure is positively
associated with Tobin’s Q

Positive
Relationship

Positive
Relationship

Rejected

7.5 Robustness Check
Based on the findings from model 2, the voluntary disclosure of a firm has
significant positive effects on the following year firm performance. Consistent with
Chapter Six, two robustness tests have been applied. Initially, a further endogeneity
test was applied as robustness test one. Then as a second robustness test, from the
second research model (sub-models), the independent variable voluntary disclosure
is replaced with each category: social, environmental and intellectual capital.
Detailed results of each test are discussed below.
7.5.1 Robustness Test 1: Additional Endogeneity Test

Regarding the relationship between firm performance and corporate
voluntary disclosure, reverse causality is a concern. It is also documented that firm
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performance can influence corporate voluntary disclosure (Haniffa & Cooke 2005;
Khan et al. 2013). This study used a lagged approach to voluntary disclosure to
avoid a causality problem. In addition, a further endogeneity (reverse causality)
check was implemented with a simple crossed-lagged regression model consistent
with Davidson et al. (1997) and Rashid (2015a). In so doing, the following ten
models have been considered:

𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.1
𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.2
𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.3
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.4
𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.5
𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.6
𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.7
𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.8
𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.9
𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.10
Within the first five equations (M2.R1.1 to M2.R1.5), the following year
firm performance is considered as a dependent variable over current year voluntary
disclosure, firm performance and other control variables. In the following five
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equations, following year voluntary disclosure is considered as dependent by
considering current year firm performance and social disclosure as independent
variables.
For the first five equations (see Appendix I for detailed results), current year
firm performance (ROA = regression coefficient is 0.757 and the p value is 0.000,
ROS = regression coefficient is 0.777 and the p value is 0.000, MCAP = regression
coefficient is 0.937 and the p value is 0.000, EPS = regression coefficient is 1.102
and the p value is 0.000, and Tobin’s Q = regression coefficient is 0.753 and the p
value is 0.000) is significantly associated with future firm performance. Detailed
results are in Appendix I. These findings are consistent with prior studies (Khlif et
al. 2015; Veronica & Bachtiar 2010) and support the concept that having better
performance may continue to impact the following year.
However, based on the results of the last five equations (see Appendix I for
detailed results), current year firm performance is not found to affect the following
year corporate voluntary disclosure (ROA = regression coefficient is .005 and the
p value is 0.775; MCAP = regression coefficient is .001 and the p value is 0.517;
EPS = regression coefficient is 9.430 and the p value is 0.606; Tobin’s Q =
regression coefficient is 0.000 and the p value is 0.813; except for ROS = regression
coefficient is 0.005 and the p value is 0.081); detailed results are in Appendix I.
Therefore, it can be concluded that for most of the firm performance indicators there
is no reverse casualty problem. Regarding ROS, a reverse casualty problem and
endogeneity issue has already been expressed for this indicator in the earlier
analysis. In addition, an insignificant result is consistent with the argument that
within a developing country like Bangladesh sales return might be not affected by
additional disclosure.
7.5.2 Robustness Test 2: The Effects of Three Main Categories of Voluntary
Disclosure on Firm Performance

A significant number of prior studies examine the effects of specific
categories of voluntary disclosure, including social (Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Khan
et al. 2013; Mohd Ghazali 2007; Saleh et al. 2010), environmental (Brammer &
Pavelin 2008; Halme & Huse 1997; Rao et al. 2012) and intellectual capital
(Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007; Li et al. 2012; Li et al. 2008) both in Bangladesh and
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other country contexts. Thus, for the purposes of robustness, this study replaces
voluntary disclosure (dependent variable) with social, environmental and
intellectual capital disclosure. Fifteen different models have been developed for
every category of disclosure and the results for the models are presented in Table
7.14.

𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.1
𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.2
𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.3
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.4
𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.5
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.6
𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.7
𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.8
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.9
𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.10
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.11
𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.12
𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.13
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.14
𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.15
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Table 7-14 Results: The individual effects of social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosure on
firm performance
Return on Asset
Return on Sales
Market Capitalization
Earnings per Share
Tobin’s Q
(ROA)
(ROS)
(MCAP)
(EPS)
Coeff.

Social Disclosure
Environmental
Disclosure
Intellectual Capital
Disclosure

Coeff.

Prob.

0.058

Prob.

0.019***

Coeff.

0.045

Prob.

0.640

Coeff.

1.560

Prob.

0.000***

Coeff.

20.262

Prob.

0.003***

1.385

0.025***

0.041

0.189

0.176

0.225

2.490

0.000***

15.609

0.1441

0.933

0.256

0.093

0.000***

0.125

0.078*

1.434

0.000***

22.218

0.000***

2.099

0.000***

Based on the results of Table 7.14 (see Appendix J for detailed results),
social disclosure has a positive effect on all the firm performance indicators (ROA
= regression coefficient is .058 and the p value is 0.019; MCAP = regression
coefficient is 1.560 and the p value is 0.000; EPS = regression coefficient is 20.262
and the p value is 0.003; Tobin’s Q = regression coefficient is 1.385 and the p value
is 0.025, with the exception of ROS = regression coefficient is 0.045 and the p value
is 0.640). This finding is also consistent with the main findings of this study. In
addition, a positive effect from social disclosure to firm performance is also
consistent with a large number of prior studies (Ahamed et al. 2014; Chen & Wang
2011; Choi et al. 2010; Mishra & Suar 2010; Prado-Lorenzo et al. 2008; Veronica
& Bachtiar 2010). Within the Bangladeshi context, a positive effect from social
disclosure to firm performance may mean that stakeholders are concerned with
social issues, which leads to improved firm performance. Accordingly, in recent
times an improved emphasis on social issues in Bangladesh (Sobhani et al. 2009)
also justifies this positive effect.
Based on the results in Table 7.14, an insignificant effect on firm
performance from environmental disclosure is identified (ROA = regression
coefficient is .041 and the p value is 0.189; ROS = regression coefficient is 0.176
and the p value is 0.225; EPS = regression coefficient is 15.609 and the p value is
0.144; Tobin’s Q = regression coefficient is .933 and the p value is 0.256, with the
exception of MCAP = regression coefficient is 2.490 and the p value is 0.000). This
result might be explained by a lack of environmental awareness among stakeholders
within Bangladesh (Hoque & Clarke 2013; Hossain et al. 2012; Islam 2008). As a
result, due to poor socio-economic conditions and overpopulation, firms may not
access a better return compared to the cost of environmental issues. Similarly, local
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stakeholders are not sufficiently influential to demand that firms address
environmental issues. Consistent with this argument, less emphasis on
environmental information has been observed in Bangladesh (Belal et al. 2010) due
to lack of enforcement from regulatory authorities (Hossain et al. 2012). In addition,
in Chapter Six it was reported that institutional ownership is negatively associated
with environmental disclosure because this form of ownership is primarily
interested in firm performance. Therefore, an insignificant effect on almost every
firm performance indicator return supports that these forms of investors ignore
environmental information as there is no compensation from a firm performance
perspective. However, a positive effect on market capitalization suggests that
society in general values environmental disclosure. Thus, a lack of monitoring of
environmental issues might be the reason for this result.
Based on the results in Table 7.14, intellectual capital disclosure has a
positive effect on firm performance (ROA = regression coefficient is .093 and the
p value is 0.000; ROS = regression coefficient is 0.125 and the p value is 0.078;
MCAP = regression coefficient is 1.434 and the p value is 0.000; EPS = regression
coefficient is 22.218 and the p value is 0.000; Tobin’s Q = regression coefficient is
2.099 and the p value is 0.000). This finding is also consistent with the main
findings of this study. In addition, a positive effect from intellectual capital
disclosure to firm performance is also consistent with prior studies
(Abdolmohammadi 2005; Anam et al. 2011; Ribeiro Soriano et al. 2012). This
result might be explained by the potential for intellectual capital disclosure to reveal
potential value creation and the intangible assets of a firm. Thus, stakeholders might
consider additional disclosure as a positive signal. Accordingly, disclosure related
to intellectual capital has a positive effect on firm performance in a positive manner.

7.6 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter reported the empirical results of whether there is an effect from
voluntary disclosure to firm performance by considering five indicators: ROA,
ROS, MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q. Specifically, it achieved three main objectives.
First, consistent with Chapter Six, this chapter also conducted some
diagnostic tests including normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and
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endogeneity. To test for normality assumptions, probability‒probability (P‒P) plots
of the dependent variable (voluntary disclosure index) and a Residual
Test/Histogram–Normality test were applied and both tests suggest that the
assumption of normality is not violated. Multicollinearity was checked by
considering the matrix of the explanatory variables and VIF. Results ensured that
there were no major violations of multicollinearity assumptions. By plotting
standardized residuals (ZRESID) versus the standardized predicted value (ZPRED)
and applying the Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test, assumptions of heteroscedasticity
were assessed and a concern in relation to heteroscedasticity was revealed. By
applying White’s (1980) correction technique for unknown heteroscedasticity, this
issue was resolved. Finally, no endogeneity issue was observed for all the firm
performance indicators: ROA, MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q, except for ROS.
Second, similar to Chapter Six, this chapter applied OLS and 2SLS for
examining the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance by investigating
five sub-hypotheses developed for research model two. A significant positive effect
for ROA, MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q were found except for ROS. For insignificant
indicator ROS, the previous section already outlined the concern for endogeneity
test that also discounts ROS. Accordingly, a consistent result from the perspective
of most of the firm performance indicators leads to the conclusion that, in
Bangladesh, voluntary disclosure has a significant positive effect on firm
performance.
Finally, this chapter discussed the tests used to check robustness. Two tests
were employed to check whether the results are robust: (1) a further endogeneity
test regarding reverse causality; (2) the independent variable voluntary disclosure
was replaced with social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures
individually. First, a robustness test reported that there is no concern for reverse
causality, thus further ensuring that there is no concern for endogeneity. For the
second robustness test aimed at understanding the effects of voluntary disclosure
on firm performance and social and intellectual capital disclosure, a significant
positive effect on firm performance was observed. In contrast, no significant effect
was revealed for environmental disclosure and firm performance, except for
MCAP. A likely explanation is that stakeholders may be aware of social and
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intellectual capital disclosures but have limited or no awareness of environmental
disclosure.
Based on the result of various statistical analyses, the result of the effects of
voluntary disclosure on firm performance can be considered strong and rigorous.
This study addresses basic statistics assumptions, including normality,
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity, to ensure a bias free result.
In the next chapter, the results of Chapters Six and Seven are summarized
and discussed, along with providing a conclusion for this thesis. More specifically,
the chapter summarizes and discusses the results regarding the determinants of
voluntary disclosure and the effects of voluntary disclosures on firm performance.
Then, it presents a summary for the policy implications from the findings and
highlights the contributions from the study. Finally, it addresses the limitations of
this study and suggests some avenues for future study.
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Chapter Eight: Discussion and Conclusions
8.1 Introduction
This study investigates the determinants and effects of corporate voluntary
disclosures of social, environmental and intellectual capital (voluntary disclosure)
with an emphasis on corporate governance characteristics and firm performance
within a Bangladeshi context. More precisely, this study combines three significant
forms of voluntary disclosure ‒ social, environmental and intellectual capital ‒ to
gain a more complete understanding. To explore the determinants of voluntary
disclosures the study examines the relationship between corporate governance
characteristics and voluntary disclosure. In addition, the effects of voluntary
disclosures on firm performance have also been examined. To achieve these
objectives, the thesis used quantitative methods along with a comprehensive
theoretical framework for a developing country context. The findings of this study
contribute to an in-depth understanding for policymakers and regulatory bodies
from Bangladesh as well as other developing countries, for example, the BSEC, the
Stock Exchanges, The Institute of Cost and Management Accountants of
Bangladesh, Bangladesh Enterprise Institute and Bangladesh Bank with regard to
enhancing transparency by considering voluntary disclosures
This chapter has two primary objectives. First, it reiterates key results along
with a detailed discussion and elaborates the contributions and limitations of this
thesis. Second, it offers suggestions for future research.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.2 provides an overview of
the thesis. Section 8.3 presents a detailed discussion of the results of the relationship
between corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosures.
Discussion of the results of the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance
are presented in Section 8.4. Section 8.5 addresses the contributions of the study.
Section 8.6 discusses the implications of this study for policymakers and
practitioners. Section 8.7 explicitly discusses the limitations of the study with some
suggestions for future research.
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8.2 Overview of the Thesis
This thesis is organized into eight chapters. Chapter One introduced the
background of this study and highlighted five factors that motivated the research. It
established the study’s two research questions and discussed the expected
contributions.
Chapter Two produced a critique of the literature regarding voluntary
disclosure, corporate governance characteristics and firm performance, focusing on
prior meta-analyses, as well as developed and developing country and Bangladeshi
contexts. From this review, a need for further insights from a Bangladeshi context
emerged and an opportunity for contributions to the literature were identified.
Chapter Three explained the theoretical underpinnings of the study.
Following a rigorous analysis of the existing individual and combined theoretical
frameworks, the framework of An et al. (2011) was considered as more appropriate
for this study, with some modifications. These changes included considering the
research context and applying social and environmental, along with intellectual
capital, disclosures in an empirical study. This study adopted agency, legitimacy
and signalling theory to articulate the determinants and effects of voluntary
disclosure suitable in a Bangladeshi context.
Chapter Four provided a review of the Bangladeshi context and developed
hypotheses for this study. The overall context, including historical, economic, legal
and regulatory aspects, relevant authorities for corporate governance, voluntary
disclosure and status of the market, were discussed. Eight hypotheses were
developed to explore the determinants of voluntary disclosure in relation to
corporate governance characteristics, including CEO duality, board size, board
composition, sub-committee, audit committee compositor, foreign ownership,
director ownership and institutional ownership. In addition, a further hypothesis
was also developed to explore the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm
performance. Five sub-hypotheses were constructed by considering five indicators
of firm performance including ROA, ROS, MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q.
In Chapter Five the data and empirical models employed in this study were
described. The study considered the top 200 listed firms on the Dhaka Stock Exchange
for the years 2011 to 2013 with firm performance based on the years 2012 to 2014.
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Since the focus of the thesis is voluntary corporate disclosure, data was collected from
listed firm's annual reports. To ensure rigorous data collection, a disclosure index for
social, environmental and intellectual capital was developed from prior studies using
content analysis. Secondary data of firm performance was collected from the
Bloomberg database. The two models focused on the relationship between corporate
governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure and the effects of voluntary
disclosure on financial performance. In addition, consistent with the literature, Firm

Size, Leverage, Industry and Current Year Firm Performance were considered as
control variables. Furthermore, to analyse the research models panel data, OLS and
2SLS were applied along with two robustness tests for each model.

Chapter Six presented the results, revealing that corporate governance
characteristics act as a significant explanatory factor for corporate voluntary
disclosures of social, environmental and intellectual capital. It should also be noted
that several robustness tests and statistical analyses were performed.
Chapter Seven presented the results revealing that voluntary disclosures of
social, environmental and intellectual capital moderate firm performance.
Consistent with the previous chapter several robustness tests and statistical
assumptions were performed.
Chapter Eight concludes the thesis with a discussion of the results obtained
in Chapters Six and Seven, implications for policy and practice, acknowledgement
of the contributions of this thesis and the limitations as well as avenues for future
research.

8.3 Discussion of the Findings.
This thesis investigated two research questions.
1) To what extent do corporate governance characteristics affect
voluntary disclosure of social, environmental and intellectual capital
disclosures in Bangladesh listed firms?
2) To what extent does voluntary disclosure affect firm performance in

Bangladeshi listed firms?
These findings are discussed in the following section.
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8.3.1 Discussion on the Findings of the Relationship Between Corporate
Governance Characteristics and Voluntary Disclosures

This section provides a summary of the findings relating to research
question one. In particular, to what extent do corporate governance characteristics
affect voluntary disclosure of social, environmental and intellectual capital
disclosures in Bangladeshi listed firms. Previous empirical studies suggest that the
characteristics of corporate governance act as an explanatory factor (Ali et al. 2017;
Allegrini & Greco 2013; Barako et al. 2006a, 2006b; Garcia-Meca & SánchezBallesta 2010; Khlif et al. 2016; Samaha et al. 2015) and the findings of the limited
studies of the Bangladeshi context also report it as a significant explanatory factor
(Khan et al. 2013; Muttakin et al. 2015; Rashid & Lodh 2008).
The hypotheses were formulated in light of prior relevant studies. Suitable
statistical tests were used to answer whether eight significant characteristics of
corporate governance: CEO duality, board size, board composition, sub-committee,
audit committee composition, foreign ownership, director ownership and
institutional ownership act as an explanatory factor. The results were also reported
in robustness tests one and two and in some cases not all three aspects of voluntary
disclosures were found. The findings are summarized in Figure 8-1.

Board
Composiiton

SubCommittee

Audit Committee
Composiiton

Positive

Positive

Positive

Not SIgnificant

Director
Ownership

Board Size
Not
SIgnificant

CEO
Duality

Foreign
Ownership

Negative

Voluntary
Dislcosures

Negative

Institutional
Ownership
Not SIgnificant

Figure 8-1 Summary of the main findings of the relationship between corporate governance
characteristics and voluntary disclosures
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A significant negative relationship was reported between CEO duality and
voluntary disclosure. This finding is consistent with a large number of prior studies
from developed and other developing countries (Allegrini & Greco 2013; Cerbioni
& Parbonetti 2007; Giannarakis 2014b; Huafang & Jianguo 2007). Within the
Bangladeshi context, the result is consistent with Muttakin et al. (2016) while Rouf
(2011) reported a positive and no significant relationship. However, a negative
relationship between CEO duality and voluntary disclosure is also consistent with
corporate governance guidelines in Bangladesh as firms are advised to avoid this
form of leadership to ensure transparency. Thus, it can be concluded that CEO
duality reduces transparency within the Bangladeshi context. In addition, finding a
negative relationship further supports the argument that a CEO can exercise his/her
power over others to focus on mandatory issues or operational success while
ignoring any additional initiative that might incur an extra cost.
An insignificant relationship was reported between board size and voluntary
disclosure. This finding is consistent with a large number of prior studies from
developed and other developing countries (Alves et al. 2012; Cerbioni & Parbonetti
2007; Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008; Giannarakis 2014a, 2014b; Haji 2015; Samaha
et al. 2012; Uyar et al. 2013). Within the Bangladeshi context, limited studies have
explored this relationship. Those that do report a significant relationship between
board size and voluntary disclosure (Muttakin et al. 2016; Rouf 2011). Thus, an
insignificant relationship provides a new dimension to the Bangladeshi context as
it provides a strong basis for the argument that having more directors is a constraint
for coordination (Lipton & Lorsh 1992) and difficult to control by the chairperson
(Hermalin & Weisbach 2003; Kaymak & Bektas 2008). Therefore, a larger board
is as a pitfall for voluntary disclosure due to a decrease in the effectiveness and
monitoring aspect of a board. In addition, a large number of directors makes
decision making time-consuming because of the likely wide range of opinions,
since values vary from person to person. Ensuring attendance may also be tricky
within a developing country context as a smaller board is more beneficial within
developing countries (Mak & Kusnadi 2005). Furthermore, it should also be noted
that, according to the BSEC guideline, board size should be between five to 20
directors within Bangladesh. Due to such a large range in the number of directors,
the monitoring mechanism might be affected or the benefit overestimated.
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Therefore, large board size might not play a significant role for adopting voluntary
disclosure.
An insignificant relationship was reported between board composition and
voluntary disclosure. This finding is consistent with other prior studies from
developed and other developing countries (Al-Shammari & Al-Sultan 2010;
Allegrini & Greco 2013; Ghazali & Weetman 2006; Hidalgo et al. 2011; Ho &
Wong 2001; Xiao et al. 2004). In contrast, limited studies from Bangladesh
consistently report a positive relationship between board composition and voluntary
disclosure (Khan et al. 2013; Khan 2010; Muttakin et al. 2015; Muttakin et al. 2016;
Rashid & Lodh 2008) and an insignificant relationship contributes a new dimension
to the literature of Bangladesh. Accordingly, an insignificant result for board
composition and voluntary disclosure might be an outcome of the recent corporate
governance guideline provided by the BSEC (one-third of board members should
be an independent director).41 Due to the amended mandatory provision to maintain
independent directors, firms may comply with the law. However, the independent
directors may not emphasize optional issues such as voluntary disclosure. In
addition, it could also be argued that, after facing a market collapse in 2010,
independent directors might be driven toward firm performance and ignore any
issues that might incur extra costs or are not required by law.
A significant positive relationship was reported between the presence of a
sub-committee and voluntary disclosure. This result is consistent with a large
number of prior studies from developed and other developing countries (AlShammari & Al-Sultan 2010; Arcay & Vazquez 2005; Barako et al. 2006b;
Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007; Ho & Wong 2001; O’Sullivan et al. 2008). Within
Bangladesh, Rouf (2011) and Khan et al. (2013) report a significant positive
relationship by considering only the audit committee as a sub-committee. However,
other sub-committees, like a nomination committee, have been ignored in prior
studies. This study includes the presence of a nomination committee along with an
audit committee to facilitate board monitoring (Allegrini & Greco 2013; Cerbioni
& Parbonetti 2007). Accordingly, this study added the presence of a nomination

41

Corporate Governance guideline 2012 http://www.secbd.org/Notification%20on%20CG07.8.12-Amended.pdf
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committee, as well as an audit committee, by arguing that these committees ensure
monitoring, controlling and transparency within firms in a Bangladeshi context.
Therefore, finding a positive relationship with the addition of another subcommittee extends our understanding and provides further support for the argument
that the existence of a sub-committee facilitates monitoring and controlling. It
should also be noted that having a sub-committee (nomination committee) is not
mandatory in Bangladesh. Thus, firms maintaining the sub-committee reduce
information asymmetry and increase transparency by disclosing additional
information.
A significant positive relationship was reported between audit committee
composition and voluntary disclosure. This result is consistent with prior studies
from other countries (Akhtaruddin & Haron 2010; Haji 2015; Madi et al. 2014). In
the robustness test, this relationship was only shown to exist between environmental
and intellectual capital disclosure. No significant relationship has been reported
with social disclosure and it is concluded that the audit committee ensures
monitoring and transparency within firms in a Bangladeshi context. Finding a
positive relationship between audit committee composition and voluntary
disclosure supports the argument that independent directors within the audit
committee strengthen the monitoring function and establish controlling power.
Accordingly, this plays a significant role in reducing information asymmetry and
increasing transparency.
A significant positive relationship was reported between foreign ownership
and voluntary disclosure. This result is consistent with a large number of prior
studies from other country contexts (Barako et al. 2006a; Haniffa & Cooke 2005;
Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Huafang & Jianguo 2007). This result is also consistent
with prior studies from Bangladesh (Khan et al. 2013; Muttakin et al. 2015).
Therefore, it is concluded that foreign ownership reinforces compliance with
international rules and standards. Hence, this form of ownership facilitates
transparency within the firms in the Bangladeshi context. Similarly, finding a
positive relationship between foreign ownership and voluntary disclosure further
supports the argument that having foreign ownership provides an opportunity to
comply with other, often developed country, norms and values. At the same time,
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firms with foreign ownership might also be interested in promoting their firm within
international markets and attracting various investment opportunities while
simultaneously considering a broader range of stakeholders.
A significant negative relationship was reported between director ownership
and voluntary disclosure and supports hypothesis1 (g). This result is consistent with
a large number of prior studies from other country contexts (Eng & Mak 2003;
Ghazali & Weetman 2006; Haji 2013; Mohd Ghazali 2007). This is also consistent
with the prior studies from a Bangladesh perspective (Khan et al. 2013; Rashid &
Lodh 2008; Rouf & Al Harun 2011). Thus, it can be concluded that director
ownership reduces transparency within the Bangladeshi context. Accordingly, this
result further supports the argument that director ownership may discourage
disclosure of additional information while limiting the focus on firm performance
metrics. It should also be noted that director ownership might encourage an agency
conflict. As a result, within a developing country like Bangladesh, directors have
the privilege of accessing additional information and might not be interested in
sharing this information with others through voluntary disclosure.
An insignificant relationship was reported between institutional ownership
and voluntary disclosure. Hypothesis1 (h) is, therefore, rejected. This result is
consistent with prior studies from developed and developing countries (Donnelly
& Mulcahy 2008; Haniffa & Cooke 2002). This result is also consistent with the
findings of Rashid and Lodh (2008). However, robustness tests demonstrate an
insignificant relationship with intellectual capital and a significant negative
relationship with social and environmental disclosures. As a result, it is concluded
that institutional ownership does not moderate the level of voluntary disclosure. It
should also be noted that an insignificant relationship between institutional
ownership and voluntary disclosure further supports the argument that this form of
owner ‒ the expert investor ‒ is more concerned with maximizing short-term
financial returns instead of considering long-term effects or a voluntary disclosure
agenda.
Besides corporate governance characteristics, this study also considers four
control variables including firm size, leverage, industry and firm profitability to
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examine the determinants of voluntary disclosure. In the following, a result for each
control variable is discussed.
A significant positive relationship was reported between firm size and
voluntary disclosure. This result is consistent with prior studies from other countries
(Barako et al. 2006b; Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008; Samaha et al. 2012) as well as
Bangladesh (Khan et al. 2013; Khan 2010; Muttakin & Khan 2014; Muttakin et al.
2015; Muttakin et al. 2016; Nurunnabi et al. 2011). A positive relationship between
firm size and voluntary disclosure further supports the argument that larger firms
are subject to additional pressure from several stakeholders. Since larger firms have
more stakeholders and greater resources, larger firms can focus on an additional
agenda like voluntary disclosure (Firth 1979; Singhvi & Desai 1971; Watts &
Zimmerman 1986; Cowenet al. 1987). Thus, firms with a larger size consider
voluntary disclosure to communicate to several stakeholders while additional
capability also allows for considering optional issues like voluntary disclosure.
An insignificant relationship was reported between leverage and voluntary
disclosure. This result is consistent with prior studies from other less developed
countries (Akhtaruddin et al. 2009; Ghazali & Weetman 2006; Ho & Tower 2011;
Ho & Wong 2001; Samaha et al. 2012) but inconsistent with prior studies from
Bangladesh (Khan et al. 2013; Muttakin et al. 2015; Muttakin et al. 2016). An
insignificant relationship might occur because, after the share market collapse,
firms from Bangladesh were focused on regular economic goals, such as improving
performance. Accordingly, due to debt there is an additional expense, thus firms are
less interested in emphasizing optional issues such as voluntary disclosure that may
cause additional cost.
A significant positive relationship was reported between industry and
voluntary disclosure This result is consistent with prior studies from other countries
(Chan et al. 2014; Jizi et al. 2014; Samaha et al. 2012) as well as Bangladesh
(Muttakin & Khan 2014; Muttakin et al. 2016; Nurunnabi et al. 2011). It should be
noted that the Bangladesh Bank, the regulator of the banking industry in
Bangladesh, called for more voluntary information (Khan 2010). In addition, firms
within the financial industry are primarily more concerned with firm transparency
due to external pressure from various parties (Bhambri & Sonnenfeld 1988). They
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are also a source of loans for various parties. Accordingly, it can be expected that
firms within the financial industry might promote increased transparency to impress
interested parties. In regards to the relationship between financial industry and
social disclosure Giannarakis (2014, p. 409) states
The financial industry plays a catalytic role in supporting others industries
by financing them. In addition, the financial companies provide more
information on their CSR initiatives to convince that the maximization of
the profit is not the unique purpose of the companies.
Consistent with the above discussion, and combined with a significant positive
result, this suggests that firms within the financial industry in Bangladesh are more
proactive in their efforts to disclose voluntarily.
An insignificant relationship was reported between profitability and
voluntary disclosure. This result is consistent with prior studies from other countries
(Eng & Mak 2003; Ho & Wong 2001; Samaha et al. 2012; Zeng et al. 2012) but
inconsistent with prior studies from Bangladesh (Khan et al. 2013; Khan 2010;
Muttakin et al. 2016). Regarding the inconsistent result from Bangladeshi studies,
it should be noted that to measure profitability accounting measurements had been
primarily considered in prior studies (Khan et al. 2013; Khan 2010; Muttakin et al.
2016) while this thesis considers a mixed method. Thus,

measurement of

profitablity may also be a probable reason for the insignificant result. Furthermore,
due to the poor social and economic conditions and lack of a strong local
stakeholder, firms may consider voluntary disclosure as less important as it may not
be significant for future profitability. Therefore, based on the results of the control
variable it can be concluded that larger firms, and those within the financial
industry, focus on voluntary disclosure. Such findings might be explained by the
capability to focus on additional agenda, such as voluntary disclosure, while smaller
firms are limited to regular operations. Similarly, the banking sector is subject to
more regulation compared to other industries. Thus, the financial industry or banks
are keen to promote transparency by discharging additional information.
8.3.2 Discussion on the Findings of the Effects of Voluntary Disclosures on
Firm Performance

This section provides a summary of the findings obtained from research
question two. In particular, to what extent does voluntary corporate disclosure of
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social, environmental and intellectual capital affect firm performance in
Bangladeshi listed firms. Previous empirical studies suggest that voluntary
disclosure has a significant positive effect on firm performance (Abdolmohammadi
2005; Griffin & Mahon 1997; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Qiu et al. 2016) and the findings
of the limited studies of the Bangladeshi context have similar results (Hossain et al.
2015).
The hypotheses were formulated in light of prior relevant studies. Suitable
statistical tests and five indicators of firm performance including ROA, ROS,
MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q were used to answer whether voluntary disclosure
affects firm performance. The main findings are summarized in Figure 8-2.

Return on
Asset

Return on
Sales

Tobin's Q

Voluntary
Dislcosure

Earnings Per
Share

Market
Capitalization

Figure 8-2 Summary of the main findings of the effects of voluntary disclosures on firm performance

A significant positive effect from voluntary disclosure on ROA was
reported. This finding is consistent with a large number of prior studies from
developed and other developing countries (Ahamed et al. 2014; Basah & Khairi
2015; Chen & Wang 2011; Chen et al. 2016; Choi et al. 2010; Garay et al. 2013;
Kim et al. 2013; Mishra & Suar 2010; Platonova et al. 2016; Wibowo 2012). Within
the Bangladeshi context, the result is consistent with Hossain et al. (2015). ROA is
an accounting based firm performance measurement, and the findings can be
explained as follows. First, consistent with agency and signalling theory, disclosing
extra information reduces information asymmetry and the cost of finance and
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promotes foreign investment. By doing so, firms may also achieve operational
efficiencies, which may lead to higher returns. It should also be noted that
Bangladesh is more dependent on Western investment (Islam 1992) and increased
disclosure facilitates donations and reductions in operational costs (cost of finance)
(Sengupta 1998). Second, firms may adopt disclosure of additional information to
address social concerns, which may make a positive contribution to operational
efficiency (Brine et al. 2007). For instance, by creating customer loyalty (Mishra &
Suar 2010), better quality of labour, minimizing costs through fewer lawsuits from
employees and environmentalists (Ullmann 1985; Waddock & Graves 1997),
customer advocacy and positive word-of-mouth (Hoeffler & Keller 2002; Sen et al.
2006). Finally, interested parties might assess the potential of a firm from value
related disclosures (intellectual capital). Thus, increased disclosure reflects the
chances of value creation by a firm, which in turn affects returns positively. In
addition, as a robustness test, it is also documented that social and intellectual
capital disclosure has a significant positive effect on ROA. However, an
insignificant effect from environmental disclosure might indicate less awareness of
environmental issues with a focus on economic development (Belal et al. 2015).
An insignificant positive effect from voluntary disclosure on ROS was
reported. It should also be noted that in the earlier analysis an endogeneity problem
was observed. An endogeneity problem suggests that there might be a contingent
factor associated with ROS. In addition, ROS might be related to poor socioeconomic conditions where customers are not keen to pay a premium for voluntary
disclosure. Although the actual reason is difficult to determine, an insignificant
result is consistent with other studies (Aras et al. 2010; Brine et al. 2007). Aras et
al. (2010) concluded that the reason for the insignificant result is uncertain but is
concerned with variable selection. Brine et al. (2007) also emphasized variable
measurement and a need for lag-year for future studies. In addition, as a robustness
test, it is also documented that social and environmental disclosure has an
insignificant effect on ROS. In contrast, intellectual capital disclosure has a
significant positive effect, and suggests that the interested parties regard highly its
potential value creation opportunities.
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A significant positive effect from voluntary disclosure on MCAP was
reported. This finding is consistent with prior studies (Abdolmohammadi 2005;
Anam et al. 2011; De Klerk et al. 2015; Elzahar et al. 2015; Uyar & Kılıç 2012)
and the perspective of legitimacy and signalling theories. This result contributes for
the first time to the Bangladeshi context. Market capitalization is a market based
firm performance measurement indicator, and the positive result could be a result
of the following. First, as agency and signalling theory implies, voluntary
disclosure facilitates a reduction in information asymmetry as interested parties
might consider it as a positive signal. Thus, by considering additional information
firms may justify the potential of value creation through intangible assets. Second,
as with legitimacy theory, firms discharge their social contract responsibilities by
considering social and environmental information. Hence, interested parties might
have a positive perception of the firm that has increased voluntary disclosure.
Finally, the Bangladeshi share market experienced a severe collapse in 2010, and
lack of transparency was argued to be a significant contributing factor (Hossain
2014). As a result, it can be speculated that investors are more concerned with
transparency to assess the potential of a firm. Therefore, a positive response from
interested parties in turn stimulates share price. In addition, as a robustness test, it
is also documented that social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosure
also has a significant positive effect on MCAP.
A significant positive effect from voluntary disclosure on EPS was reported.
This finding is consistent with Oeyono et al. (2011) and Verbeeten et al. (2016) as
well as legitimacy and signalling theory. It could be speculated that interested
parties within Bangladesh perceive voluntary disclosure as a positive signal and
value firms with more voluntary disclosure, which leads to increased earnings per
share. It should also be noted that EPS is a marketing based firm performance
indicator. Thus, a positive effect is also advocated by agency theory that additional
information (voluntary disclosure) reduces information asymmetry and improved
EPS. In addition, as a robustness test, it is also documented that social and
intellectual capital disclosure has a significant positive effect on EPS. However,
consistent with other indicators (i.e., ROA, ROS) an insignificant effect from
environmental disclosure was reported, further supporting that there is less
awareness about environmental issues within the Bangladeshi context.
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A significant positive effect from voluntary disclosure on Tobin’s Q was
reported. This finding is consistent with prior studies (Chi 2009; Choi et al. 2010;
Garay et al. 2013; Khlif et al. 2015) and advocates the concept of signalling and
legitimacy theory where the interested parties perceive voluntary disclosure in a
positive manner, resulting in a positive impression. In addition, Tobin’s Q as a
mixed measurement of firm performance with a positive effect is consistent with
the result from the accounting indicator (ROA) as well as the market indicator
(MCAP and EPS). In addition, as a robustness test, it is also documented that social
and intellectual capital disclosure also has a significant positive effect on ROA.
Consistent with other indicators (i.e. ROA, ROS, EPS) an insignificant effect from
environmental disclosure has been reported and further supports the argument that
there is less awareness about environmental issues within the Bangladeshi context.
This study also considers firm size, leverage, industry, CEO duality and
board composition as a control variable while investigating the effects of voluntary
disclosure on firm performance. In the following, a result of each control variable
is discussed.
A mixed result was found regarding the relationship between firm size and
firm performance. A positive relationship between firm size and firm performance
was documented by considering MCAP and EPS as indicators of firm performance.
A positive relationship is consistent with the literature (Anam et al. 2011; Uyar &
Kilic 2012). A possible explanation may be that investors might appreciate larger
firms. On the other hand, a significant negative relationship was observed by
considering ROS and Tobin’s Q as indicators. This negative finding is also
consistent with prior studies (Lo and Sheu 2007; Weir et al. 2002). It may be that
larger-sized firms also require a higher amount of return to cover larger costs and
negatively affect firm performance. In contrast, no significant effect was revealed
for firm performance by considering ROA. An insignificant relationship between
firm performance and size is also consistent with prior studies (Mishra & Suar
2010). Therefore, due to various calculation methods and the involvement of
various stakeholders in firm performance, firm size may act as an explanatory factor
in a mixed way and Bangladesh is not an exception.
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Leverage reveals the debt structure of a firm and a negative relationship with
firm performance has been observed. In particular, a negative relationship has been
demonstrated by considering ROA, MCAP and Tobin’s Q as indicators. A negative
relationship is also consistent with prior studies (Alsaeed 2006; Anam et al. 2011;
Garay et al. 2013; Lima et al. 2011). Accordingly, it can be claimed that higher
leverage incurs more agency costs between creditors and shareholders and that can
lead to a negative effect on firm performance (Fama & French 1998; Khlif et al.
2015). Therefore, a negative relationship is also consistent with the arguments of
agency theory. In addition, having more debt might be a concern for investors and
this perception may have an adverse relationship with firm performance (Myers
1977). In contrast, no relationship was reported by considering ROS and EPS as an
indicator. An insignificant relationship between leverage and performance is also
consistent with prior studies (Qiu et al. 2016). This mixed finding may occur as the
calculation of firm performance indicators is not unique. Thus, the cost of leverage
may not be considered as a contingent factor during the calculation process for
every indicator.
Regarding the relationship between industry and firm performance, a
negative relationship was found. In particular, a negative relationship has been
demonstrated by considering ROA, MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q as firm
performance indicators. Prior studies also documented that industry acts as an
explanatory factor for firm performance (Haniffa & Hudaib 2006; Khlif et al. 2015;
Schmalensee 1985; ). It should be noted that the financial industry is subject to
intense monitoring from regulators42 and Bangladesh is not an exception. To some
extent, other industries in Bangladesh are more relaxed compared to the financial
industry in terms of monitoring and supervision (Bhuiyan & Biswas 2007). As a
result, varied responses across industries may act as an explanatory factor for firm
performance (Elsayed & Paton 2005). Therefore, it can be explained that firms in
financial services may struggle to develop firm performance compared to other
industries. In contrast, an insignificant relationship with ROS was found. This is
not surprising as sales are not a direct concern in the financial industry because it is
service-oriented.
42

https://www2.deloitte.com/au/en/pages/risk/articles/monitoring-conduct-financial-markets.html Visited
3/03/2018 6.11PM
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Primarily a negative result was found regarding the relationship between
CEO duality and firm performance by considering ROA, ROS, EPS and Tobin’s Q
as indicators. This negative relationship is also consistent with prior studies
(Jackling & Johl 2009; Rahman & Haniffa 2005; Ujunwa 2012). This negative
effect may indicate that having this leadership structure is not appreciated by
interested parties due to a lack of transparency and individuals’ centralized power.
In addition, according to the recommendations of the Bangladesh BSEC, firms
should avoid this leadership style. Accordingly, a firm may have a negative effect
from a cost of debt/equity perspective. Therefore, a firm with CEO duality struggles
to maintain better performance. However, an insignificant relationship with firm
performance was reported by considering MCAP as an indicator. This may be due
to poor socioeconomic conditions, in which a lack of concern regarding this
leadership structure exists. In addition, CEO duality may not directly moderate
MCAP as this indicator is not based on a firm’s operational issues directly. Other
issues act as a contingent factor for this indicator, therefore, CEO duality has a
minimal effect on MCAP.
Board composition does not have a significant relationship with firm
performance indicators including ROA, ROS, MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q. An
insignificant relationship between board independence (composition) is also
consistent with prior studies in Bangladesh (Rashid et al. 2010; Rashid 2018d). This
insignificant relationship can be explained by firms in Bangladesh being mainly
family ownership dominated (Farooque et al. 2007) where independent directors
are proposed by internal directors (Rashid 2018d). As a result, independent
directors may not have enough power to dominate firm performance. It should also
be noted that the BSEC’s new corporate governance guidelines maintain one-third
independent directors. Thus, board composition from an independent director
perspective is less a matter of choice but of compliance with regulatory guidelines.
Therefore, independent directors may not be a strong mechanism to moderate firm
performance.
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8.4 Implications of the Findings
This section relates to the implications of the findings of this thesis. In
particular, the contributions arising from the relationship between corporate
governance characteristics and voluntary disclosures and the effects of the
voluntary disclosures on firm performance are presented.
8.4.1 Implications for the Findings of the Relationship between Corporate
Governance Characteristics and Voluntary Disclosures

As discussed in the findings, certain characteristics of corporate governance
act as an explanatory factor for voluntary disclosure for the 134 listed firms in
Bangladesh. Therefore, the following implications arise from this finding.
First, in 2012, the BSEC in Bangladesh promulgated a new guideline for
corporate governance in response to a severe share market collapse and to foster
corporate transparency for investors. Since this study investigated disclosures from
a corporate governance perspective, the thesis has made a significant contribution
in relation to the assessment of corporate governance practices. For example,
consistent with the BSEC guideline, this study of Bangladeshi listed firms reported
that CEO duality adversely contributes to the transparency of a firm. Besides this
characteristic, audit committee composition and the presence of sub-committees
(audit and nomination) contributes to the voluntary disclosure of social,
environmental and intellectual capital information. This result has the potential to
guide future issuance of corporate governance guidelines to ensure firm
transparency and boost investor confidence. For example, the BSEC may encourage
listed firms to establish a nomination committee for monitoring and controlling a
firm and stimulating transparency.
Second, regarding ownership, the relationship between foreign, director and
institutional ownership was equivocal. Therefore, the findings of this thesis suggest
that in terms of ownership structure foreign investors are more concerned with
voluntary disclosure. This is consistent with agency and legitimacy theory as this
form of investor requires more information for investment decisions as well as to
comply with the values of a wide range of investors. The BSEC may provide more
compensation or incentives for firms with foreign investors to voluntarily disclose
or encourage voluntary disclosure. In addition, director ownership provides the
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opportunity to limit information as these director owners have direct access. Thus,
from an agency theory perspective, the BSEC may introduce incentives for
directors to consider voluntary disclosure as transparency might be a concern. In
relation to institutional ownership, this group of investors are more concerned with
firm performance. Thus, once again from an agency perspective the BSEC may
need incentives for voluntary disclosure.
Third, board size and composition were observed to have an insignificant
impact on voluntary disclosure. The current BSEC guidelines suggest that board
size should be between five to 20 directors, however, it was documented that the
benefit of a larger board size reduced after a certain level of members (Abeysekera
2010; Hidalgo et al. 2011). Accordingly, the BSEC may consider the effectiveness
of a large board when setting the maximum number of board members. In addition,
the BSEC suggests a board should consist of at least one-third independent
directors. However, this study found that this finding did not contribute to voluntary
disclosures, which suggest that (i) the power to appoint directors rests with large
shareholders and (ii) independent directors in Bangladesh may concentrate on the
firm or operational performance and ignore voluntary disclosure due to the
influence of other stakeholders. These features adversely influence firm
transparency. Therefore, it is essential that the BSEC provide further guidelines to
ensure increased voluntary disclosure and therefore firm transparency.
Fourth, leverage did not contribute to voluntary disclosure. This result
reflects that debt providers may not indicate social and environmental concerns or
intellectual capital aspects. Accordingly, the BSEC may initiate incentives for firms
or debt providers. For example, for lending guidelines, firms with more voluntary
disclosure may get priority.
Finally, firm size and industry type (banking industry) contributes to the
level of voluntary disclosure since large firms are able to afford the additional cost
of managing voluntary disclosures (Ammann et al. 2011; Firth 1979; Singhvi &
Desai 1971). Similarly, larger firms are subject to additional agency costs, which
are reduced by additional disclosures (Hossain et al. 1995). Therefore, the BSEC
could provide incentives to smaller firms to provide more voluntary disclosures.
Similarly, firms from the financial (banking) industry have an increased level of
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voluntary disclosure. However, the banking industry receives inducements from the
Central Bank of Bangladesh to provide additional information (Khan 2010) in the
form of voluntary disclosure. In addition, increased transparency is expected from
banks as investor confidence is critical for banking and finance in Bangladesh.
Therefore, from a legitimacy theory perspective, to comply with the social contract
and reduce information asymmetry from the agency and signalling theory
perspectives, voluntary disclosures are important.
8.4.2 Implications for the Findings of the Results of the Effects of Voluntary
Disclosure on Firm Performance

Voluntary disclosures contribute to firm performance for the 134 listed
firms with the following implications.
First, within the Bangladeshi context, the BSEC is keen to ensure
transparency;43 accordingly more voluntary disclosures are expected from firms as
a mechanism to reduce information asymmetry. Therefore, this effect on firm
performance provides evidence for regulatory authorities such as the BSEC to
promote transparency through voluntary disclosures as an incentive.
Second, since there are insufficient levels of voluntary disclosures within
Bangladeshi firms (Omran & El-Galfy 2014; Azim et al. 2009; Belal 2000, 2008;
Belal & Momin 2009; Khan et al. 2009) due to the socio-economic environment,
firms may assume voluntary disclosures are merely an additional cost with little
return. Therefore, the findings of this study provide an incentive for firms to
consider voluntary disclosures from an economic perspective. Accordingly, firms
may disclose social, environmental and intellectual capital information more
effectively to align with the strategic goals of shareholder value. For example, firms
may consider recruiting directors with social, environmental and intellectual capital
knowledge.
Finally, for the local investor, the findings shed light on the potential of their
investment. Investors from Bangladesh may not be aware of the significance of a
socially or environmentally responsible attitude in terms of firm performance,
43
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seeing it only as an additional cost or sacrifice to profit. Therefore, the findings of
this study provide investors with a lead indicator of overall performance.

8.5 Contributions of the Study
The current study extends the understanding of the determinants and effects
of voluntary disclosure by combining the concepts of corporate governance,
voluntary disclosure and firm performance. It also contributes methodologically to
the accounting literature in several ways.
First, most of the prior studies limit the focus of their studies on
determinants (Khan et al. 2013; Khan 2010; Muttakin & Khan 2014; Muttakin et
al. 2015; Muttakin et al. 2016; Rashid & Lodh 2008) or effects (Hossain et al. 2015)
of voluntary disclosure. This study combines both the determinants and effects
within Bangladeshi listed firms by integrating three perspectives: (1) corporate
governance; (2) voluntary disclosure; and (3) financial performance. Therefore, it
provides a more complete picture of voluntary disclosures as it is presumed that,
when making decisions about the level of voluntary disclosures, a firm also assesses
the potential effect on performance. This study also extends the literature by
considering environmental and intellectual capital disclosure in addition to social
disclosures in the Bangladeshi context. It also considers the period following a
severe share market crash in Bangladesh. Thus, the findings contribute to the use
of an integrated approach by establishing evidence of voluntary disclosure from
corporate governance and firm performance aspects in Bangladesh.
Second, the study contributes to the literature by adopting a combined
theoretical framework to interpret the empirical findings and to understand the
underpinnings of corporate governance, voluntary disclosure and firm performance
from a developing country context. In so doing, this study reviews the existing
theoretical framework and finds combining several theories guides voluntary
disclosure studies more appropriately since most studies combine several concepts
instead of considering the interactions developed by An et al. (2011). An et al.
(2011) is considered as a pioneering framework with some limitations. This study
considered these limitations to develop a combined framework for a Bangladeshi
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country context. For example, when considering voluntary disclosure, a firm has to
consider:

reducing information asymmetry; maximizing shareholder interest;

transparency; monitoring; controlling; agent‒principal conflict; compliance with
the social contract; and the consequences of ignorance. All these concepts are
articulated by integrating agency, legitimacy and signalling theory. By considering
or ignoring voluntary disclosures a firm demonstrates whether it has complied with
the social contract. Similarly, by considering voluntary disclosure as a signal,
interested parties may have a certain perception of the firm. These concepts align
with the concept of legitimacy and signalling theory as articulated in Figure 8-3.
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Research Question: Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure (Decision-making Process of Voluntary Disclosure)

Legitimacy
Agency
CEO duality: Due to extra power increase agent
principal conflict & information asymetry
Sub-Committee: Increase monitoring / maximize
shareholders' interest
Audit Committee Composiiton: Increase
monitoring / maximize shareholders' interest
Director Ownership: Increase agent principal
conflict & information asymetry
Foreign Ownership: Reduce information
asymetry by satisfying interested parties with
other region

CEO duality: Due to extra power ignore social contract .
Sub-Committee: Increase monitoring also ensure to
comply with social contract
Audit Committee Composiiton: Increase monitoring
also ensure to comply with social contract
Director Ownership: Due to personal interest ignore
social contract
Foreign Ownership: Social values and norms from
foreign investors need to emphasize and provides priroty
to social contract

Voluntary
Dislcosure

Signalling
CEO duality: Due to extra power ignore reduction of information
asymetry
Sub-Committee: Would like to send a positive signal regarding
the monitoring by increasing transperency (dislcosure)
Audit Committee Composiiton: Would like to send positive
signal regarding the monitoring by increasing transperency
(dislcosure)
Director Ownership: Due to personal interest just ignore the
signalling by avoiding additional information.
Foreign Ownership: Would like to send a positive signal for
promoting more investors from abroad, thus by giving

addiitonal information they reduce information asymetry

Research Question: Effects of Voluntary Disclosure (How Interested Parties Perceive Voluntary Disclosure)

Legitimacy

Signalling

- From voluntary disclosure, interested parties assess
whether that firm complies with the social contract

- By considering voluntary disclosure, interested parties
react towards the firm. Thus, a posiitve signal may facilitate
positive reaction and negative signal inversely.

-Based on the social compliance interested parties
moderates the share price, cost of debt, good will and
cost of equity for a firm. In addition, ignoring social
contract also increase operational cost like lawsuit,
enviornmental penalty etc.

- The reaction from the interested parties moderates the
share price, cost of debt, goodwill and cost of equity for a
firm either positively or negatively.

Firm Performance
Compliance with social contract or a positive signal improves the financial performance of a firm. In other words, by considering voluntary disclosure firm may improve firm performance.

Figure 8-3 Summary of the theoretical contribution
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Third, this study extends the voluntary disclosure literature by categorizing
social and environmental disclosures according to the long-term, short-term and
general disclosure perspectives. Prior studies mainly assess disclosure by only
considering the operational context (Belal et al. 2010; Hackston & Milne 1996;
Kamal & Deegan 2013; Khan et al. 2013). Voluntary disclosure is also considered
a strategic tool of a firm as it has the potential to develop competitive advantage
(Mishra & Suar 2010). Accordingly, both long and short-term perspectives (Banks
& Wheelwright 1979) are included in the categorization of social and
environmental disclosures (Carroll 1991). Therefore, this study extends the
literature by aligning strategic management objectives.
Fourth, this study investigates the relationship between corporate
governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure from Bangladesh as a
developing country context. Accordingly, by combining social, environmental and
intellectual capital disclosures, this study extends the extant literature by providing
evidence on novel aspects of corporate governance. 44 In addition, for corporate
governance related studies, endogeneity is considered as a significant pitfall
(Larcker et al. 2007; Larcker & Rusticus 2007). In this study robustness tests, such
as the additional endogeneity test and the individual effects of social, environmental
and intellectual capital disclosures guarantee a rigorous result. Furthermore, the
period of this study covers the post-share market crash, therefore, providing more
relevant information for decision making.
Finally, this study draws on three categories of firm performance indicators
accounting, market-based and mixed, which are absent in prior studies (Brine et al.
2007; Hossain et al. 2015; Lima Crisóstomo et al. 2011). Therefore, the results from
this study are considered more rigorous and contribute to a robust understanding of
voluntary disclosure in a developing country context.

44

This study considers an extra sub-committee in addition to audit committee. In addition, consideration of
the audit committee composition from independent directors is also novel. Furthermore, consideration of
institutional ownership is also limited within Bangladesh.
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8.6 Limitations of this Study
Although the contributions and implications of the study are addressed in
the preceding sections, similar to any other empirical study, this study is also subject
to limitations, as discussed below.
First, the findings of this study are based on listed firms in Bangladesh.
Although listed firms are important, there are other firms that significantly
contribute to the Bangladesh economy, such as small or family firms. Extending
the data set to include other firms would generate further insight.
Second, this study’s investigation was based on a three-year period between
2011 to 2013 for corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure and
2012 to 2014 for firm performance. Voluntary disclosure data was extracted
manually from the firms’ annual reports and collection of data in further years was
beyond the timeline for the thesis. There are 134 firms in the yearly samples (402
observations), which is larger than prior studies and the study also considered data
after the share market collapse in Bangladesh (Hossain et al. 2015; Khan et al. 2013;
Khan 2010; Muttakin & Khan 2014; Muttakin et al. 2015; Rashid & Lodh 2008).
Extending the study from 2014 would provide further support for the findings and
also the theoretical framework.
Third, the study relies on the annual reports of the firms as the main source
of voluntary disclosures and ignores other publicly available information. Although
the annual report is considered the most suitable document as it is published on a
regular basis (Abeysekera & Guthrie 2005; Khan et al. 2009; Rashid 2015a;
Unerman 2000) in recent years firms are increasingly using alternative sources such
as sustainability or CSR reports.
Fourth, while this study developed a complex disclosure index for content
analysis, there is always a risk of subjectivity. Future studies using the index in
other contexts or different time periods may test the accuracy of the categorization.
Fifth, this study examines the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm
performance from the Bangladesh share market, which market is not considered as
an efficient market (Nguyen & Ali 2011). In particular, if all the information is
reflected in determining share price, then it is considered an efficient measure
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(Malkiel 1989). A comparatively lower explanatory power (adjusted R2) for EPS
might be affected by this pitfall. Accordingly, there might be another contingent
factor for deciding market related performance.
Finally, although the study used five financial performance indicators:
ROA, ROS, MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q, a large number of indicators are available
(Margolis & Walsh 2003; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Richard et al. 2009). To overcome
these limitations, performance indicators from accounting, market-based and mixed
were used for the first time in studies within Bangladesh. Further studies could
expand the number, type or mix of performance indicators and control variables.
To summarize, future studies could address the following issues for a further
contribution.
1) Consider non-listed firms from Bangladesh.
2) Consider extending data years and a larger sample.
3) Include other publicly available information sources, to assess the
disclosure levels.
4) Adopt a mixed-method approach to provide an in-depth explanation and
understanding of the governance phenomenon (Johl et al. 2012). MolinaAzorin (2012, p. 33) states that:
mixed-methods research is becoming an increasingly popular
approach in several areas, and it has long been called for as an
approach for providing a better understanding of research problems.
5) Integrate the findings from quantitative and qualitative data.
6) Conduct a comparison study of Bangladesh to test the adoption of An et
al.’s (2011) framework and extend understanding for a multi theoretical
perspective.
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Appendix A: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries – Relationship between corporate governance
characteristics (determinant) and voluntary disclosure
Sample Descriptions
Year

2001

Authors

Ho & Wong

Firm
98 Hong Kong
firms

Year

1997

2002

Haniffa &
Cooke

167 Malaysian
firms

1995

2002

Naser et al.

84 Jordan firms

1998-99

2003

Eng & Mak

158 Singapore
listed firms

1995

Statistical
Method
Multiple
regression

Multiple
regression

Dependent:
Disclosure
Voluntary
Disclosure

Voluntary
Disclosure

Multiple
linear
regression

OLS

Voluntary
Disclosure

236

Test Variables
Independent:
Corporate Governance Variables
Board Composition
CEO Duality
Presence of Audit Committee
Percentage of Family Board member
Non-executive Director
Family Member on Board
CEO Duality
Non-executive Chairperson
Board Directors with Multi
Directorship
Chairperson with Multi Directorship
Top Ten Shareholders
Malay Managing Director
Malay Financial Director
Malay Chairperson
Malay Director
Malay Shareholding
Accounting Expertise Director
Accounting Expertise Finance
Director
Diffusion of Ownership
Foreign Ownership
Institutional Ownership
Large Audit Firm
Number of Shareholders
Government Ownership
Individual Ownership
Foreign Ownership
Arab Ownership
Audit Firm Status
Managerial Ownership
Block holder Ownership
Government Ownership
Board Composition

Significant Results
Presence of Audit Committee (+)
Percentage of Family Board
member (-)

Family Member on Board (-)
Non-Executive Chairperson (-)
Top Ten Shareholders (+)
Foreign Ownership(+)

Audit firm status (+)

Managerial Ownership (-)
Government Ownership (+)
Board Composition (-)

Appendix A: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries – Relationship between corporate governance characteristics (determinant) and
voluntary disclosure (continued).

Sample Descriptions
Year

Authors

Firm

Year

Statistical
Method

2004

Gul & Leung

385 listed firms in
Hong Kong

1996

2004

Xiao et al.

300 largest
Chinese listed
firm

2001

OLS
Logit

2005

Haniffa &
Cooke

139 Malaysian
firms

1996 & 2002

Multiple
regression

2005

Arcay &
Vazquez

91 firms listed in
Madrid stock
exchange

1999

Dependent:
Disclosure
Voluntary
Disclosure

Structural
Equation

Voluntary
Internet-based
Disclosures

Social Disclosure

Voluntary
Disclosure

237

Test Variables
Independent:
Corporate Governance Variables
Independent & Experienced Directors
CEO Duality
Independent Directors
Director Ownership
Audit Firm
Government Ownership
State Ownership
Legal Person Ownership
Foreign Listing/ Share Ownership
Independent Director
Audit Firm
Malay Director
Malay Financial Director
Malay Shareholder
Non-executive Director
Multiple Directorship
Foreign Ownership
Proportion of Independent Directors
on Board
Existence of Audit Committee
CEO Duality
Board Participation (Director
Ownership)
Stock Options in Directors
Remuneration
Board Size
Ownership Concentration
Foreign Stock Listing

Significant Results

Independent Directors (-)
CEO Duality (-)

Government Ownership (-)
Legal Person Ownership (+)

Malay Director (+)
Non-executive Director (-)
Multiple Directorship (+)
Foreign Ownership (+)

Proportion of Independent
Directors on Board (+)
Existence of Audit Committee (+)
Board Participation (Director
Ownership) (+)
Stock Options in Directors
Remuneration (+)
Ownership Concentration (+)
Foreign Stock Listing (+)

Appendix A: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries – Relationship between corporate governance characteristics (determinant) and
voluntary disclosure (continued).

Sample Descriptions
Year

2006

2006

2006

2006

Authors

Barako et al.

Firm

43 Kenyan firms

Year

1992-2001

Statistical
Method

Pooled OLS

Pooled OLS
Barako et al.

43 Kenyan firms

1992 to 2001

Cheng &
Courtenay

104 firms listed
on the Singapore
Stock Exchange

1998 and
2000

Ghazali &
Weetman

Top 87 firms
(after excluding
financial firms)
listed Malaysian
firms

Dependent:
Disclosure

Voluntary
Disclosure

Voluntary
Disclosure

OLS
Voluntary
Disclosure
Stepwise
regression
2001

Test Variables
Independent:
Corporate Governance Variables
Board Composition
CEO Duality
Presence of Audit Committee
Shareholder Concentration
Foreign Ownership
Institutional Ownership
Board Composition,
CEO Duality,
Presence of Audit Committee
Shareholder Concentration,
Foreign Ownership,
Institutional Ownership,
Type of Auditor
Board Composition

Voluntary
Disclosure

238

Significant Results
Board Composition (+)
Presence of Audit Committee (+)
Shareholder Concentration(-)
Foreign Ownership (+)
Institutional Ownership (+)

Board Composition (-),
Presence of Audit Committee (+)

Board Composition (+)
Ownership Concentration
Number of Shareholder
Director Ownership
Government Ownership
Family Members on Board
Independent Non-executive Director

Director Ownership (-)

Appendix A: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries – Relationship between corporate governance characteristics (determinant) and
voluntary disclosure(continued).

Sample Descriptions
Year

2007

Authors

Cerbioni &
Parbonetti

Firm

54 European
firms

Year

Statistical
Method

Dependent:
Disclosure

Eight categories
of Intellectual
Capital Disclosure

2002-04

Test Variables
Independent:
Corporate Governance Variables
Board Size
Board Composition
CEO Duality
Board Committee (Audit,
Nomination, Remuneration )
Ownership Structure

Block Ownership ,
Managerial Ownership,
State Ownership,
Legal person Ownership,
Foreign Ownership,
Board Composition ,
CEO Duality ,
Board Composition
Board Size
Type of Auditor
Top Shareholders
Management Compensation

2007

Huafang &
Jianguo

559 listed firms in
Shanghi Stock
Exchange

2007

Lim et al.

181 Australian
firms

2001

2SLS

Voluntary
Disclosure

2007

Mohd Ghazali

87 listed firm in
Malaysia

2001

Multiple
regression

Social
Responsibility
Disclosure

Ownership Concentration
Director Ownership
Government Ownership

2007

Patelli &
Prencipe

171 listed nonfinancial Italian
firms

2002

Voluntary
Disclosure

Independent Directors on Board
Ownership Diffusion

2002

OLS

Multivariate
least squares
regression

Voluntary
Disclosure

239

Significant Results
Board Size (-)
Board Composition (+)
CEO Duality (-)
Board Committee (Audit,
Nomination, Remuneration )
Ownership Structure (-)

Block Ownership (+),
Foreign Ownership (+),
Board Composition (+),
CEO Duality (-),

Board Composition (+)
Top Shareholders (-)

Director Ownership(-)
Government Ownership (+)
Independent Directors on Board
(+)
Ownership Diffusion (+)

Appendix A: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries – Relationship between corporate governance characteristics (determinant) and
voluntary disclosure (continued).
Sample Descriptions
Year

Authors

Firm

Year

2008

Donnelly &
Mulcahy

51 listed firms in
Irish market

2002

2008

Li & Qi

100 Chinese firms

2003-05

2008

Li et al.

100 UK firms

2008

O’Sullivan et
al.

200 & 183 listed
firms in Australia

2009

Akhtaruddin et
al.

105 listed
Malaysian firms

Statistical
Method
Poisson
regression
Technique

Dependent:
Disclosure

Voluntary
Disclosure

Voluntary
Disclosure

2004 and 05

Multiple
regression

Intellectual
Capital Disclosure

2000 and 02

Logistic
regression

Voluntarily
Disclose Forwardlooking
Information

2002

OLS

Voluntary
Disclosure

240

Test Variables
Independent:
Corporate Governance Variables
Non-Executive Director on Board
Non-Executive Director as Chairman
Institutional Ownership
Managerial Ownership
Index of Managerial Ownership
Board Size
CEO Duality
Managerial Ownership
Board Composition
CEO Duality
Share Concentration
Audit Committee Size
Audit Committee Meetings
Board Autonomy
Presence and Value of Board
Committee
Independent Ownership
Audit Quality
Strength of Corporate Governance
Board Size,
Board Composition,
Outside Owner,
Family Control,
Proportion of Audit Committee
Members on Board
Nature of the Audit Firm

Significant Results

Non-Executive Director on Board
(+)

Managerial Ownership(+)
Board Composition (+)
Share Concentration (-)
Audit Committee Size (+)
Audit Committee Meetings (+)

Presence and Value of Board
Committee(+)
Audit Quality (+)

Board Size (+)
Board Composition(+)
Outside Owner(+)
Family Control (-)

Appendix A: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries – Relationship between corporate governance characteristics (determinant) and
voluntary disclosure (continued).
Sample Descriptions
Authors

Firm

Year

Statistical
Method

Dependent:
Disclosure

2009

Jiang & Habib

116 New Zealand
firms

2001=005

2009

Laidroo

52 European firms
( 3 emerging
Capital Market)

2001-05

2010

Abeysekera

Top 26 Kenyan
firms

2002-03

Logistic
regression

Intellectual
capital
disclosure

2010

Al-Shammari &
Al-Sultan

170 listed Kuwait
firms

2007

Multiple
regression

Voluntary
Disclosure

2010

Akhtaruddin &
Haron

2010

Veronica &
Bachtiar

124 Malaysian
Firms

Voluntary
Disclosure

Public
Announcements
’ Disclosures

2003

Hierarchical
regression

Voluntary
Disclosure

Board ownership
Proportion of independent directors on
audit committee
Proportion of expert directors on audit
committee

2003

Multiple
regression

Corporate
social reporting

Board Size
Foreign Investees

87 Listed firms in
the Indonesian
Stock Exchange

2SLS

Test Variables
Independent :
Corporate Governance Variables
Institutional Ownership at High Level
Concentration
Institutional Ownership at Low Level
Concentration
Government Ownership at High Level
Concentration
Government Ownership at Low Level
Concentration
Managerial Ownership at High Level
Concentration
Managerial Ownership at Low Level
Concentration
Ownership concentration
Managerial Ownership
Government Ownership
Institutional; Ownership
Foreign Ownership
Board size
Independent directors on board
Independent directors on audit committee
Independent directors on other committee
Non-executive director on board
Family members on board
Role Duality
Audit committee existence

241

Significant Results

Institutional Ownership at High
Level Concentration (-)
Government Ownership at High
Level Concentration (+)
Managerial Ownership at High
Level Concentration (+)

Ownership concentration (-)
Institutional Ownership (+)
Foreign Ownership (-)
Board size (+)
Independent directors on other
committee (+)

Audit committee existence (+)
Board ownership (-)
Proportion of independent
directors on audit committee (+)
Proportion of expert directors on
audit committee (+)
Board Size (+ & -)

Appendix A: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries -Relationship between Corporate Governance Characteristics (determinant) and
Voluntary Disclosure (continued).
Sample Descriptions
Year

Authors

2011

Hidalgo et al.

Firm

100 Mexican
Firms

2012

Alves et al.

140 Iberian
peninsula (38
Portugal & 102
Spain)

2012

Esa & Anum
Mohd Ghazali

27 Malaysian
firms

Rao et al.

100 Australian
Firms

2012

Year

2005-07

Statistical
Method

Dependent:
Disclosure

Multiple
regression

Intellectual Capital
Disclosure

Multiple
regression
Voluntary
Disclosure

2007

2005 and 07

2008

Multiple
regression

OLS

Social

Environmental
Disclosure

Multiple
Regression
2012

Li et al.

100 UK Firms

2005

Intellectual Capital
Disclosure

242

Test Variables
Independent :
Corporate Governance Variables
Board Size
Board Independence
Audit Committee Independence
Chairman/ CEO Duality
Insider Ownership
Family Ownership
Ownership Concentration
Institutional Ownership
Managerial Ownership,
Government Ownership,
Presence of large shareholder,
Proportion of non-executive and
independent directors,
Board Size,
Monitoring and control structure,
Management incentive,
Management Expertise,
Board size,
Board composition,
Independent Non-Executive
Institutional Ownership
Board Size
Female Directors
Audit Committee Size
Audit Committee Meetings
Audit Committee Independence
Audit Committee directors
shareholding
Audit Committee financial expertise
Board Independence
Share Ownership Concentration

Significant Results

Board Size (+)
Institutional Ownership (-)

Management Incentive ( +)
Presence of a large shareholder (-)

Board size (+),
Board composition (-),

Independent Non-Executive (+)
Institutional Ownership (+)
Board Size (+)
Female Directors (+)
Audit Committee Size (+)
Audit Committee Meetings (+)
Audit Committee directors
shareholding (-)
Board Independence (+)
Share Ownership Concentration (-)

Appendix A: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries -Relationship between Corporate Governance Characteristics (determinant) and
Voluntary Disclosure (continued).

Sample Descriptions
Year

2012

Authors

Firm

169 South African
Firms

Ntim et al.

Year

2002 -06

Statistical
Method

OLS

Dependent:
Disclosure

Voluntary
Corporate
Governance
Disclosure

OLS

2012

100 Egyptian
Listed Firms.

Samaha et al.

Corporate
Governance
Disclosure

2009

OLS
Allegrini
2013

2013

Greco

Uyar et al.

&
177 non-financial
Italian firms

131 Turkish
Firms

Voluntary
Disclosure

2007

2010

OLS
2SLS

Voluntary
Disclosure

243

Test Variables
Independent :
Corporate Governance Variables

Significant Results

Block Ownership
Institutional Ownership
Government Ownership
Board Size
Audit Firm
Cross Listing
Corporate Governance Committee

Block Ownership (-)
Institutional Ownership (+)
Government Ownership (+)
Board Size (+)
Audit Firm (+)
Cross Listing (+)
Corporate Governance Committee
(+)

Board Composition
Board Size
Ceo Duality
Director Ownership
Block Ownership
Number of Shareholder
Existence of Audit Committee
Ownership Diffusion
Board composition,
Board size,
CEO Duality,
Lead independent director,
Board committees,
Board meetings,
Audit committee meetings
Proportion of Independent Directors
Institutional Ownership
Board Size
Ownership Diffusion

Board Composition (+)
Ceo Duality (-)
Block Ownership (-)

Board size (+),
CEO Duality (-),
Board meetings (+),
Audit committee meetings (+)

Proportion of Independent
Directors (+)
Institutional Ownership (+)
Ownership Diffusion (-)

Appendix A: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries -Relationship between Corporate Governance Characteristics (determinant) and
Voluntary Disclosure (continued).

Sample Descriptions
Year

Authors
Firm

Statistical
Method

Test Variables
Significant Results
Dependent:
Disclosure

Year
Multiple
Regression

2014

2014

Madi et al.

Othman et al.

146 listed firm in
Malaysia

Top 94 Listed
firms in Malaysia

Voluntary
Disclosure

2009

2011

Multiple
linear
Regression

Voluntary Ethics
Disclosure

Multiple
regression
2014a

2014b

Giannarakis

Giannarakis

100 firms from
Fortune 500

366 firms from
Fortune 500

Corporate Social
Responsibility
Disclosure

2011

Multiple
regression
2011

Corporate Social
Responsibility
Disclosure

244

Independent :
Corporate Governance Variables
Audit Committee Independence
Financial Expertise in Audit
Committee
Audit Committee Meetings
Audit Committee Size
Audit Committee Members Multiple
Directorship
Audit Committee Independence
Expertise of Audit Committee
Audit Committee Meetings
Audit Committee Size
Audit Committee tenure Members
Multiple Directorship
Board composition
Board commitment
Ceo duality
Board size
Board meeting
Board age
Women on board
Ceo duality
Board size
Board meeting
Board age
Women on board

Audit Committee Independence (+)
Audit Committee Size (+)
Audit Committee Members
Multiple Directorship (+)

Audit Committee tenure (+)
Members Multiple Directorship (-)

Board commitment (+)

Ceo duality (-)
Board size (+)

Appendix A: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries – Relationship between corporate governance characteristics (determinant) and
voluntary disclosure (continued).

Sample Descriptions
Year

Authors
Firm

2015

Haji

51 Malaysian
listed firms

Year

2008-10

2017

Appuhami &
Tashakor

300 listed firms in
Australia

2012-13

2017

Pisano et al

150 European
Firms

2014

Test Variables
Statistical
Method

Panel

Multiple
Regression

Dependent:
Disclosure

Independent:
Corporate Governance
Variables

Significant Results

Intellectual Capital
Disclosures

Audit Committee Size
Audit Committee Independence
Financial Expert in Audit Committee
Audit Committee Meetings
Board Size
Board Independence
Director Ownership
Institutional Ownership

Corporate Social
Responsibility
Disclosure

Audit Committee Size
Audit Committee Meetings
Audit Committee Independence
Audit Committee Gender Diversity
Independent Audit Committee Chair
Audit Committee’s Financial Expertise

Audit Committee Size (+)
Audit Committee Meetings (+)
Audit Committee Independence (+)
Audit Committee Gender Diversity
(+)

Human Capital
Disclosure

Ownership concentration

Ownership concentration (-)
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Audit Committee Size (+)
Audit Committee Independence (+)
Financial Expert in Audit
Committee (+)
Audit Committee Meetings (+)
Director Ownership (-)

Appendix B: Prior studies from Bangladesh – Relationship between corporate governance characteristics (determinant) and
voluntary disclosure
Sample Descriptions
Year

Authors

Firm

Year

Dependent:
Disclosure

Multiple
regression

Corporate
Social
Environmental
Disclosure

2003-04 to
2006-07

2SLS

Social
Disclosure

2007-08

Multiple
regression

2007

Multiple
regression

Corporate
Social
Responsibility
Disclosure
Voluntary
Disclosure

2007

Multiple
regression

Voluntary
Disclosure

2006

Hossain et al.

107 listen nonfinancial firms

2002-2003

2008

Rashid &
Lodh

21 Bangladesh
listed firms

2010

Khan

30 listed Banks
in Bangladesh

2011

Rouf & Al
Harun

2011

Rouf

97 Bangladeshi
listed firms
120 listed NonFinancial firms
in Dhaka Stock
Exchange ,
Bangladesh

Statistical
Method

246

Test Variables
Independent:
Corporate Governance
Variables

Significant Results

International Link of Audit Firm
Ownership Concentration,
Board Composition,
Directors Share Ownership ,
Institutional Share Ownership
Non-Executive Director
Women Directors
Foreign National on Board
Management Ownership
Institutional Ownership
Independent Director
CEO Duality
Audit Committee Existence
Board Size
Ownership Structure

Director Ownership (-)
Board Composition (+)
Non-Executive Director (+)
Foreign National on Board
(+)
Management Ownership (-)
Institutional Ownership (+)
CEO Duality (+)
Audit Committee Existence
(+)
Board Size (+)
Ownership Structure (-)

Appendix B: Prior studies from Bangladesh – Relationship between corporate governance characteristics (determinant) and voluntary disclosure (continued)
Sample Descriptions
Year

2013

Authors

Khan et al.

Firm

116
manufacturing
listed firms in
Bangladesh

2015

Muttakin et
al.

116 listed firms
in Bangladesh

2016

Muttakin et
al.

155 listed firms
in Bangladesh

2017

Bose et al.
2017

205 Sample
Year

Year

2005-09

Statistical
Method

Multiple
regression

2007-14

Corporate
Social
Responsibility
Disclosure

Intellectual
Capital
Disclosure

2005-09

2005-13

Dependent:
Disclosure

Panel Least
Square

OLS

Corporate
Social
Responsibility
Disclosure

Test Variables
Independent:
Corporate Governance
Variables
Managerial Ownership
Public Ownership
Foreign Ownership
Independent Directors
CEO Duality
Audit Committee Existence
Family Ownership
Foreign Ownership
Independent Director
CEO Duality
Family Duality
Audit Committee Existence

Board Capital
CEO Power
Board Independence
Board Size
Board Size
Board Independence
Institutional Ownership
green banking
Foreign Ownership
disclosure
CEO Pay
Female Director
Government Ownership

247

Significant Results
Managerial Ownership (-)
Public Ownership (+)
Foreign Ownership (+)
Independent Directors (+)
Audit Committee Existence
(+)
Family Ownership (+/-)
Foreign Ownership(+)
Independent Director(+)
Family Duality (-)
Audit Committee
Existence(+)
Board Capital (+)
CEO Power (-)
Board Independence (+)
Board Size (+)
Board Size (+)
Institutional Ownership (+)
Government Ownership (+)
CEO Pay (-)

Appendix C: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries – Relationship between voluntary disclosure and
firm performance (effects)

Sample Descriptions
Year

Authors

Firm

Year

Test Variables
Dependent:
Firm Performance
Indicators

Statistical
Method

2005

Abdolmohammadi

58 Fortune
500 firms

1993-97

Regression

2006

Murray et al.

100 UK
firms

1988 to 97

Regression analysis

2007

Brine et al.

277 listed
Australian
firms

2005

Cross sectional
regression analysis
and OLS

2007

Montabon et al.

2008

Prado-Lorenzo et
al.

2009

2009

Chi

Hassan et al.

45 US and
internation
al firms
117
Spanish
listed
Firms
208 listed
Firm In
Taiwan
80
Egyptian
firms

2004 for
disclosure
2004-05 for
growth
2004 disclosure
2005 firm
performance
1995 to 2002

Market Capitalization

Multiple linear
regression

Panel data analysis

248

Share Price

Independent:
Disclosure

Significant Results

Intellectual Capital
Disclosure

A significant positive effect.

Social Disclosure

Social disclosure does not
affect share price

ROA
ROE
ROS

Social Responsibility
(Sustainability Disclosure)

ROI
Sales Growth

Environmental Disclosure

Sales Growth

Social Disclosure

Social Disclosure positively
affects Sales growth

Tobin’s Q

Corporate Governance
Disclosure

Corporate governance
disclosure positively affects
Tobin’s Q

Firm Value

Voluntary Disclosure

Social responsibility does
not have any effect on ROA
ROE ROS
Environmental disclosure
positively affects ROI and
sales growth

There was no significant
impact from voluntary
disclosure to market value

Appendix C: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries – Relationship between voluntary disclosure and firm performance (effects) (continued)
Sample Descriptions
Year

Authors

2010

Aras et al.

2010

Choi et al.

2010

Mishra & Suar

Firm
40 listed
firms on the
Istanbul
Stock
Exchange
1222 firms
years From
Korea
150 Indian
firms (101
listed and 49
non-listed)

2010

Veronica &
Bachtiar

87 listed
firms from
Indonesia

2011

Anam et al.

91 listed
firms in
Malaysia

Year

Test Variables
Dependent:
Firm Performance
Indicators

Statistical
Method

2006
(Disclosure)
2007 (Firm
Performance)

Independent:
Disclosure

Significant Results

ROE
ROA
ROS

Social Responsibility
Disclosure

Social responsibility
disclosure does not affect
ROE, ROA, ROS

2002-08

Panel data
analysis

ROE
ROA
Tobin’s Q

Social Responsibility
Disclosure

Social Responsibility
Disclosure Positively affects
ROE, ROA & Tobin’s Q

2003-04 to
2005 to 06

Hierarchical
regression

Industry Adjusted ROA
Non-Financial Firm
Performance (NFP)

Social Reporting

Social reporting positively
affects industry adjusted
ROA and NFP

Social Disclosure

Social disclosure positively
affects return on equity and
stock returns

Intellectual Capital
Disclosure

A significant positive effect

2003

Regression analysis

2002 & 06

Multiple OLS

Return on Equity for
Next Year
Stock Return for Next
Year

Market Capitalization

249

Appendix C: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries - Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure and Firm performance (effects)
(Continued)

Sample Descriptions
Year

Authors

2011

Kwanbo

20 listed firms
in Nigeria Stock
Exchange

2005-09

2011

Chen & Wang

141 Chinese
firms

2007 for
disclosure
2008 for
performance

2011

Lima Crisóstomo
et al.

78 Brazilian
firms

2001-06

2011

Oeyono et al.

Top 48
Indonesian
corporations

2003-07

2012

Ribeiro Soriano et
al.

Firm

428 Listed
firms in Taiwan

Year

2006
(Disclosure)
2007 (Firm
Performance
)

Test Variables
Independent :
Dependent:
Corporate Governance
Disclosure
Variables

Statistical
Method

Social Disclosure

Social Disclosure does not
have any significant effect
on earning per share.

ROA (next year)
ROS (next year)
Growth rate of sales
(next year)

Social Reporting

Social Reporting positively
effects ROA (next year),
ROS (next year), Growth
rate of sales (next year)

ROA
Tobin’s Q

Social Responsibility
Disclosure

Profitability (EDITDA)
Earnings Per Share

Corporate Social Reporting

Market to Book Ratio
Return on Asset

Human Capital Disclosure

Multiple Regression
Analysis

Earnings Per Share

Multiple Regression

Regression
Spearman’s rho
correlation
coefficient

Significant Results

Social Responsibility
Disclosure negatively effects
Tobin’s Q
Social Disclosure effects
positively Profitability
(EDITDA)
Earning Per Share in a weak
form.

Hierarchical
Regression

250

A significant positive effect.

Appendix C: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries - Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure and Firm performance (effects)
(Continued)

Sample Descriptions
Year

Authors

Firm

Year

Test Variables
Independent :
Dependent:
Corporate Governance
Disclosure
Variables

Statistical
Method

Significant Results

Market Capitalization
Market Capitalization
(after six months of
year ending)
2012

Uyar & Kılıç

129 firms listed
in the Istanbul
Stock
Exchange.

2010

Multiple Regression
Analysis

Natural logarithm of
market value to book
value of equity

Voluntary disclosure

Voluntary disclosure
positively effects Market
Capitalization and Market
Capitalization (after six
months of year ending)

Natural logarithm of
market value to book
value of equity (after
six months of year
ending)
2012

2013

Wibowo

Garay et al.

25 listed firms
in Indonesia
Stock Exchange
(IDX)
7 largest stock
exchanges of
latin America
(Argentina,
Brazil —
Bovespa and
Novomercado
— Chile,
Colombia,
Mexico and
Peru)

2005-10

Multiple Regression
Analysis

2006,2008,
2010

ROA

Tobin’s Q
ROA

251

Social Responsibility
Disclosure

Social Responsibility
Disclosure positively effects
ROA

Internet-based corporate
disclosure

Internet-based corporate
Disclosure positively effects
Tobin’s Q and ROA.

Appendix C: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries - Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure and Firm performance (effects)
(Continued)

Sample Descriptions
Year

Authors
Firm

Test Variables

Year

Statistical
Method
Panel regression
analysis

2013

Kim et al.

162 Korean
Firms

2008

2013

Yusoff et al.

30 Malaysian
listed firms

2009-11

2014

Ahamed et al.

3 Malaysian
Listed Firms

2007-11

2014

Qiu et al.

152 firms from
FTSE350

2015

Basah & Khairi

2015

De Klerk et al.

Dependent:
Disclosure
Price to Book ratio
Return on Asset
Operating Profit
Margin

Multiple
Regression
Analysis

Independent :
Corporate Governance
Variables
Firm transparency
(Financial, Governance,
Operational and Social
disclosure)

(ROA+ROE+ROS)
Next year

Social Responsibility
Disclosure

OLS

ROA
ROE

Social Responsibility
Disclosure

2005-09

Regression
Analysis

Stock Price
Residual Income

Environmental & Social
Disclosure

72 Firms in
Jordan

2009-13

The Granger test

ROA

Voluntary Disclosure

89 UK Firms

2007-08

Regression
Analysis

Share Price ( Market
value of the equity)

Social Disclosure

252

Significant Results

Firm transparency positively
effects Return on Asset and
Operating Profit Margin

Social Responsibility does
not have any significant
effect on ROA ROE ROS
Social Responsibility
Disclosure positively effects
ROE and ROA
Environmental & Social
Disclosure positively effects
stock price and residual
income.
Voluntary Disclosure
positively effects ROA
Social Disclosure positively
effects stock price ( Market
value of the equity)

Appendix C: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries - Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure and Firm performance (effects)
(Continued)

Sample Descriptions
Year

Authors
Firm

Test Variables

Statistical
Method

Year

Dependent:
Disclosure

Independent :
Corporate Governance
Variables

Market Value of the
Equity

Key performance indicators'
disclosure

Tobin’s Q

Social and Environmental
Disclosure

OLS
2015

Elzahar et al.

102 UK firms.

2006-10

2015

Khlif et al.

168 listed firm
in South Africa

2004-2009

Multiple Regression
Analysis
Hierarchical
stepwise regression

2016

2016

Chen et al.

Cheng et al.

54 Engineering
News Record
firms

805 and 813
Chinese firms

ROA
ROS
Tobin’s Q
Revenue Growth

2012

2008-09 for
disclosure
2009-10
for growth

Regression Analysis

253

ROA (next year)
Market Return (next
year)
Tobin’s Q (next
year)

Various Categories of
Environmental Disclosure

Significant Results

Key performance indicators'
disclosure positively effect
Market Value of the Equity
Social and Environmental
Disclosure Positively effects
Tobin’s Q
Pollution related
environmental disclosure
negatively effects ROA,
ROS, Tobin’s Q, Revenue
Growth
Environmental governance
related disclosure positively
effects ROA,
ROS, Revenue Growth

Social Disclosure

Social Responsibility
Disclosure Positively effects
next year ROA

Appendix C: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries - Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure and Firm performance (effects)
(Continued)

Sample Descriptions
Year

Authors

Firm

Year

2016

Laskar & Maji

28 listed Indian
Firms

2016

Li et al.

475 Chinese
listed firm

2013 and 14

2016

Mathuva &
Kiweu

212 Kenyan
Firms

2008-13

2016

Nekhili et al.

2016

2016

Nor et al.

Platonova et al.

98 French Firms

2008-09 to
2013-14

Test Variables
Independent :
Dependent:
Corporate Governance
Disclosure
Variables

Statistical
Method
Generalised least
squares (GLS)

OLS
Panel OLS

2000-04

100 Malaysian
Firms

2011

24 Islamic banks
in Gulf
Cooperation
Council (GCC - 9
from Bahrain, 3
from Qatar, 3
from Kuwait, 4
from Saudi
Arabia and 5
from UAE)

2000-14

3SLS
Multiple Regression
Analysis

Panel data regression

254

Significant Results
Corporate Social
Responsibility Disclosure
positively effects Market to
Book Ratio
Environmental Disclosure
Negatively effects ROA
Social and Environmental
Disclosure Negatively effects
ROA & ROE

Market to Book Ratio

Corporate Social
Responsibility Disclosure

ROA

Environmental Disclosure

ROA
ROE

Social and Environmental
Disclosure

Market Value

R&D narrative disclosure

ROA
ROE
EPS
Profit Margin

Environmental Disclosure

Environmental disclosure
positively effects Profit
Margin

ROA
ROA next year

Social Disclosure

Social Disclosure positively
effects ROA, ROA next year

There no significant impact
from R&D narrative
disclosure to Market value

Appendix C: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries - Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure and Firm performance (effects)
(Continued)
Sample Descriptions
Year

Authors

2016

Reverte

Firm
35 firms from
Spain

Year
2007-11

Test Variables
Independent :
Dependent:
Corporate Governance
Disclosure
Variables

Statistical
Method

Multiple Regression

Share Price of a Firm

Social Disclosure

Social Disclosure positively
effects Share price

Social Disclosure

Social Disclosure positively
effects Share price and
return Per Share
Environmental disclosure
negatively effects Share
price and return Per Share.

Regression Analysis
2016

Verbeeten et al.

130 German
firms

Share Price
Return Per Share

2005 -08

255

Significant Results

Appendix D: Prior studies from Bangladesh – Relationship between voluntary disclosure and firm performance (effects)

Sample Descriptions
Year

Authors
Firm

2012

Ahmed et al.

5 banks

2015

Hossain et al.

131 firms

2015

Ahmed & Habib

2016

2016

Ahmed

Islam & Rahman

Test Variables

Statistical Method
Dependent:
Disclosure

Year

Survey

Social Reporting

2008-12

Regression analysis

Corporate Social
Disclosure

25 banks

2008-12

Regression analysis

Corporate Social
Reporting

30 banks

2009-12
2010-13

Regression analysis

Corporate Social
Reporting

1 bank

2010-14

Regression analysis

256

Corporate Social
Reporting

Independent:
Corporate Governance
Variables
ROA
EPS
Price Earnings Ratio
ROE
ROA
Tobin’s Q
Net Profit After Tax
(NPAT),
ROE for next year
ROA for next year
Average Market Value of
Share for next year
Dividends Per Share (DPS),
Net Profit After Tax
(NPAT),
Economic Value Added
(EVA),
Market Value Added
(MVA),
EPS,
ROA,
ROE,
ROI

Significant Results

No significant effects
ROE (+)
ROA (+)
No significant effects

No significant effects
Dividends Per Share (DPS),
Net Profit After Tax
(NPAT),
Economic Value Added
(EVA),
Market Value Added
(MVA),
EPS,
ROA,
ROE,
ROI

Appendix E: Voluntary Disclosure Items
Main
Category
of
Disclosure

Subcategory of
Disclosure

Voluntary Disclosure Items
Disclosure Details

1. Existence of committee for social affairs.
2. Board takes care about social issues as a significant matter.
3. Governance encompasses ethics, transparency and
accountability.
4. A commentary on behalf of the board about the key
relationship with employee and other significant
stakeholders.
5. Firm policy to promote social welfare.

Voluntary
Disclosure

6. Key person’s (CEO or chairman) views about social issues.
7. CEO statement about considering social issues to the
shareholders/ stakeholders.
8. A statement that the firm maintains regular review of
social factors.
9. Firm has specific policy for maintaining human rights.

Social
Disclosure

Strategic/
long term
social
disclosure

10. Firm has a specific code of conduct to main nondiscrimination in regards to gender, race, religion or ethnic
group.
11. Firm activities are affiliated with International Labour
Organization.
12. Firm has a specific policy about child labour.
13. Firm has a specific policy about working hour and
overtime payment.
14. Firm has specific and clear guideline about employee
promotion
15. Firm has faculties about staff training, education,
prevention and control program to manage or avoid workrelated injuries.
16. Firm has a budget for staff welfare.
17. Amount spent on staff welfare has been disclosed.
18. Firm has a clear guideline to handle complained about
harassment or abuse of any employee at any form.
19. Firm has a specific policy regarding security and
employment of workers

257

Voluntary Disclosure Items (Continued)
Main
Sub-category of Disclosure Details
Category of Disclosure
Disclosure

Voluntary
Disclosure

Social
Disclosure

Current/
short term
social
disclosure

20. Community involvement or donation on social
issues.
21. Firm has a policy to prioritize greater benefit for the
welfare of their society.
22. Firm has policies and procedure to about anticorruption.
23. Firm has policy to provide a fair chance to work as a
trainee to various education institute students.
24. Firm has policy to maintain local and national culture
and protection of personal information.
25. Firm has a policy about disadvantage side of the
society.
26. Firm has a policy to sponsor regional of national
educational, cultural event.
27. A statement about product safety assurance.
28. A statement about quality assurance in regards to
service or product.

General social
disclosure

29. Any moral statement for considering social issues.
30. Any statement about social welfare for public
awareness.
1. Existence of environmental committee.

Environmenta
l Disclosure

Strategic/long
term
environmental
disclosure

2. Executive performance is associated with
environmental performance.
3. CEO statement about environmental performance to
the shareholders/ stakeholders.
4. Budget on environmental policy.
5. Amount paid for developing environmental issue.
6. Employee training on environmental management
and operation.
7. Internal environmental award.
8. Key performance indicator for environmental issues
is discussed.
9. Environmental risk assessment process.
10. Implementing environmental policy.
11. Following any particular standard for guideline for
environmental reporting.
12. Referring any standard in the report.
13. Any affiliation in regards to product or service
providing.

258

Voluntary Disclosure Items (Continued)
Main Category of Sub-category
Disclosure
of Disclosure

Disclosure Details
14. Community involvement or donation on
environmental issues.
15. Waste management.
16. Any form of Pollution control process

Environmental
Disclosure

17. Recycling process.
18. Conservation of natural resources.

Current/
short term
environmental
disclosure

Voluntary
Disclosure

19. Energy savings.
20. Direct energy usage.
21. Indirect energy usage.
22 Any award from local or national stakeholder.

General
environmental
disclosure

Intellectual
Capital
Disclosure

23. Any award or certification from international
Stakeholders
24. Any information about fine or noncompliance.
25. Any potential threat about environmental
issues.
26. Any general statement about environmental
issues.
27. Any moral statement about following
environmental issues.
28. Any statement about environment for public
awareness.
1. Management process.

Internal
Capital

2. Copyrights, patents and trademarks.
3. Financial relations.
4. Networking system.
5. Innovative idea.
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Voluntary Disclosure Items (Continued)
Main Category Sub-category
of Disclosure
of Disclosure

Disclosure Details
6. Brands.

External
Capital

7. Customer loyalty.
8. Focus on customer.
9. Firm image and reputation.

Voluntary
Disclosure

10. Distribution channel.

Intellectual
Capital
Disclosure

11. Business collaborations.
12. Franchising agreement.
13. Research & development.
14. Positive feedback from customers.

Human
Capital

15. Employee education.
16. Training.
17. Work-related knowledge.
18. Employee health & safety.
19. Career development.
20. Employee welfare.
21. Entrepreneurial spirit, proactive and reactive
abilities.
22. Opportunity for diverse range of people.
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Appendix F: Diagnostic test results for research model one
a) Normality Test: P Plot

Normality Test: Histogram
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b) Heteroscedasticity Test: Scatter plot

c) Endogeneity Test:
CEO Duality_resid = 0
F( 1, 388) = 0.01
Prob > F = 0.9218
________________________
Board Composition _resid = 0
F( 1, 388) = 0.24
Prob > F = 0.6210
Board Size_resid = 0
F( 1, 387) = 0.04
Prob > F = 0.8351
Sub-committee _resid = 0
F( 1, 387) = 1.01
Prob > F = 0.3166
Audit Committee Composition _resid = 0
F( 1, 387) = 1.69
Prob > F = 0.1945
Foreign Ownership _resid = 0
F( 1, 387) = 1.15
Prob > F = 0.2844
Director ownership_resid = 0
F( 1, 387) = 2.33
Prob > F = 0.1281
Institutional Ownership_resid = 0
F( 1, 387) = 1.27
Prob > F = 0.2601
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Appendix G: Diagnostic test results for research model two
a) Normality Test: P Plot
Return on Asset (ROA)

Return on Sales (ROS)
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Market Capitalization (MCAP)

Earnings per Share (EPS)
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Tobin’s Q

Normality Test: Histogram

Residual Test/Histogram–Normality Test
Return on Asset (ROA)
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Return on Sales (ROS)

Market Capitalization (MCAP)
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Earnings per Share (EPS)

Tobin’s Q
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b) Heteroscedasticity Test: Scatter plot
Scatterplot
Dependent Variable: ROA_N
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2

Scatterplot
Dependent Variable: MCAP_N
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Scatterplot
Dependent Variable: EPS_N
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c) Endogeneity tests:

ROA

ROS

( 1) FINAL_VDI_resid = 0

( 1) FINAL_VDI_resid = 0

F( 1, 394) = 0.58
Prob > F = 0.4482

F( 1, 394) = 7.60
Prob > F = 0.0061

EPS

MCAP
( 1) FINAL_VDI_resid = 0

( 1) FINAL_VDI_resid = 0

F( 1, 394) = 1.52
Prob > F = 0.2188

F( 1, 394) = 0.31
Prob > F = 0.5770

Tobin’s Q
( 1) FINAL_VDI_resid = 0
F( 1, 394) = 1.24
Prob > F = 0.2659
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Appendix H: Robustness tests for research model one
Relationship between corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure
from alternative measurement (2SLS)

Variable

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Prob.

C

-0.944365

-6.867343

0.000

CEO Duality

-0.075469

-2.027525

0.043**

Board Size

-0.007895

-0.416317

0.677

Board Composition

-0.009617

-0.852138

0.394

Sub-committee

0.064751

3.410248

0.000***

Audit Committee Composition 0.024506

2.061069

0.040**

Foreign Ownership

0.060906

2.092681

0.037**

Director Ownership

-0.031059

-3.137612

0.001***

Institutional Ownership

-0.016852

-1.296618

0.195

Firm Size

0.049618

7.279959

0.000***

Leverage

0.000262

0.383800

0.701

Industry

0.049375

3.443685

0.000***

Firm Performance

0.003209

0.715547

0.474

Appendix I: Results Robustness tests one for research model two
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.1
Variables

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Prob.

Current Year ROA

0.757

8.797

0.00***

Current Year : VDI

0.061

2.507

0.01***

Firm Size

-0.001

-1.098

0.27

Leverage

-0.000

-0.006

0.99

Industry

-0.018

-2.669

0.00***

CEO Duality

-0.037

-1.681

0.09***

Board Composition

0.003

0.276

0.78
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𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.2
Variables

Coefficient

Current Year ROS

Leverage
Industry
CEO Duality
Board Composition

Prob.

0.777

8.284

0.00***

0.158

2.196

0.02***

-0.018

-2.569

0.01***

-0.000

-1.095

0.27

-0.019

-1.244

0.21

-0.073

-2.439

0.01***

-0.038

-0.878

0.38

Current Year : VD
Firm Size

t-Statistic

𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.3
Variables

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Prob.

Current Year MCAP

0.937

29.158

0.00***

Current Year : VD

0.352

2.0965

0.03***

Firm Size

-0.002

-0.108

0.91

Leverage

0.003

1.145

0.25

Industry

-0.158

-4.322

0.00***

CEO Duality

-0.147

-1.474

0.14

Board Composition

0.639

3.011

0.00***

𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.4
Variables

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Prob.

Current Year EPS

1.102

16.768

0.00***

Current Year : VD

6.111

1.631

0.01***

Firm Size

-0.352

-1.533

0.12

Leverage

0.005

0.622

0.53

Industry

-0.603

-1.225

0.22

CEO Duality

-4.807

-1.656

0.09***

Board Composition

1.287

0.877

0.38
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𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.5
Variables

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Prob.

Current Year Tobin’s Q

0.753

10.650

0.00***

Current Year : VD

0.650

2.052

0.04***

Firm Size

-0.011

-0.318

0.75

Leverage

0.002

0.955

0.34

Industry

-0.253

-2.880

0.00***

CEO Duality

-0.316

-2.788

0.00***

Board Composition

0.672

2.758

0.00***

𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.6
Variables

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Prob.

Current Year ROA

0.005

0.286

0.77

Current Year : VD

1.001

93.753

0.00***

Firm Size

-0.000

-0.100

0.91

Leverage

-0.000

-0.913

0.36

Industry

0.008

2.789

0.00***

CEO Duality

-0.003

-2.993

0.00***

Board Composition

0.006

0.758

0.44

𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.7
Variables

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Prob.

Current Year ROS

0.005

1.747

0.08**

Current Year : VD

1.001

92.653

0.00***

Firm Size

0.000

0.046

0.96

Leverage

-0.0000

-1.021

0.30

Industry

0.008

3.005

0.00***

CEO Duality

-0.004

-3.210

0.00***

Board Composition

0.006

0.776

0.43
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𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.8
Variables

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Prob.

Current Year MCAP

0.001

0.648

0.51

Current Year : VD

0.999

83.841

0.00***

Firm Size

-0.000

-0.570

0.56

Leverage

-0.000

-0.361

0.71

Industry

0.008

3.046

0.00***

CEO Duality

-0.003

-2.924

0.00***

Board Composition

0.008

0.922

0.35

𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.9
Variables

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Prob.

Current Year EPS

0.000

0.515

0.60

Current Year : VD

0.999

94.332

0.00***

Firm Size

-0.000

-0.196

0.84

Leverage

-0.000

-0.952

0.34

Industry

0.009

3.221

0.00***

CEO Duality

-0.003

-2.712

0.00***

Board Composition

0.005

0.680

0.49

𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.10
Variables

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Prob.

Current Year Tobin’s Q

0.000

0.236

0.81

Current Year : VD

1.001

92.420

0.00***

Firm Size

-0.000

-0.020

0.98

Leverage

-0.000

-0.971

0.33

Industry

0.008

2.779

0.00***

CEO Duality

-0.003

-2.407

0.01***

Board Composition

0.006

0.765

0.44
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Appendix J: Results Robustness tests two for research model two
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.1
Social Disclosure
Firm Size
Leverage
Industry
CEO Duality
Board Composition

Coefficient
0.058
0.003
-0.000
-0.065
-0.041
-0.014

t-Statistic
2.352
1.411
-1.801
-13.087
-5.070
-0.705

Prob.
0.01***
0.15
0.07*
0.00***
0.00***
0.48

𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.2
Social Disclosure
Firm Size
Leverage
Industry
CEO Duality
Board Composition

Coefficient
0.045

t-Statistic
0.468

Prob.
0.64

-0.030

-2.518

0.01***

-0.001

-0.926

0.35

-0.011

-0.478

0.63

-0.062

-2.363

0.01***

-0.090

-1.255

0.21

𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.3
Social Disclosure
Firm Size
Leverage
Industry
CEO Duality
Board Composition

Coefficient
1.560
0.518
-0.019
-0.169
-0.336
-0.488

t-Statistic
4.415
15.600
-5.381
-2.152
-1.296
-1.567

Prob.
0.00***
0.00***
0.00***
0.03***
0.19
0.11

𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.4
Social Disclosure
Firm Size
Leverage
Industry
CEO Duality
Board Composition

Coefficient
20.262
1.309
-0.056
-9.178
-4.036
2.246
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t-Statistic
2.950
3.443
-0.744
-6.693
-2.609
0.592

Prob.
0.00***
0.00***
0.45
0.00***
0.00***
0.55

𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.5
Social Disclosure
Firm Size
Leverage
Industry
CEO Duality
Board Composition

Coefficient
1.385
-0.163
-0.006
-1.450
-1.039
0.026

t-Statistic
2.240
-2.447
-1.587
-13.285
-6.112
0.053

Prob.
0.02***
0.01***
0.11
0.00***
0.00***
0.95

𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.6

Environmental Disclosure
Firm Size
Leverage
Industry
CEO Duality
Board Composition

Coefficient
0.041
0.004
-0.001
-0.063
-0.044
-0.013

t-Statistic
1.314
2.018
-1.821
-12.763
-4.972
-0.692

Prob.
0.18
0.04***
0.06***
0.00***
0.00***
0.48

𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.7

Environmental Disclosure
Firm Size
Leverage
Industry
CEO Duality
Board Composition

Coefficient
0.176
-0.035
-0.001
-0.013
-0.053
-0.092

t-Statistic
1.214
-2.798
-1.008
-0.557
-1.977
-1.288

Prob.
0.22
0.00***
0.31
0.57
0.04***
0.19

𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.8

Environmental Disclosure
Firm Size
Leverage
Industry
CEO Duality
Board Composition

Coefficient
2.490
0.487
-0.020
-0.154
-0.294
-0.504
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t-Statistic
5.840
16.529
-5.554
-2.091
-1.044
-1.675

Prob.
0.00***
0.00***
0.00***
0.03***
0.29
0.09*

𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.9
Environmental Disclosure
Firm Size
Leverage
Industry
CEO Duality
Board Composition

Coefficient
15.609

t-Statistic
1.463

Prob.
0.14
0.00***

1.669

4.398

-0.070

-0.865

-8.571

-6.538

0.38
0.00***

-4.762

-2.775

0.00***

2.310

0.598

0.54

𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.10
Environmental Disclosure
Firm Size
Leverage
Industry
CEO Duality
Board Composition

Coefficient
0.933
-0.132
-0.007
-1.405
-1.098
0.032

t-Statistic
1.136
-2.063
-1.741
-12.84
-6.367
0.067

Prob.
0.25
0.03***
0.08*
0.00***
0.00***
0.94

𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.11
Intellectual Capital Disclosure
Firm Size
Leverage
Industry
CEO Duality
Board Composition

Coefficient
0.093
0.000
-0.000
-0.067
-0.039
-0.019

t-Statistic
3.967
0.523
-1.599
-12.414
-5.959
-1.029

Prob.
0.00***
0.60
0.11
0.00***
0.00***
0.30

𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.12

Intellectual Capital Disclosure
Firm Size
Leverage
Industry
CEO Duality
Board Composition

Coefficient
0.125
-0.034
-0.001
-0.015
-0.056
-0.098
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t-Statistic
1.768
-3.534
-0.898
-0.606
-2.115
-1.365

Prob.
0.07*
0.00***
0.36
0.54
0.03***
0.17

𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.13
Intellectual Capital Disclosure
Firm Size
Leverage
Industry
CEO Duality
Board Composition

Coefficient
1.434
0.519
-0.018
-0.160
-0.358
-0.559

t-Statistic
4.451
17.678
-4.791
-2.052
-1.422
-1.887

Prob.
0.00***
0.00***
0.00***
0.04***
0.15
0.05***

𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.14

Intellectual Capital Disclosure
Firm Size
Leverage
Industry
CEO Duality
Board Composition

Coefficient
22.218
1.119
-0.048
-9.224
-4.007
1.087

t-Statistic
3.969
2.831
-0.558
-7.175
-2.507
0.295

Prob.
0.00***
0.00***
0.57
0.00***
0.01***
0.76

𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.15
Intellectual Capital Disclosure
Firm Size
Leverage
Industry
CEO Duality
Board Composition

Coefficient
2.099
-0.209
-0.005
-1.480
-0.986
-0.091
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t-Statistic
4.118
-3.846
-1.440
-12.529
-6.561
-0.192

Prob.
0.00***
0.00***
0.15
0.00***
0.00***
0.84

